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Abstract 
 
 In early mediaeval Christian Iberia, domestic peace was necessary in order to 
provide a concerted military effort against Islamic al-Andalus during the Reconquest.  
This was the case both before and after the partition of the Empire in 1157, and 
especially during the era of the ‘cinco reinos’.  Peacemaking was required to counteract 
the tendency of the Christian kingdoms to rivalry, particularly over territorial disputes.  
It was largely achieved through diplomacy, both by successive royal peace treaties, and 
through dynastic marriage alliances.   
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Introduction – Diplomacy in the Latin West in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries 
 
Peacemaking in the High Middle Ages: 
 Peace in any era equates with an absence of violence.  This applies both to 
politically motivated hostilities or private feuding, both of which were rife in the early 
Middle Ages.  To this extent it is the corollary of security in any given territory at any 
specific time.  Peace implied freedom from external attack by a potential aggressor.  
Often, it also entailed an absence of baronial rebellion, which uncontrolled, might lead 
to internal conflict and civil war.  Peace was often associated with Christianity and the 
Church, which attempted to restrain the martial energies of medieval society and 
introduce peaceful harmony.  Indeed, peace was regarded as a religious duty, whereas 
breach of the peace was a sin.  Moreover, peace was regarded as the supreme good – the 
visible manifestation of the divine law on Earth. 
Nevertheless, long-term peace also became the standard policy justification for 
war, to the extent that peace was equated with security.
1
  The strategic goal of peace 
could be used to justify hostilities.  In practice, war was necessary to ensure the broader 
peace – for example, this was broadly Anglo-Saxon strategy with the Vikings.2 Isidore 
of Seville describes peace as one of the four stages of war.
3
  Fasoli argues that peace 
could only be achieved through victory over one’s enemies, and hence conflict is 
sometimes necessary.  Hence, the medieval term ‘peace’ (pax) had multiple 
                                                          
1
 J. Benham, Peacemaking in the Middle Ages – Principles and Practice (Manchester and New York, 2011), 
2, n. 16. 
2
 Cf. R. Abels, ‘Paying the Danegeld: Anglo-Saxon Peacemaking with the Vikings’, in War and Peace, eds. 
P. De Souza and J. France (Cambridge, 2008), 176-7. 
3
 Isidore of Seville, Etymologiae sive originum, ed. W.M. Lindsay, 2 vols (Oxford, 1911), Bk. XVIII, x. 
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connotations, and was employed in a variety of contexts by contemporaries, in narrative 
sources and treaties alike.
4
 
Whilst scholarship on medieval warfare has been prolific in the past half century, 
including much work on knighthood, the Crusades, castles and chivalry, peacemaking 
in Western Europe in the High Middle Ages is a much neglected topic.
5
   Nevertheless, 
there has been a shift in recent years, with the publication of works by Benham, 
Holdsworth, Althoff, and regarding Spain, Pascua.
6
  The exception to this dearth of 
scholarship is the subject of the Peace of God movement of the eleventh century.
7
  This 
is surprising since contemporaries regarded war and peace as two sides of the same 
coin.
8
  War and peacemaking were two alternate but complementary political means of 
achieving the same ‘foreign policy’ objective, especially the division of territory.   
 It is a truism to say that peace was often achieved through conflict, especially if 
the king in question was victorious in battle, thereby defeating his enemy and 
preventing a foreign invasion.  Nevertheless, it was also the duty of the monarch to 
ensure the internal peace of his kingdom.  Naturally, in a martial society domestic peace 
was easier to achieve when there was military success abroad.  Footloose younger sons 
required land and booty to satisfy their career ambitions.  The classic example of this 
phenomenon was the Normans, who had settled in Normandy after the Treaty of St. 
                                                          
4
 R. Lavelle, Towards a Political Contextualisation of Peacemaking and Peace Agreements in Anglo-Saxon 
England’, in Peace and Negotiation: Strategies for Coexistence in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, 
ed. D. Wolfthal (Turnhout, 2000), 39.  Fasoli is cited via Lavelle. 
5
 C. Holdsworth, ‘Peacemaking in the Twelfth Century’, R. Allen Brown Memorial Lecture. Anglo-Norman 
Studies, 19 (1997), 1-17, at 2. 
6
 Benham, Peacemaking;  E. Pascua Echegaray, Guerra y Pacto  en el Siglo XII – La consolidación de una 
sistema de reinos en Europa Occidental (Madrid, 1996);  Idem, ‘De Reyes, señores y tratados en la 
Peninsula Ibérica del Siglo XII’, Studia Historica  - Historia Medieval, 20 (2002), 1-21;  Idem, ‘Peace 
among Equals:  war and treaties in Twelfth Century Europe’, in War and Peace in Ancient and Medieval 
History, eds. P. De Souza and J. France (Cambridge, 2008), 193-210; G. Althoff, ‘Friendship and Political  
Order’, in Friendship in Medieval Europe, ed. J. Haseldine (Stroud, 1999). 
7
 T. Head and R. Landes, The Peace of God:  Social Violence and Religious Response in France around the 
Year 1000 (Ithaca and London, 1992).   
8
 J.M. Wallace-Hadrill, ‘War and Peace in the Earlier Middle Ages’, Transactions of the Royal Historical 
Society [TRHS], 5
th
 Series, 25 (1976), 157-74, at 157. 
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Clair-sur-Epte in 911.
9
  Norman society was pre-eminently a military one, both in terms 
of ethos and behaviour.  At this time in the eleventh century, Francia was characterised 
by weak central government, in the wake of the demise of the Carolingian Empire and 
the rise of the successor Capetian monarchy after 987.   Francia was divided into a 
plethora of feudal principalities, of which Normandy fast became the most powerful; the 
others included Anjou, Blois, Champagne, Flanders, Brittany, Burgundy and Toulouse.  
Ancient administrative divisions still commanded loyalty, however the new feudal 
bonds (liens) were a competing source of authority amongst the military aristocracy.
10
   
Hence, it became necessary for the Church to moderate the levels of violence in 
the interests of wider peace.  By the mid-eleventh century, the Church had instituted the 
‘Peace of God’ and the ‘Truce of God’ movements.11  These phenomena involved the 
public abjuration of violence on the part of local knights, in the interests of maintaining 
the peace.  The Peace of God was instituted by local church councils, which were 
summoned by the bishop, abbots and lay nobility of the surrounding region.  Whereas 
the Peace of God sought to protect certain classes of people at all times, especially the 
clergy, religious and the poor, the Truce of God sought to prevent all violence at certain 
times of the year.
12
  This peace movement acquired an ideological spirit, inspired by the 
ideals of order, unity and justice.  At the Peace councils, local milites (knights) would 
be forced to swear oaths to keep the peace on relics in front of the clergy and local 
populace.  These oaths would be enforced by the threat of excommunication and social 
penalties, such as ostracism from the local community.  Such peacemaking councils 
became common in eleventh-century Francia, and extended as far south as Catalonia 
                                                          
9
 R. Allen Brown, The Normans and the Norman Conquest , 2
nd
 edn. (Woodbridge, 1985), 11. 
10
 Idem, The Normans, 9. 
11
 The Peace of God: Social Violence and Religious Response in France around the Year 1000, eds. T. Head 
and R. Landes (Ithica and London, 1992), 2;  J. Martindale, ‘Peace and War in Early Eleventh-Century 
Aquitaine’, in Medieval Knighthood, IV: Papers from the Fifth Strawberry Hill Conference 1990, eds. C. 
Harper-Bill and R. Harvey (Woodbridge, 1992), 147-76. 
12
 H.E.J. Cowdrey, ‘The Peace and the Truce of God in the Eleventh Century’, Past and Present, 46 (1970), 
42-67. 
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and Galicia.
13
  Cowdrey argues that drawing on the power of the saints and their relics, 
the Church aimed to restore peace to a disordered society.
14
 
 The Truce of God movement was rather a disciplinary measure than an 
ideological movement.  The term ‘treuga’ (truce) lacked the Biblical, theological and 
liturgical overtones of the religious word ‘pax’ (peace).  Its main purpose was to restrain 
the knightly classes from the use of arms at proscribed times, for example, during Lent.  
It reached its apex at the Council of Narbonne (1054), where by written agreement, 
inter-Christian violence was forbidden at all times.
15
  The significance of the Truce of 
God movement was that it prohibited all violence, not only against unarmed peasants 
and clergy, but also between armed knights.  As such, it was an effective counterweight 
to the feud, which was endemic in eleventh-century Francia.
16
 
 The tendency towards Christian domestic peace left the European aristocracy 
with a need to find an appropriate outlet for their martial energies.  Erdmann observes 
that the Peace movement was significant on two levels: firstly, it was the first mediaeval 
religious movement in which the mass of the populace was involved, and as such 
demonstrated the influence of the Church on contemporary society; and secondly, it 
represented the principal means by which the Church attempted to Christianize the 
knightly profession.  As such, it offered knights the opportunity to fight for the Church 
as part of a Holy War.
17
  Duby takes the debate one step further, arguing that the Peace 
movement acquired a moral force, in the sense that the shedding of Christian blood 
became outlawed.
18
  However, Bull rejects the argument that the Peace movement 
                                                          
13
 T. Bisson, ‘The Organised Peace in Southern France and Catalonia, c. 1140-1233’, American Historical 
Review [AHR], 82 (1977), 290-311. 
14
 Cowdrey, Peace and Truce, 51. 
15
 J.S. Mansi, Sacrorum conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio [Mansi], XVII, Chap. 827. 
16
 S.D. White, ‘Feuding and Settlement in the Touraine c. 1100’, Traditio, 42 (1986), 195-265. 
17
 Erdmann, Origin, 57-58, 62-64, 75-76, 92. 
18
 G. Duby, ‘The Laity and the Peace of God’, The Chivalrous Society, trans. C. Postan (London, 1977), 
131-32. 
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inexorably led to the Crusades, observing that papal encouragement for the Crusades 
only really materialised when local prelates held Church councils and granted 
indulgences.
19
 
Kingship and the Royal Prerogative to Wage War and Conclude Peace: 
 Theoretically, only the king had the right to wage war and conclude peace with 
his enemies.  The monarch, qua sovereign, had the power to agree peace with his 
opponent above the level of the lord-vassal relationship.  The emergence of independent 
kingdoms led to political discourse.  The aim of such diplomacy might be to establish a 
truce in order to gain tactical advantage; or it might signal an outright end to hostilities 
– an armistice agreement.  In León-Castile, successive monarchs followed these policies: 
Fernando I, Sancho II, Alfonso VI and Queen Urraca all did so, using the grant of 
forfeiture of castles to reward or punish their noble followers in the process.  More 
broadly, the arms-bearing population was obliged to engage in hostilities by virtue of 
their duty to the king as subjects.
20
  In contrast to his magnates, whose primary concern 
was to defend their castles and their surrounding territory (alfoz), the king was 
responsible for the security of his entire kingdom and its populace.  Nevertheless, the 
defence of a castle assumed greater importance if it was located in a frontier region that 
was of great strategic significance to a ruler. 
 As Grassotti argues, the prerogative to wage war and make peace rested with the 
king, mediated by the clergy and accepted by all the subjects of his kingdom.
21
  Thus, it 
was the duty of monarchs to defend the realm, by virtue of the royal power conferred on 
him at his coronation.  Indeed, Kershaw asserts that insofar as kingship was about peace 
                                                          
19
 M. Bull, Knightly Piety and the Lay Response to the First Crusade (Oxford, 1993), 63. 
20
 H. Grassotti, Instituciones feudo-vassallaticas, II, 984, n. 129. 
21
 Idem, ‘El deber y el derecho de hacer guerra y paz en León y Castilla’, Cuadernos de la Historia de 
España [CHE], 59-60 (1976), 221-96 at 223. 
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and peacemaking, so in turn, peacemaking was about kingship.
22
  Le Goff emphasises 
that the ideals of the medieval king were to obey God and serve the Church; to ensure 
justice and the peace of his subjects; and to provide for their prosperity.  In particular, 
the king was to be expected to be a leader in war.
23
  Nevertheless, sometimes this duty 
was circumscribed, for example in 1188 at Carrión, King Alfonso IX of León promised 
not to ‘make war and peace’ without the consent of his curia (court).24   
However, in return for loyal military service, nobles could expect to receive 
tenancies (tenencias), and these took the form of the grant of castles.  Hence, there was 
a feudal element to royal peacemaking strategies.  Increasingly, this practice was 
formalised by the redaction of written agreements, in which the formula ‘de hacer 
guerra y paz’ was made explicit.  Grassotti further argues that the distinction between 
the royal power to levy an army for war, and the duty of feudal lords to raise 
contingents, is academic.
25
  Kings consulted with their magnates, prelates, and more 
occasionally, civic representatives (concejos) before commencing or ceasing hostilities, 
whether temporarily or more permanently.  Nobles were also obliged to ‘make peace’ 
by ceasing hostilities when the king demanded it, either for reasons of policy – when a 
peace treaty had been signed – or else for more practical reasons, such as the  tactics of 
war.
26
  In this respect, diplomacy was the continuation of warfare by other means, to 
quote the famous nineteenth-century German military theorist, Clausewitz’s famous 
dictum.
27
 
                                                          
22
 P.J.E. Kershaw, Rex Pacificus:  Studies in Royal Peacemaking and the Image of the Peacemaking King in 
the Early Medieval West (Ph. D. Thesis, London, 1998), 31. 
23
 J. Le Goff, ‘Le Roi dans l’ Occident Medieval:  Caractères Originaux’, in Kings and Kingship in Medieval 
Europe, ed. A..J. Duggan (London, 1993), 13-14. 
24
 J. González, Alfonso IX, 2 vols (Madrid, 1944), II, no. 11, 24 and 257. 
25
 Grassotti, ‘Deber y derecho’, 285. 
26
 Grassotti, Estudios Medievales, 87. 
27
 C. von Clausewitz, On the Nature of War (London, 2005), 54. 
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 Peace in the Middle Ages has traditionally been defined in ‘negative’ terms, as 
an absence of hostilities, for example, this is Wallace-Hadrill’s view.28  More recently, 
there has been a shift in the definition of ‘peace’ to one of an undertaking between 
certain groups of people with chronological and spatial specificity.  Neils Lund, for 
example, argues for an empathic interpretation of peace, which was viewed by 
contemporaries as a positive concept implying a set of agreed terms.
29
  Lavelle posits 
that in a period when strong leadership in battle was seen as a royal virtue, peacemaking 
would seem to represent a compromise.  He poses the question of how can there be 
universal, Christian peace in an era of endemic warfare.
30
  Nevertheless, he accepts later 
that there could be a universal peace in certain circumstances, namely following a major 
battle when one side was clearly the victor, thus eradicating the threat from his 
opponent and ensuring a lasting peace.  Such was the case when King Alfred the Great 
defeated the Danish leader, Guthrum, at the battle of Edington (878) and agreed the 
Treaty of Wedmore with the Dane.
31
  In this situation, we see the king as Christian ruler 
and royal legislator.
32
 
 Peace agreements could also be used strategically, to form political alliances.
33
  
Paying tribute, such as the Muslim taifa (party) kingdoms of al-Andalus had done to 
León-Castile under the paria arrangement of the eleventh century was one means of 
‘buying’ short-term peace.34  Tribute usually consisted of payment in coinage.  Such 
                                                          
28
 J.M. Wallace-Hadrill, ‘War and Peace in the Early Middle Ages’, in Early Medieval History (Oxford, 
1975), 23. 
29
 N. Lund, ‘Peace and Non-Peace in the Viking Age:  Ottar in Biarmaland, the Rus in Byzantium, and the 
Danes and Norwegians in England’, in Proceedings of the 10
th
 Viking Conference:  Larkollen, Norway, 
1985, ed. J.E. Knirk (Oslo, 1987), 256. 
30
 R. Lavelle, ‘Towards a Political Contextualisation of Peacemaking and Peace Agreements in Anglo-
Saxon England’, in Peace and Negotiation:  Strategies for Coexistence in the middle ages and the 
Renaissance, ed. D. Wolfthal (Turnhout, 2000), 39. 
31
 F.M. Stenton, Anglo-Saxon England, 3
rd
 edn. (Oxford, 1971), 290-91.  For the Treaty of Wedmore, cf. 
English Historical Documents, Vol. 1, c. 500-1042, ed. D. Douglas (London, 1985). 
32
 P. Wormald, Making of English Law, 286. 
33
 Lavelle, Contextualisation, 46. 
34
 D. Wasserstein, The Rise and Fall of the Party Kings (Princeton, NJ, 1985);  M.J. Viguera Molins, ‘Reinos 
de Taifas’, in Historia de España, ed. R. Menéndez Pidal, Vol. 8 (Madrid, 1994), 135-53. 
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peacemaking had military and humanitarian consequences, to the extent that needless 
bloodshed was spared. 
 Althoff argues that friendship was the principal motivation for the contraction of 
mutual relations between medieval monarchs, out of a desire for a personal bond 
between the parties concerned.  This was especially so in the early twelfth century, 
before feudal ties (liens) became widespread, which entailed legally-binding 
relationships between lord and vassal.  This scenario applied to peace initiatives and 
conflict resolution as much as to other aspects of medieval diplomacy.
35
  Monarchs 
bound themselves to each other out of a desire for mutual recognition and support.  For 
example, this was the case in the first Iberian peace treaty, the Treaty of Túy (1137), 
concluded between Emperor Alfonso VII of Castile-León and the Portuguese Infante, 
Afonso Henriques.  The aim of the treaty was to establish the Portuguese Infante as a 
‘good and faithful friend of the Emperor.’36 
 Althoff observes that whilst there has been a lot of scholarship on preventative 
peacemaking, for example, the Peace and Truce of God movements, relatively little 
work has been done on amicable dispute resolution, such as arbitration and mediation.
37
  
He notes that these mechanisms were operative before and after such conflicts erupted.  
Often, such litigation was resolved by mediators – who were often multilingual – to 
effect an amicable resolution to the dispute.  Such personnel were usually persons of 
high rank, for example, bishops, nobles and persons connected to the parties in the 
dispute.  Crucially, however, they were also friends with the parties to the case.  For 
example, when Henry II of England adjudicated in the Castilian-Navarrese suit, he set 
                                                          
35
 G. Althoff, ‘Satisfaction:   Peculiarities of the Amicable  Settlement of Conflicts in the Middle Ages’, in 
Ordering Medieval Society, eds. B. Jussen and P. Selwyn (Pennsylvania, 2001);  cf also Idem, ‘Friendship 
and Political Order’, in Friendship in Medieval Europe, ed. J. Haseldine (Stroud, 1999). 
36
 Treaty of Túy (1137), Colección Diplomatica del Monasterio de Sahagún (857-1300), ed. J. Fernandez 
Florez (Leon, 1991), 161. 
37
 Pascua, Guerra y Pacto, 61. 
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forth his judgement in two letters to the respective parties, calling them his ‘dearest 
friends’ (‘carissimis amicis suis’).38 
International meetings between monarchs (known as ‘vistas reales’) were 
usually prepared by envoys, who represented the parties to the negotiations, and this is 
the first issue that I will be examining in my research.  Burns (1978) and Burns and 
Chevedden (1999) draw attention to the role of embassies in concluding peace after a 
prolonged military campaign, such as existed during the Spanish Reconquista.
39
  This 
was especially necessary when cross-cultural missions were undertaken, for example 
with the rulers of al-Andalus.   
Emissaries would also be present as delegates if the vista real matured into a 
full-bodied peace conference.  In this instance, the representatives would liaise with the 
monarchs participating in the vista real.  For example, this occurred at Paradinas during 
the preparations for the Treaty of Fresno-Lavandera in 1183.   Embassies could be both 
clerics and laymen, although Ganshof emphasises that that such personnel were usually 
persons of high-standing at court, who were attached to the central administration, army 
or the Church.
40
   
When long-distance diplomacy was involved, diplomats were often granted full 
powers to conclude an agreement with a foreign power, as Queller describes.
41
  For 
instance this was the case with the Castilian nuncios despatched to arrange the marriage 
of the Infanta Berenguela to King Conrad III of Germany, which was ratified by the 
                                                          
38
 J. Gonzalez, El reino de Castilla en la epoca de Alfonso VIII, 3 vols (Madrid, 1960), I, 256. 
39
 R.I. Burns, ‘How to End a Crusade:  Techniques for Making Peace in the Thirteenth-Century Kingdom 
of Valencia’, in Idem, Moors and Crusaders in Medieval Spain (London, 1978), 1-15 at 8;  idem and 
Chevedden, P.E., Negotiating Cultures:  Bilingual Surrender Treaties in Muslim-Crusader Spain under 
James the Conqueror (Leiden, 1999), 36. 
40
 ibid., 130. 
41
 D. Queller, ‘Thirteenth-Century Diplomatic Envoys – Nuncii and Procuratores’, Speculum, 35 (April, 
1960), 196-213 at 202;  idem, The Office of the Ambassador in the Middle Ages (Princeton, NJ, 1967), 24. 
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Treaty of Seligenstadt (1188).
42
  About this time, in the late twelfth century, it became 
common practice to issue diplomats with written instructions as well a letter of credence, 
rather than merely oral commands.  For instance, this was the case with the Castilian-
Navarrese lawsuit referred to arbitration at the English Court in London (1177).   
Nevertheless, the relationship between the parties themselves to an agreement 
was crucial in diplomatic activity, as Althoff argues in his work on friendship, and this 
is the second issue that I will be examining in my approach to the treaties.
43
  To this 
extent, ceremonies such as vassalage came to be imbued with added significance, as Le 
Goff asserts in his 1977 opus.
44
  Other aspects of the royal relationship include the 
exchange of gifts - as Mauss elaborates in his 1997 study, originally published in French 
in 1924 under the title ‘Essai sur le Don’, the English translation first being published in 
1954
45
 - although these are never mentioned in the treaties themselves, which represent 
the outcome of such diplomatic intercourse.  Such ceremonial would be conducted at 
royal assemblies, held at special times of the year, and would involve the whole court 
comprised of the leading ecclesiastical and secular lords of the kingdom, as Reuter 
(2001) argues.     
We also need to address the need for peacemaking at all, hence I will be 
examining the formal nature of the peace treaties in my research.  In concrete terms, this 
implied the the duty to wage war and make peace at the sovereign’s command.  
However, sometimes war was necessary to vanquish an aggressor – it was necessary ‘to 
win  the peace’.  In this scenario, peace and security might be attained by means of a 
decisive victory – for example, the battle of Las Navas de Tolosa (1212) - removing the 
threat of an invasion.  In this sense, ‘peace’ really did mean an absence of hostilities.  
                                                          
42
 Gonzalez, Alfonso VIII, II, Doc. 499. 
43
 G. Althoff, ‘Friendship and Political Order’, in Friendship in Medieval Europe, ed. J. Haseldine (Stroud, 
1999), 25. 
44
 J. Le Goff, ‘Le ritual symbolique de la vassalité’, in Idem, Pour un Autre Moyen Âge (Paris, 1977), 39. 
45
 M. Mauss, The Gift:  The Forms and Reasons for Exchange in Archaic Societies (London, 1997), 27. 
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This is a point which Jenny Benham makes clear
46
, and in an age of endemic warfare, 
this consideration will form the thrust of my analysis of the Iberian peace treaties.  
Hence, in my thesis, I will examine the formal nature of the treaties in question.   
Once diplomacy was embarked upon, peacemaking could take different forms.  
Jenny Benham
47
 is the only English scholar to attempt such a categorisation, and her 
work will influence my methodology considerably.  Firstly, a truce might be agreed.  In 
this case, a ceasefire would take effect during which peace negotiations would occur, 
leading to a lasting settlement.  Secondly, an armistice agreement might be concluded.  
This was a comprehensive peace agreement, concluded in order to halt hostilities, 
usually on the victor’s terms.  Thirdly, treaties of alliance might be agreed.  These were 
concords of friendship and assistance, directed towards deterring hostilities from 
reoccurring.  Consequently, they were of vital strategic value in geopolitical terms. 
Once peace treaties were agreed, they needed to be implemented.  This was 
largely achieved through castle exchange, as castles controlled the security of their 
surrounding territory (alfoz).  Glick (1995) is the foremost authority on Spanish castles, 
and the social consequences of the assignment of castles to the nobility.
48
  Although the 
transfer of castles occurs in almost every treaty, their true significance is most potently 
emphasised in the Treaty of Palencia (1199), when King Alfonso IX settled thirty 
castles on his bride, Queen Berenguela of Castile as a means of stabilising the frontier 
between the two kingdoms – a wedding gift with huge diplomatic repurcussions, as 
Bianchini (2012)
49
 and Rodríguez López (1995) argue.50   Bianchini emphasises the 
                                                          
46
 Benham, Peacemaking, 4. 
47
 Benham, Peacemaking, 23. 
48
 T.F. Glick, From Muslim Fortress to Christian Castle – Social and Cultural Change in Medieval Spain 
(Manchester and New York, 1995), 57. 
49
 J. Bianchini, The Queen’s Hand – Power and Authority in the Reign of Berenguela of Castile (Penn., 
2012). 
50
 A. Rodríguez López, ‘Dotas y arras en la politíca territorial de la monarquía feudal castellana: siglos XII-
XIII’, Arenal, 2:2 (1995), 271-93 at 291. 
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significance of Queen Berenguela’s lordship in the Tierra de Campos by virtue of her 
control of her arras (prenuptial agreement) castles.  More generally, Martin elaborates 
on the theme of Queen Berenguela’ political influence as a powerful women in both the 
Leonese and Castilian courts.
51
  
The exchange of castles is a subject which was has been addressed by the 
Spanish scholar, Pérez Alfaro (1991),52 although she concentrates on the period of the 
‘cinco reinos’ only (i.e. from 1157 until 1230).  In this way, noble tenants of castles 
held the peace of the kingdom in their hands, effectively guaranteeing the substance of 
the peace agreement.  The role of secular lords as guarantors of royal peace treaties is a 
topic which Calderón Medina (2001) alludes, too.53   
In an age of endemic warfare, it was necessary to have some means of enforcing 
peace treaties.  This was especially so when a treaty was agreed between two foreign 
powers, or at an international level.  For example, the Emperor Alfonso VII concluded a 
treaty of auxilium (military support) with the Commune of Genoa, in Italy.  This was 
agreed in the presence of more than forty witnesses to ensure that it was upheld, as Hall 
and Phillips observe.
54
  Often, parties or their representatives were obliged to swear to 
maintain the peace on the Gospels or on the relic of a saint. 
In case of derogation from the duties specificed in the treaty, the parties 
implicated could expect to face severe sanctions.  These could be ecclesiastical 
punishments, such as excommunicaton or interdict, as referred to by Vodola (1986)
55
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and Clarke (2007)
56
, respectively.  However, they could also be secular in nature, 
principally the confiscation of castles, as Grassotti (1981)
57
 and Perez Alfaro
58
 make 
clear.  This would constitute a drastic punishment for nobles responsible for breaching 
the peace, in violation of the peace agreement reached by their monarchical overlords. 
Holdsworth observes that Anglo-French peace was achieved in Normandy 
through four treaties between Henry I and Louis VI of France.  These were the treaties 
of 1101, 1109, 1113, and 1120.  However, none of these treaties are extant, and he 
opines that diplomatic agreements of this era were not written down.
59
  The first treaty, 
the Treaty of Alton (1101), was between Henry I and his brother, Robert Curthose.  
Negotiations ended in stalemate, and according to the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, ‘the chief 
men’ intervened and reconciled the two brothers.60  The treaty was then guaranteed by 
the oaths of twelve worthy men on either side.  A number of elements in diplomatic 
procedure can be elucidated from this agreement: first, the role of intermediaries or 
negotiators; second, the actual terms of the agreement; and third, measures to ensure 
compliance with the treaty. 
The second agreement, that of 1109, was heralded by negotiations at Neaufles in 
the disputed Vexin region.
61
  The only coherent source for Louis is Suger’s Vie de Louis 
le Gros, and is heavily biased in Louis’s favour.62  The negotiations led to a truce.  The 
agreement was guaranteed by the exchange of hostages.
63
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The third treaty, the Treaty of Gisors (1113), was preceded by preliminary 
negotiations between Henry and Count Fulk of Anjou near Alencon at the end of 
February 1113.   The two monarchs met at Gisors at the end of March 1113,
64
 and 
swore to keep the peace. 
The Treaty of 1120 was the last treaty between Henry and Louis.
65
  This treaty 
was mediated by Pope Calixtus II, to whom Louis had complained about Henry’s 
behaviour at the Council of Rheims.  The pope visited Henry to hear his side of the 
dispute.  The two met at a church halfway between the castles in which they were 
staying.  The choice of a church as a venue, and one between castles on opposite sides 
of a strategic river, indicate that as neutral a location as possible was chosen.   
Both the pope and the king were accompanied by intermediaries.  Much of the 
diplomatic intercourse was effected by clergy present at the conference.   
The outcome of these negotiations in the summer of 1120, was that William 
Adelin performed homage to the French king, and received Normandy as a fief in return.  
Both parties could claim tangible results: first, Henry did not have to perform homage 
himself; and second, Louis’s suzerainty was recognised.66 
The salient feature of Henry II’s reign (1154-89) is the sheer weight of evidence 
that remains, in contrast to the dearth of material from Henry I’s rule.  This is so despite 
the fact that both reigns are of similar length, i.e. thirty-five years.  Firstly, the 
chronicles are much richer from c. 1170 onwards.  Some of them actually incorporate 
the complete texts of peace agreements from this epoch.  For example, the Gesta 
Henrici, which Stubbs wrongly attributed to Benedict of Peterborough, and which is 
now thought to have been authored by Roger of Hoveden, tells us more about 
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peacemaking in Angevin England than any other source.
67
  Other narrative sources, 
such as Roger of Hoveden, Ralph of Diceto and Gerald of Wales are all significant 
sources because all three chroniclers were court historians, and consequently their 
accounts are reliable. 
Holdsworth now elaborates on the role of intermediaries in the reign of Henry I.  
He remarks on the involvement in peace negotiations of the Cistercian Order, who were 
attractive as mediators because of their strong organisational networks.  The most 
famous Cistercian, St. Bernard of Clairvaux, had preached the Second Crusade, and 
lauded the ‘new knighthood’ (de laude novae militiae).  The Papacy found the 
Cistercians useful in the Anglo-French negotiations, and employed them as papal 
legates.   
The Papacy was heavily involved in late-twefth century peacemaking, as it saw 
the peace of Christendom as the essential prerequisite to ensure the success of the 
Crusades to the Holy Land.  To this end, Papal legates were despatched all over Europe 
to reconcile bellicose kings.  These monarchs also welcomed the mediation of such 
third parties in their own partisan interests.  Most legates were of the rank of cardinal. 
Occasionally, legates lost patience with monarchs who placed the interest of the 
crown above the interests of the wider Church.  When this occurred – and it was a 
regular feature of Western European politics at this time – legates had the power to 
excommunicate kings.  For instance, Cardinal John Anagni threatened King Philip II 
Augustus of France with excommunication.  Such a case demonstrates that 
ecclesiastical sanctions such as excommunication or interdict were not necessarily 
effective against a determined monarch, if the ruler concerned believed he was fighting 
in a just cause. 
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Furthermore, internal and external peace often complemented each other; 
conversely, a deterioration in domestic harmony often presaged a decline in foreign 
relations.  Contemporaries viewed these two spheres as one and the same duty of a 
Christian prince.  For example, the chronicler Gerald of Wales described King Henry II 
of England thus: 
 ‘[he] dreaded…war, and with supreme wisdom…he essayed every method 
before resorting to arms.’68 
Furthermore, medieval peacemaking was international in character.  Peace was 
made between kings or rulers of independent polities, rather than between local 
magnates or royal subjects.  However, although the latter were not interlocutors or 
parties to the agreement in question, they were often implicated in royal treaties, as the 
documents bear out.  This scenario of inter-monarchical peacemaking presupposes that 
diplomacy was often bilateral or multilateral in the early Middle Ages.  Reuter argues, 
correctly in my view, that a clear distinction must be made between international peace 
conferences (colloquia) and domestic assemblies (curia).
69
  However, the terminology 
was subject to great regional and stylistic variations. 
Finally, peacemaking was often just one aspect of broader diplomatic initiatives, 
for example, commercial transactions or marriage alliances.  Significantly, peacemaking 
was often required following noble rebellion.  At times such as these, rebellious 
magnates would frequently align themselves with enemy rulers.  Hence, domestic 
politics could assume an international character.  In Spain, the classic example of this 
phenomenon of disaffected nobles defecting to a   foreign court was the departure of the 
Castro dynasty to the court of Fernando II of León during the Castilian civil war (1162).   
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Historiography: 
There are several recent English works on mediaeval peacemaking, notably 
those by Holdsworth
70
 and Benham.
71
  Holdsworth begins by observing that Ganshof’s 
seminal work, The Middle Ages – A History of International Relations, published in 
1953, has not been surpassed despite being somewhat dated.
72
   Ganshof asserts that in 
the Middle Ages there were a variety of conflict resolution methods, and diplomacy was 
often as important a means as war for attaining a state’s political objectives.   
In his own paper delivered as the R. Allen Brown Memorial Lecture (1997), 
Holdsworth concentrates on the reigns of Henry I and Henry II of England.  Using 
Orderic Vitalis as his principal source, he notes that Henry I (1100-35), was deeply 
committed to peace, and fostered peace in the international arena, namely with Capetian 
France.
73
  This is significant because Holdsworth is emphasising Anglo-French ‘long-
distance’ diplomacy, as opposed to Henry’s domestic peace efforts in Normandy.   
Benham adopts a comparative approach to peacemaking, contrasting the 
principles of diplomacy with contemporary reality, using twelfth-century England and 
Denmark as her case studies.
 74
   She categorises five main aspects of peacemaking: first, 
the importance of the location of peace conferences; second, the role of ritual, such as 
banquets and diplomatic gifts; third, the role of envoys; fourth, the means of enforcing 
peace agreements, such as oaths and hostages; and lastly, the redaction of written 
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agreements themselves.  However, she emphasises the practice of diplomacy, rather 
than the subject of diplomatic agreements themselves.  This is an aspect of diplomacy 
that I hope to remedy in this thesis. 
 Benham’s first chapter is devoted to the location of peace conferences.  She 
argues that as meeting-places fluctuated with shifting patterns of territorial dominance, 
so too did frontiers.   
 In Chapter 3, devoted to the diplomatic envoys, Benham challenges Queller’s 
assertion that medieval envoys can be divided between nuncii and procuratores outside 
of Italy before 1200.
75
  Benham proceeds to argue that specific gestures of submission 
performed by lords to suzerains were of less significance than the circumstances in 
which they were undertaken.  Even acts of fealty and homage ‘encompass a number of 
different scenarios and relationships.’ 76   In such a situation, Benham argues, 
peacemaking involved a set of standard procedures which added symbolism to the 
occasion.  However, the real significance of these practices is open to interpretation, and 
contingent upon the specific political-military context in which the two parties met.  
Indeed, Benham admits that an examination of ritual, location and the parties provides 
only a superficial understanding of peacemaking, and could be misleading without a 
deeper knowledge of the political circumstances. 
In his review of Benham, Cox alerts the reader to the fact that Benham’s work 
rests on the premise that in order to understand medieval warfare, we also need to 
comprehend medieval war and peace equally.  Consequently, the medieval historian 
needs to grasp the mechanics of peacemaking.
77
  Benham chooses as her case study the 
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relations between England and Denmark between the mid-twelfth to the mid-thirteenth 
centuries.  She also examines the Angevin Empire, which is far better documented than 
Denmark, and more germane to my study.   
 Cox argues that Benham’s methodological approach is not particularly 
convincing.  Benham adopts a comparison of extremes, contrasting the worst-
documented kingdom (Denmark) with the best-documented kingdom (Angevin England) 
in Western Europe at this epoch.  However, as Cox asserts, this approach does not 
materially advance our understanding of the principles of medieval peacemaking, which 
is the subject of her book.  She also has a significant bias towards the Angevin Empire.  
Moreover, she does not confine herself to Angevin or Danish examples, and cites 
examples from both before 1154 and after 1241.  This is to her credit, as it demonstrates 
both breadth and depth of research.   
  Cox observes that the argument that peacemaking was highly circumstantial 
undermines Benham’s central thesis that there were certain principles of peacemaking, 
and that analysis of these norms is essential to understanding war and peace.  Indeed, 
the end of this argument is that it is impossible to discern general ‘principles’ of 
peacemaking.  It would seem that the answer lies somewhere in between Benham’s and 
Cox’s views: there were principles of peacemaking, but these were confined to the 
practice of diplomacy, rather than the subject of diplomatic business. 
Iberian Historiography: 
 The principal history of Iberian diplomacy in the Early Middle Ages is by 
Miguel Ochoa Brun in three volumes, however his account is rather a manual of the 
practice of diplomacy in the Middle Ages, rather than an academic historical study.
78
  In 
Volume III he discusses the principal themes of Castilian-Leonese diplomacy, both 
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during the reigns of Emperor Alfonso VII, and after the partition in 1157.  Much of his 
discussion concentrates on the late Middle Ages, namely, post-1250.  However, his is a 
rather cursory account, and he does not subject the written treaties to close analysis.  
Ochoa Brun concentrates on diplomatic procedure, rather than the substance of the 
diplomatic agreements themselves.  In so doing, he outlines diplomatic practice, but he 
does not elaborate on the changes in the methodology of diplomacy.  Consequently, his 
analysis lacks depth.       
In Chapter 10 he focuses on the morphology of ‘direct diplomacy’, the role of 
the king as protagonist in diplomacy, royal vistas reales (peace conferences) and the 
Spanish chanceries.  However, his analysis is rather abstract, with no political context or 
specific examples.  His discussion is confined to the theoretical and actual role of the 
monarch as a ruler, observing that in an autocratic age, foreign policy was embodied in 
the person of the ruler.  However this analysis is very cursory, being confined to a few 
pages.  However, he does emphasise the importance of the location of vistas reales.  In 
particular, his discussion of the royal chancery is of a general nature, without close 
reference to documentary evidence, as for example, is to be found in Lucas Álvarez’s 
study.
79
  Nevertheless, he observes that chancery staff were scribes who could be 
entrusted with government business, namely redacting documents that resulted from 
royal peace conferences.    
In his section on ‘Diplomacy by Procuration’, he notes that diplomacy became 
itinerant because the royal court was constantly on the move.  He examines itinerant 
diplomacy in general, and the role of diplomatic personnel, focusing on the duties of the 
ambassador.   This again is discussed in very abstract terms.  Moreover, as Queller has 
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observed, these emissaries only appear post-1200.
80
  Like Queller, he distinguishes 
between different classes of diplomat, however he does not elaborate on this distinction, 
although he states correctly that until c. 1200 diplomatic personnel only consisted of 
nuncios (messengers) and papal legates; ambassadors appeared later, constituting 
resident diplomats as opposed to earlier representatives who were merely entrusted with 
a specific mission.  However, he does observe that different terminology was used to 
differentiate various categories of diplomatic personnel, such as messengers, 
procurators and heralds (p. 311).  He also describes a diplomat’s duties, and relates the 
qualities required of a diplomat in the Middle Ages. He observes that a diplomat was 
required to be an orator, charged with the task of articulating the foreign policy of his 
principal.     
His section on documentation is his most substantial.  He observes that with the 
emergence of Feudal kingdoms and their bureaucracies in the twelfth century, there is a 
wealth of documentation for perusal by the scholar.  Nevertheless, as for surviving 
documentation, he observes that only a tiny proportion of extant medieval Spanish 
documents concern foreign policy; instead, there is a mass of documentation relating to 
political affairs in general.  He relates how diplomats required letters of credence to 
function effectively in their host court, and that a diplomat’s ‘armoury’ consisted of his 
diplomatic credentials, his brief, and his safe conduct.  In an era of political uncertainty, 
when the iter (mission) itself was an ordeal, these issues were far from routine.  
However, his discussion of these matters is hindered by the fact that he selects examples 
exclusively from the Late Middle Ages.  Moreover, his discussion of how diplomatic 
business was conducted is conflated with his section on Documentation, which is 
confusing for the reader. 
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Regarding documentation, Ochoa Brun offers a short discussion of the form of 
diplomatic documents, beginning with the title of the king and ending with seals.  This 
discussion is cursory in the extreme.  However, he does have an interesting discussion 
of the conservation of diplomatic documents.  In brief, he notes that copies of texts were 
preserved in chanceries (in the case of the Papacy called the Registry), and he illustrates 
this point by citing the example of the Corona de Aragón, which is known to be a very 
rich archive.   
Ochoa Brun then examines the ‘Nature of Diplomacy’, focusing on the role of 
diplomats in the Middle Ages.  Rightly, he analyses their immunity, and the privileged 
nature of their mission, based on Roman law.    He then launches into a litany of 
exceptions to this rule.  He proceeds to allude to the issue of diplomatic precedence, 
which in an age of hierarchies was of prime importance.  He describes how the 
procedure of diplomatic business would unfold, and he relates how the actions of the 
ambassador would be shaped by the customs of the host court.  He proceeds to outline 
how the host monarch’s response would be delivered.  However, this is a very 
schematized analysis and takes no account of political reality in the Middle Ages.   
He concludes by examining the final audience of a diplomatic mission with the king and 
his councillors.  These were of an occasional nature in the Middle Ages, as there were 
no resident embassies.  However, the ambassador could hope to depart with a signed 
copy of the treaty which was outcome of his negotiations, concluded on the basis of his 
mandate from his principal.  With the exception of a very few cases, these negotiations 
would be a bilateral intercourse between himself and the opposing monarch.  Rarely, a 
third party, such as the Papacy or Holy Roman Empire would intervene to achieve a 
solution to a dispute that had wider regional consequences 
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The main Spanish scholar to write on war and peace is Esther Pascua.  This is 
the subject of her 1996 work, Guerra y Pacto en el Siglo XII – La Consolidación de una 
systema de reinos en Europa Occidental.
81
  As the title implies, her range embraces the 
whole of Western Europe in the twelfth century, not just Spain, although Iberia features 
prominently.  Her main objective is to relate the nature of peace agreements in twelfth- 
century Western Europe, their alternation with periods of bellicosity, and the role of 
both warfare and diplomacy in consolidating the emergent feudal kingdoms of the West. 
Pascua’s work adopts an anthropological approach, concentrating on the 
procedures of diplomatic activity rather than the substance of the treaties themselves.  
She adopts a very broad approach, outlining the trends of twelfth-century Western 
diplomacy.  There is scant reference to the political history which forms the context for 
these developments, and no analysis of specific political developments.  Instead, the 
reader is offered a morass of generalisations, for example her assertion at the beginning 
of Chapter 1 that peace was the norm of inter-monarchical relations in the twelfth 
century.
82
  This is a very abstract hypothesis with little substantiation. Indeed, it is a 
very idealistic notion of peace as a political goal.  However, she discusses the 
motivation for peacemaking, namely, friendship, fraternity or alliance.  Later, she 
discusses dispute resolution and breach of the peace in sociological terms, with no 
historical context; this is typical of her work as a whole.  
In Chapter II, she analyses the institutional nature of diplomacy, for example, 
the role of arbitration, excommunication and hostage-taking, without studying the 
political nature of these events.  Once again, she adopts a sociological method, simply 
describing the principal vehicles for medieval diplomacy, rather than placing diplomatic 
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activity within the context of political history.  Nevertheless, in this chapter, she 
correctly focuses on the replacement of oral tradition with written forms of diplomacy.   
As regards the documentation, she surveys the nature of diplomatic treaties, 
identifying the sequence of clauses common to all medieval treaties and classifying 
them in order of appearance in the agreements themselves.  She also notes their 
significance as symbols of royal prestige: the outcome of vistas reales (royal summits), 
and the product of royal relationships, that ipso facto were superior to patterns of noble 
allegiance.  She correctly observes regional variations in terminology, even within the 
Iberian Peninsula itself.  She discusses amicitia (friendship) as the fundamental 
prerequisite for diplomatic business at a monarchical level.  Later, she discusses 
hostages, although these do not appear in twelfth-century Iberian treaties at all, albeit 
other kingdoms of Western Europe employed this tactic.  In discussing vistas reales, she 
rightly alludes to the landmark Treaty of Fresno-Lavandera (1183), which was a 
paradigm of royal peacemaking in Iberia, based on elaborate diplomatic practice.   
She then analyses the practice of arbitration.  She correctly defines the legal 
nature of arbitration – namely as a contractual process of conflict resolution, whereby 
the two parties to the dispute delegate a limited power of referee to an agreed third party.  
Furthermore, she correctly stresses the role of the king as judge, a phenomenon that 
becomes obvious in the litigation that I examine in my thesis, when King Henry II of 
England arbitrated in the dispute between Castile and Navarre.  However, she devotes 
much space to disputes resolved by the Papacy or the Holy Roman Emperor, which are 
marginal to the concerns of my study.   
She then discusses excommunication as a spiritual sanction.  She correctly 
identifies the Papacy as the main enforcer of sanctions.  She proceeds to discuss their 
likely success against monarchs who were adamant that their policies were justified, and 
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who were not to be deflected from their course of action.  There is extensive discussion 
of excommunication as a foreign policy weapon of the Papacy, although she does not 
enter into the wider question of Papal intervention in the domestic politics of rulers who 
incurred the wrath of the reigning pope. 
She also devotes a section to ‘Hostages and Conduct’, as does Kosto in his 
recentbook.
83
   This phenomenon is outside the ambit of my thesis, as Iberian monarchs 
appear not to have employed hostage-taking as a diplomatic tool.  Hostage-taking does 
not appear in any of the treaties that I examine in this thesis, although it is worthy of 
note, by being ‘conspicuous by its absence’, especially as it was common practice 
elsewhere in Western Europe, for example, in Anglo-Scottish relations.  Consequently, I 
will not discuss it here. 
 In her 2002 article, ‘De Reyes, Senores y Tratados en la Peninsula Iberica del 
Siglo XII’, Pascua explores at length the relationship between the feudal monarchs of 
the Iberian Peninsula and the nobility of the twelfth century.
84
  This study analyses the 
effect of royal treaty-making on the monarchical-noble relationship.  However, her 
argument is a rather polarized debate between kings and nobles, and war and pacts.  She 
begins by considering the historiography of this topic however this receives very 
cursory treatment.  She then analyses the consolidation of the Feudal monarchies of the 
period, and sets Iberia within the context of Western Europe at that time.  However her 
sketch of twelfth century political history is very broad, with little elaboration or detail.  
Next, she focuses on the Iberian Peninsula in the twelfth century, considering the issue 
of feudalism in Spain.  She notes that the vistas reales were one of the principal 
developments in Spanish history of the time.  She also usefully examines the difference 
between monarchical policy and noble ambitions in terms of the establishment of royal 
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power and the creation of political hierarchies.  This leads into a discussion of the 
nobility and noble rebellions in this study.  On the positive side, she confronts the issue 
of noble rebellions, which other scholars of peacemaking ignore.  Her principal 
argument is that kings collaborated in order to constrain noble rebellion, which 
unhindered, might infringe the peace.   
Royal supremacy was achieved through an alternating process of war and royal 
peace treaties, which effectively produced alliances of kingdoms aligned in royal blocs.  
She devotes a whole section to royal treaty-making in the context of vistas reales and 
‘direct diplomacy’ between monarchs.  This is positive to the extent that she cites 
specific treaties as examples.  She examines the motivation for diplomacy, personnel, 
terminology, and the nature of liens between parties and non-parties, for example, 
magnates.  In particular, she identifies the partition treaties as a special class of peace 
agreement, in the sense that they constituted an alliance between Castile and Aragon.   
She also examines the role of the Church in peacemaking.  She emphasises the 
role of senior clergy in the business of treaty-making, acting as mediators, scribes and 
witnesses.  In her conclusion, she merely reiterates the monarch-noble dichotomy, its 
manifestations and consequences.  She concludes by arguing that royal peace treaties 
constrained noble unilateral action through the formation of alliances of kingdoms that 
effectively constituted a political ‘bloc’.  Like her 1996 work, Pascua’s article suffers 
from a lack of detailed political analysis which forms the background to her argument; 
she merely cites random examples to bolster her case, rather than offering an informed 
and extensive study of the period.  On the positive side, she does examine some of the 
Iberian treaties in detail, analysing the terms of agreements in question.   
 Pascua’s last work, ‘Peace among Equals: war and treaties in twelfth-century 
Europe’ (2008), takes as its theme the equality of kingship in twelfth-century Western 
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Europe, and the role of royal peace treaties in subjugating the nobility, who were lower 
down the political hierarchy.  Once again, she emphasises the nature of regal power at 
colloquia pacis (peace conferences), and the distinction between monarchs and their 
aristocratic retinues.  She also emphasises that kings mutually recognised their authority, 
and that partition treaties, such as that of Cazola (1179), had the effect of denying 
magnates new land, as kings carved up territory and expanded their kingdoms.  The net 
effect of this consolidation process was the formation of centralised feudal kingdoms at 
the expense of fragmented noble principalities.   
However, she does not attempt to place treaties within their historical context.  
For example, she discusses gift exchange, citing Mauss, but in fact there are very few 
examples of gift exchange from twelfth-century Iberia.  She correctly states that written 
diplomacy was the principal innovation in political discourse in twelfth-century 
Western Europe.  Next, she provides a useful summary of the standard form of a 
medieval peace treaty.  She also relates the whole gamut of terminology used to define 
the treaty in question, noting regional variations.  For example, she has a useful section 
on amicitia, which was the basis for most early medieval treaties, although she does not 
cite Althoff, the principal authority on the subject.  In discussing convenientiae 
(covenants), she omits to refer to Kosto. 
Then she analyses the nature of colloquia pacis, distinguishing between 
monarchs and their noble lineages; this is the main thrust of the work.  She briefly refers 
to the nature of treaty provisions and their likelihood of success, given the possibility of 
noble transgression.    Then she states her argument: that monarchs collaborated to 
outmanoeuvre footloose magnates through a combination of treaties and wars, creating 
alliances that were too powerful for nobles to overcome.  She has a brief section on 
chronicles, which is inconclusive.  In discussing homage, she correctly differentiates 
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between the personal bonds of early medieval treaties which bound monarchs as 
common leaders in war, and the strictly legal ties (liens) that obliged parties and non-
parties, such as nobles, to levy an army in return for a fief, which was the very essence 
of feudalism.  In so doing, she correctly alludes to the specific, feudal duties that 
defined twelfth-century pacts.   
She also refers to the definition of territory and problems of royal legitimacy, 
correctly observing that these problems often led to political submission, such as at the 
Curia of Carrión (1188).  Pascua correctly observes that military auxilium (mutual 
assistance) was linked to the defence of kingdoms with established borders, although it 
was also employed in an aggressive capacity.  Significantly, although this diplomatic 
nicety is elaborately articulated in numerous treaties in the twelfth century, it is difficult 
to cite a single example of defensive co-operation in practice.  Moreover, the prosaic 
reality of political and military affairs also embraces the king-noble relationship: often 
magnates were dependent on their monarchs, rather than the converse.  Finally, her case 
for the equality of rulers is not proven.  Indeed, all the evidence points to a clear 
hierarchy of rulers, as I hope to illustrate in this thesis. 
Pascua compares the Iberian treaties with those between the Anglo-Norman 
realm and Capetian France.  However, she does not offer a comprehensive analysis of 
inter-monarchical treaty-making in any one kingdom, merely selecting random 
examples to support her argument.  On a positive note, she elucidates the significance of 
royal treaty-making, emphasising the importance of solemnity, reputation, prestige and 
legitimacy between the parties to the agreement.  She also examines legal terminology, 
the role of the Church, the need for enforcement of treaties with regard to conflicting 
noble ambitions, the importance of alliances between kingdoms, castle exchange, and 
fidelity between lords and vassals. 
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Research Aims and Methodology: 
In this thesis I will first examine the motivation for peacemaking between the 
kingdoms of Christian Iberia in the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries.  This will 
involve a consideration of the political context in which peace treaties arose.  Hence, I 
will examine the political history of twelfth- and thirteenth-century Christian Iberia, 
especially León and Castile that forms the background to the diplomacy between these 
powers.  In so doing I will survey the chronicles, which provide valuable historical 
context to diplomatic activity at this time.  Peacemaking constitutes an arm of 
diplomacy, and this consideration of the foreign policy of the Christian Iberian 
kingdoms is the contribution of my thesis.  Peacemaking was also a distinct political 
strategy, in opposition to waging war.  Moreover, it was the prerogative of kingship; 
only the king, as leader of his subjects, was able to negotiate with foreign rulers.   
Iberian foreign policy was divided between broad, idealistic accords of friendship prior 
to c. 1150; and more pragmatic agreements of alliance that characterised the later period 
(c. 1150-1230).  Thus, I will analyse the circumstances that led to the peace conferences 
(vistas reales), looking at the motivation for royal peacemaking.   
As regards chronology, I have divided my first two chapters sequentially, the 
first examining the period c. 1100-1157; and the second the period 1157-1230.  The first 
period was the age of the Castilian-Leonese Empire.   
The second period was the era of the ‘cinco reinos’, and lasted from the division 
of the Empire at the death of Emperor Alfonso VII in 1157 until the reunification of the 
crowns of Castile and León in 1230.  At this point Castilian-Leonese treaties terminate 
because there were no longer two rival kingdoms confronting one another.  There was 
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now no need to conclude peace agreements because central Iberia was now controlled 
by one unified polity.   
Nevertheless, treaty-making in Christian Iberia did not begin until 1137, when 
the first peace treaty between Castile-León and Portugal was agreed.  Moreover, there is 
an uneven patten of peacemaking as evidenced by the survival of treaties.  Quite simply, 
there are more peace treaties for some reigns than others.  This is partly because some 
monarchs lived longer than others, and longer reigns gave rise to greater opportunities 
to pursue an ambitious foreign policy.   
Some monarchs also pursued more aggressive foreign policies than others.  For 
example, King Alfonso VIII of Castile embarked upon an energetic diplomatic 
engagement with Aragón, Navarre and León.  In contrast, King Enrique I of Castile, 
who was still a minor when he occupied the Castilian throne, was mainly concerned 
with ensuring his own survival.  The multiplicity of treaties thus generally reflects the 
seniority of the ruler who propagated them. 
In this thesis, I will examine the role of diplomatic personnel in negotiating 
treaties, such as nuncii (messengers) and papal legates.  Subsequently, I will analyse the 
importance of preliminary negotiations, in which emissaries played a vital role, such as 
at Paradinas in 1183.  I will also evaluate the significance of truces, which were broadly 
designed to hold the peace for a transition period whilst more permanent arrangements 
were made for a durable peace.   
Thirdly, I will assess the importance of location regarding vistas reales. This 
was of vital significance in the Middle Ages, when the prestige of the monarchs who 
were the respective parties to the treaty in question was at stake.  As Benham observes, 
it could be a humiliation for a lesser potentate to travel deep inside his enemy’s territory 
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to attend a peace summit.
85
  Hence, both sides often met at agreed frontiers, at place 
delineating their respective kingdoms.  This ‘frontier’ was often a geographical feature, 
such as a river.  More importantly, it constituted neutral territory.   
Fourthly, I will examine the texts of the treaties themselves.  Adopting a forensic 
approach, I will analyse the formal, technical language of the large cache of peace 
agreements which survive from medieval Castile and León.  This will involve an 
appraisal of the parties to the treaty; the nature of the agreement – for example, concord 
and alliance – and the relationship of the parties in political and legal terms. 
Finally, I will examine the measures incorporated in the treaty to ensure its 
implementation and compliance, such as guarantors and oaths, castles, hostages, and 
ecclesiastical sanctions, such as excommunication and interdict.  Particularly important 
in this section will be an appreciation of the value of castles, both as assets in 
implementing agreements, and as liabilities in the case of derogation from the treaty in 
question.   
In Chapter 1 I will look at Leonese-Castilian Diplomacy in the Imperial Age, 
prior to 1157.  Firstly, I will examine Kingship, and the royal prerogative to wage war 
and conclude peace agreements.  I will analyse friendship and fidelity between 
monarchs as the basis for foreign relations in the early twelfth century.   On the negative 
side, territorial disputes led to political discourse, as the principalities of Iberia 
coalesced into feudal kingdoms.   
Then I will examine frontier diplomacy, analysing long-term structural issues, 
such as the hegemony of León-Castile, and the rivalry with Aragón during the reign of 
Alfonso I el Batallador.  In this section I will focus on the partition treaties, and the 
partition of Navarre between Castile and Aragón.   
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Thirdly, I will appraise the subject of inter-Christian diplomacy and the crusades 
in Iberia.  The context for this development was the internal peace of the Christian 
powers themselves.  I will consider both long-distance diplomacy with states outside the 
Iberian Peninsula, such as the Italian Commune of Genoa, as well as diplomatic 
relations proper to Iberia itself, such as the Castilian-Aragonese alliance. 
In Chapter 2 I will examine Leonese-Castilian Diplomacy in the era of the 
‘Cinco Reinos’. 86   In this chapter I will first continue my examination of frontier 
diplomacy.  In particular, I will analyse the effects of Emperor Alfonso VII’s divisio 
imperii in the Tierra de Campos on sovereignty in León and Castile, and posing the 
question of whether fragmentation inevitably follows succession.  I will also examine in 
depth the ongoing Castilian-Navarrese territorial dispute, and the various partition 
treaties between Castile and Navarre that affected Navarre.   
Secondly, I will address the issue of the monarchical-noble relationship in Leon 
and Castile.  Nobles were regarded as potential violators of the peace, and were often 
co-opted into peace treaties as non-parties.  Pascua argues that alliances between 
monarchs alienated the nobility by forming royal ‘blocs’ that magnates were powerless 
to overcome.
87
  By contrast, Doubleday argues that ‘monarchs were the fount of noble 
power’, that it was only through royal favour that noble ambition could be rewarded.88  
Pascua also asserts that monarchs were equals, whilst nobles were inferior in the 
political hierarchy – this is a hypothesis which I will confront. 
Thirdly, I will look at marriage alliances and succession.  For most of the latter 
half of the twelfth century, there existed a Leonese-Portuguese axis in the west of the 
Iberian Peninsula.  This consisted of repeated dynastic marriages between the kings of 
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Leon and Portuguese Infantas.  Both Fernando II and Alfonso IX married Portuguese 
brides.  These alliances were mediated by the Church, and dowries of castles were given.  
They were particularly successful in maintaining a durable peace because both sides had 
a stake in ensuring the success of the union.   
My work will concentrate on the treaties themselves, which are the primary 
source for medieval Iberian peacemaking.  There is a large cache of peace agreements 
from Iberia in the period c. 1100-1230, and this is fertile territory.  These documents 
constitute the evidence for peacemaking activity during my period.  I will first analyse 
the legal framework of the treaties themselves.  Hence, I will examine the parties (and 
non-parties, such as nobles), their successors, and the role of third parties, such as 
arbitrators and papal legates.  The main thrust of my argument will be to attempt to 
understand contemporary efforts to achieve peace, in an era of endemic warfare.  In so 
doing, I will appraise the language of peacemaking, friendship, concord, alliance, and so 
forth.  In analysing the treaties, I will consider whether they can be categorised as truces 
(treuga) designed to ensure peace for a limited period during which negotiations for a 
durable peace would occur; armistice agreements following a period of bellicosity; and 
treaties of friendship (amicitia) and alliance, including marriage alliances, designed to 
forge political unions and deter future hostilities. 
I will then examine how peace was to be held once it had been agreed, focusing 
in particular on castle exchange.  I will also survey sanctions to be implemented in case 
of derogation.  Such sanctions could be either temporal – notably forfeiture of castles – 
or ecclesiastical, such as excommunication and interdict.  However, the emphasis in 
medieval peace treaties was to ensure that peace would endure, hence there were 
elaborate compliance measures to prevent contravention of treaties, such as guarantees 
and oaths.  Finally, I will attempt to gauge treaties’ success by their duration; a 
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proliferation of peace treaties will indicate that previous treaties have foundered, 
occasioning the need for a new agreement.    
 I will also discuss the role of papal influence in such diplomacy.  The supreme 
court in the Middle Ages was the Papal curia.   Ullmann argues that the Papal Curia had 
compulsory jurisdiction, and could enforce its judgements through the ecclesiastical 
sanctions of excommunication and interdict.
89
  By virtue of the universality of Church 
law, rulings of the Papal Court applied to all Christians.  Nevertheless, Papal diplomacy 
could be protracted because of the distance of Rome from northern Europe.  Death or 
defeat of one of the parties could halt papal intervention.  Also, the pope himself, like 
other medieval rulers, could be a party to international diplomacy – this could hinder, 
delay or bias any final judgement.
90
  Furthermore, it is clear that formal papal 
judgements did not always take precedence over other political considerations in 
guiding a ruler’s decisions.  For example, King Alfonso IX and Queen Berenguela 
proceeded to conclude an illegal marriage, despite Pope Innocent III’s pronouncements. 
 However, the Papacy was not the only forum for independent arbitration.  There 
are also a number of cases of monarchical arbitration, of which the most celebrated was 
the case of the Castilian-Navarrese dispute.  The arbiter, King Henry II of England, 
asked for the claims to be presented in writing.  Among these were the Truce of Fitero 
(1167), which the Navarrese plaintiff, King Sancho VI, asserted had been breached by 
the Castilian monarch, Alfonso VIII.   
 The remarkable aspect of Henry’s arbitration in this case was that both the oral 
testimony of the Spanish envoys and the written petitions of both sides played a 
significant role in proceedings.  Henry was not content with hearing the claims and 
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allegations of the Spanish emissaries; he also wanted them          committed to writing, 
ostensibly because he could not understand the spoken Latin of the diplomats.  
Furthermore, both sides were furnished with documentary proof of their claims, in the 
form of written petitions, which have survived. 
 In order to be able to submit their disputes to arbitration or to make an appeal, 
parties needed to have near exact copies of the terms of any agreement, redacted, 
exchanged and proclaimed.  According to Chaplais, all surviving treaties from Henry 
II’s reign are in the form of a final agreement, drawn up in duplicate, in the       joint 
names of the two sides.  Both copies were then sealed interchangeably, and delivered to 
the opposite party, and vice versa.
91
  However, from the reign of Richard I onwards (c. 
1190), Anglo-French treaties were no longer issued in the joint names of rulers, but 
were redacted in the form of individual letters patent and exchanged.
92
  Pascua notes 
that the stronger ruler often precedes the other party in peace agreements of the twelfth 
century.
93
  This was certainly the case in Christian Iberia from this period.  However, in 
Anglo-French treaties of this era, it is more probable that each king disseminated a text 
in which he named himself first. 
Sources - The Iberian Peace Treaties: 
 Despite the dearth of extra-Peninsula sources, there is a remarkable cache of 
documents from Christian Spain.  This documentation amounts to thirty-five peace 
treaties between the five Christian Iberian kingdoms during the period c. 1100-1230.  
This proliferation of diplomatic activity is particularly significant when one considers 
that other comparable kingdoms in early mediaeval Europe, such as Plantagenet 
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England or Capetian France, have preserved very few such documents.  Consequently, 
the Iberian cache constitutes a ‘forensic laboratory’ for the scholar of diplomacy. 
 Most of the treaties concerning Aragon are preserved in the cartulary known as 
the Liber Feudorum Maior, housed in the Archivo de la Corona de Aragon, in 
Barcelona.  This has now been edited and published by F. Miquel Rosell.    The 
Genoese treaties have been edited and published by C. Imperiale di Sant’ Angelo as part 
of the Fonti per la Storia d’ Italia series.  Some Castilian and Leonese treaties are 
preserved in the Archivo Historico Nacional, and the Biblioteca Nacional, in Madrid, 
although sometimes there are copies in provincial cathedral and diocesan archives, as 
well as monastic archives.  In the case of the Castilian-Leonese peace treaties of the 
1180s, they are preserved in the archive of the Cathedral of Santiago de Compostela, the 
Metropolitan see of the Kingdom of Leon.  The treaties relating to the Castilian-
Navarrese dispute are preserved in the British Library in London, and were published as 
part of the Rolls Series.  Thomas Rymer also published these documents in the 
eighteenth century as part of his ‘Foedera et conventiones’ series.  The majority of the 
thirteenth-century treaties are preserved in the Cathedral archive of Leon.  Two of the 
thirteenth-century treaties, the Treaty of Toro I (1216) and the Treaty of Benavente 
(1230), are preserved in the Archivio Segreto Vaticano, in the Registers of Popes 
Honorius III and Gregory IX, respectively.  All the treaties from the post-Imperial 
epoch, i.e. dating from after the divisio imperii in 1157 until reunification in 1230, have 
been published in modern editions by Julio Gonzalez.     
Most of these treaties are preserved in ecclesiastical archives, either monastic 
houses or cathedral archives.  Often these monasteries were in remote locations, close to 
the frontier with neighbouring kingdoms.  Three monastic houses have preserved 
documents that contain peace treaties during this period.  They are: Sahagún on the 
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Castilian-Leonese frontier; Las Huelgas, near Burgos; and Silos, near the Castilian 
border with Navarre.  The first treaty that concerns us, the Treaty of Túy (1137), was 
preserved in the archive of Sahagún, and is now published in the Colección Diplomática 
del Monasterio de Sahagún, edited by J.A Fernández Flórez.94   In addition, some 
treaties that are now preserved elsewhere originated in monastic scriptoria, for example, 
the Treaty of Sahagún (1158), whose provenance was the monastery of Sahagún, but 
which is now in the Archivo Histórico Nacional [AHN], Madrid.
95
   
Some treaties were deposited in monastic archives because the monastery was 
close to the frontier between the two kingdoms which were party to the treaty in 
question.  For example, this was the case with the Treaty of Sahagún (1158), which 
addressed the apportionment of territory following the divisio imperii that attempted to 
divide the Castilian – Leonese Empire between the descendants of Emperor Alfonso VII.  
This was done so that future litigants could avail themselves of documentary proof of 
the terms of earlier treaties that they alleged had been breached by the other side.  For 
example, the Treaty of Nájera-Logroño II (15 April 1179) was stored in the archives of 
the monastery of Silos in the vicinity of the Castilian–Navarrese border, so that both 
Castilian and Navarrese parties could have access to it.
96
   
Sometimes monasteries were also chosen to house royal treaties because the 
monastery was close to the political interests of the parties concerned.  This was the 
case with Las Huelgas, which was a royal foundation.  Several treaties were stored here, 
including the Treaty of Tordehumos (1194)
97
 and the Treaty of Palencia (1194)
98
, both 
of which concerned the dynastic interests of the royal houses of Castile and León, 
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namely the question of the Leonese succession and the settlement of strategic castles on 
the brides of the Leonese monarchs as dowries.  Later, King Alfonso VIII of Castile and 
his queen, Leonor, were buried at Las Huelgas. 
Cathedral and diocesan archives also preserved peace treaties in medieval Iberia.  
Sometimes, these archives belonged to metropolitan sees; at other times, they were 
suffragan dioceses.
99
  Several diocesan archives hold treaties, among them the Archivo 
de la Catedral de Palencia, which holds a twelfth-century copy of the partition Treaty of 
Sahagún (1158).
100
  The archive of the Archdiocese of Santiago de Compostela contains 
the important treaties of Medina de Ríoseco (1181)
101
 and Fresno-Lavandera (1183). 
102
 
These treaties regulated the peacemaking efforts of the kings of Castile and León in the 
1180s.  These peacemaking initiatives were focused on the dispute over the contested 
territory of the Tierra de Campos, which lay in the border area between the two 
kingdoms.  These treaties were germane to the notion of territorial sovereignty of both 
kingdoms as they attempted to halt the seizure of land by the other party.   Consequently, 
they were of immense political significance.  Moreover, they needed to be preserved in 
case of future derogation.  This was especially so with the Treaty of Fresno-Lavandera, 
which actually specified that the parties should reconvene at a later time and date to deal 
with issues arising from foreseen breaches of the original agreement.  
Several treaties were preserved in the archives of the Metropolitan See of Toledo.  
Toledo had been the capital of Visigothic Spain, and several Councils of the Church had 
been held there during that period.  For example, a contemporary copy of the Treaty of 
Sahagún (1158), formerly preserved in the Archives of Toledo Cathedral (Archivo de la 
Catedral de Toledo) is now preserved in the Archivo Histórico Nacional (AHN) in 
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Madrid.
103
  Several copies of treaties are also preserved in the cartulary known as the 
Liber Privilegiorum Toletanae Ecclesiae (Book of Privileges of the Church of 
Toledo).
104
   
Most of the thirteenth-century peace treaties survive in the archive of the 
Cathedral of León (AC León), reflecting the ascendancy of the Kingdom of León at this 
time.  These include the vernacular Treaty of Cabreros (1206)
105
; the Treaty of 
Valladolid (1209)
106
; the Truce of Coimbra (1212)
107
; the unnamed truce between 
Alfonso IX of León, and Fernando III and Queen Berenguela of Castile (1217)108; the 
Treaty of Toro II (1218)
109
; and the Treaty of Boronal (1219)
110
. 
The Archivo Histórico Nacional in Madrid holds copies of several treaties 
whose provenance lie in the provincial cathedral archives of Spain.  This is the case for 
the Treaty of Sahagún (1158).  The Treaty of Cazola (1179)
111
, which also originates in 
Toledo; the Treaty of Fresno-Lavandera (1183), which originates in Ávila
112
; the Treaty 
of Calatayud (1198), which also originates in Toledo
113
.  
The Biblioteca Nacional [BN] in Madrid also houses several copies of 
mediaeval peace treaties.  One, the Treaty of Sahagún (1158) is a seventeenth-century 
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copy of the Palencia codex of this treaty
114
.  Significantly, a copy of the Cuenca 
manuscript of the Treaty of Seligenstadt (1188) is also preserved in the capital.
 115
   
The Papal Curia was the supreme court of jurisdiction in Western Europe at this 
time, and it is natural to expect the papacy to take an interest in the affairs of Western 
rulers.  This tendency increased after the election of Pope Innocent III in 1198, but 
earlier popes had despatched legates to ensure the Church’s interest was represented.   
Two thirteenth-century treaties are preserved in the Vatican Archives in Rome, known 
as the Archivio Segreto Vaticano (ASV): those of the Treaty of Toro I (1216)
116
, 
preserved in the Register of Honorius III; and the Treaty of Benavente (1230), contained 
in the Register of Gregory IX
117.  Both of these reflect the Papacy’s continued interest 
in Iberian affairs at this time, as the bulwark of Christendom against Islamic al-Andalus.   
 The treaties in the post-Imperial period, i.e. after 1157, have all been transcribed 
and edited by Julio González.  They appear in his four works, Regesta de Fernando II 
(Madrid, 1943); Alfonso IX, 2 vols (Madrid, 1944); El Reino de Castilla en la época de 
Alfonso VIII, 3 vols (Madrid, 1960); and Reinado y diplomas de Fernando III, 3 vols 
(Córdoba, 1980-86). 118  Taken together they represent a far larger archive of diplomatic 
than exists in any other kingdom of Western Europe during the twelfth and early 
thirteenth centuries.  This fact testifies to the flourishing diplomatic activity in León and 
Castile at this period in the early Middle Ages.
119
  Indeed, it is highly significant when 
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one considers that comparable kingdoms such as Angevin England had an efficient 
government bureaucracy.   
 The Treaty of Seligenstadt which determined the proposed marriage of Castilian 
Infanta, Berenguela, to the son of the Holy Roman Emperor, Conrad, survives in the 
original, in two copies.  Both are preserved in Castilian cathedral archives, one in 
Cuenca and the other in Burgos.  Indeed, the Cuenca version is authenticated by a lead 
seal of King Alfonso VIII of Castile, although the Burgos version has lost its seals.  A 
later marriage alliance between doña Berenguela and King Alfonso IX of León is 
preserved in the Treaty of Palencia; this survives in the archive of the monastery of Las 
Huelgas, near Burgos, where her father was buried.   
Most thirteenth-century Castilian-Leonese peace treaties, starting with the 
landmark Treaty of Valladolid (1209) survive in the Archivo de la Catedral (AC) de 
León.  The Treaty of Valladolid is extant in the original.  Two Leonese treaties were 
concluded with Portugal, León being the nearest Spanish kingdom to Portugal and 
sharing a long border with it: these were the Truce of Coimbra (1212) and the Treaty of 
Boronal (1219).  Finally, two Castilian- Leonese treaties are preserved in the Vatican 
Archives, in the Registers for the pontificates of popes Honorius III and Gregory IX.  
This reflects the Papacy’s ongoing interest in the maintenance of peaceful Castilian-
Leonese relations. 
Most Aragonese treaties, where the Crown of Aragón was a party to the 
agreement, are preserved in the royal archives known as the Archivo de la Corona de 
Aragón (ACA) in Barcelona.  Aragón-Catalonia was a major force in twelfth-century 
Iberian politics, second only to Castile-León, its principal rival and later partner in the 
Reconquest. Consequently there exists a proliferation of diplomatic agreements 
contained in the Aragonese archives.  These contain the cartulary known as the ‘Liber 
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Feudorum Maior’ (LFM) (Book of Major Fiefs), edited by F. Miquel Rosell and 
published under this title. Often the LFM contains copies of treaties originating 
elsewhere, such as the Treaty of Carrión (1140/1), which is to be found in the cathedral 
archives of Jaca
120
.  For example, the treaty formalising the Castilian – Aragonese 
alliance, the Treaty of Zaragoza (1170), is preserved in the LFM cartulary in the ACA 
archive.
121
  Likewise, the Treaty of Cuenca (1177), agreed during the siege of the city 
by joint Castilian – Aragonese forces, is also preserved in the LFM cartulary.  Some 
Castilian treaties concerning Navarre have also been preserved in ACA, reflecting 
Castile’s oriental policy throughout the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, both 
unilaterally and in conjunction with Aragón, such as the Treaty of Guadalajara (1207). 
The treaties relating to Genoese intervention in the Second Crusade in Iberia 
(1147) are preserved in a modern edition known as the Codice Diplomatico della 
Repubblica di Genova [CDG], edited by C. Imperiale di Sant’ Angelo.  This collection 
has been published as part of the Fonti per la Storia d’ Italia [FSI] series.  These 
contain the treaties of 1146 between the Commune of Genoa and Emperor Alfonso VII 
of León-Castile relating to the forthcoming siege of Almería.
122
  The Genoese also 
concluded treaties with Count Ramon Berenguer IV of Barcelona regarding the siege of 
Tortosa (1148 ) and Lérida (1149) respectively, as part of their involvement in the 
Second Crusade.
123
  In each case, the treaties are significant for the division of captured 
territory, which represented the commercial reward for their participation in a ‘foreign 
war’. 
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The treaties relating to the Castilian-Navarrese dispute which was ajudicated by 
King Henry II of England at the Council of Westminster (Easter 1177), are all preserved 
in English archives preserved in the British Library in London.  They were later 
published in Rymer’s Foedera.124  These documents were also incorporated into the 
English chronicles of the day, such as the anonymous Gesta Regis Henrici and Gerald 
of Wales’s chronicle.  These include the Truce of Fitero (1167), which preceded the 
legal proceedings, and which was integrated into the Gesta Regis Henrici, translated by 
Stubbs and now part of the Rolls Series
125
.  Also included are the Treaty of Nájera-
Logroño I (1176), which officially referred the issue to arbitration, and the Petitions of 
both monarchs, King Alfonso VIII of Castile and King Sancho VI of Navarre, stating 
their claims to the contested region of La Rioja.  Only the Treaty of Nájera-Logroño II 
(1179), which finally settled the matter, is preserved in situ, in the archives of the 
monastery of Silos, on the Castilian-Navarrese frontier, where it could avail the parties 
to the controversy.  This arbitration procedure was recorded for the purpose of 
providing a permanent record of the lawsuit.   
Most of the treaties examined in my thesis are copies, either contemporary or 
later ones.  Six of the thirty five peace treaties are original documents.  For example, the 
Treaty of Seligenstadt (1188) between Alfonso VIII of Castile and the Emperor 
Frederick Barbarossa contracted the marriage between Alfonso’s daughter, Berenguela, 
and the Emperor’s son, Conrad III.  This dynastic marriage – which was never 
concluded – was significant because it represented the integration of the Kingdom of 
Castile, the most powerful of the Spanish kingdoms, into European politics in the 
                                                          
124
 T. Rymer, Foedera, Conventiones et litterae et cuiuscumque generis  acta publica  (London, 1704). 
125
 Truce of Fitero (October 1167).  British Library [BL], Cotton MS. Julius A. XI, fols. 90-95.  It is preserved 
in Gesta Regis Henrici Secundi Benedicti abbatis, ed. W. Stubbs, 2 vols (Rolls Series, [R.S.], 1867), Vol. 1, 
24. 
47 
 
 
twelfth century.  Two originals of the treaty have survived, one in the Archivo de la 
Catedral de Cuenca
126
, and the other in the Archivo de la Catedral de Burgos
127
.   
Several other late-twelfth century and early thirteenth century treaties have also 
survived in the original.  They include the Treaty of Tordehumos (1194), the parties to 
which included the Papal Legate, Cardinal Gregory de Sant’ Angelo128; the Treaty of 
Cabreros (1206)
129
, which was the first treaty to be written in Castilian Romance, rather 
than Latin; and the Treaty of Valladolid (1209), which was the first   treaty to 
successfully achieve a durable peace   between the erstwhile enemies of Castile and 
León
130
. 
 In an increasingly litigious age, treaties were committed to writing primarily to 
anticipate future litigation.  In the event of the dispute being referred to arbitration, 
written documents served as proof of claim, for example written submissions were 
required by King Henry II in his arbitration of the Castilian-Navarrese dispute.  
However, it seems likely that many treaties were incorporated into the accounts of 
chroniclers, simply for the purpose of providing a permanent record of the agreement 
being reached. 
 As regards patterns of preservation, many of the treaties have survived in the 
Archivo de la Corona de Aragón.  This is largely because the rulers of the Crown of 
Aragón were a party to numerous peace treaties with their opposite numbers in Castile, 
both as Counts of Barcelona and later, as kings of Aragón.  As regards the Navarrese 
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territorial dispute with Castile, the records of this litigation are preserved in the British 
Library, in London.  .   
 However, treaties of national importance are preserved in the Biblioteca 
Nacional, in Madrid.  For example, the Treaty of Seligenstadt (1188) is preserved there.  
However, copies of this treaty are also housed in the   Archivo Catedral de Toledo, the 
Metropolitan See of Castile, and other significant locations.  Furthermore, treaties of 
geopolitical significance, like partition treaties, are to be found in the Archivo Histórico 
Nacional, in Madrid, for example, this is the case with the treaties of Sahagún (1158) 
and Calatayud (1198).  Moreover, copies of partition treaties are usually to be found in 
situ, close to the frontier delineated in the treaty concerned.   
 Several treaties are preserved in locations connected with parties involved in 
their genesis.  For example, this is the case with the Treaty of Palencia (1199), which 
was agreed at the initiative of Queen Leonor of Castile – this treaty is preserved in the 
archives of the monastery of Las Huelgas, Burgos, which had once been a palace of the 
Castilian monarchy.   
 As regards the proliferation or absence of treaties in any given reign, prior to the 
divisio imperii in 1157, the Castilian-Leonese emperor was the protagonist with respect 
to the agreement of peace treaties with neighbouring kingdoms, of which six remain.  
Three of these were concluded with the Crown of Aragón, Castile’s long-term ally in 
the Reconquest, most importantly the partition Treaty of Tudején (1151).  This alliance 
was renewed under successive Aragonese rulers, namely Count Ramon Berenguer IV of 
Barcelona, Alfonso II and Pedro II.  On the Castilian side, King Alfonso VIII was 
assiduous in cementing this alliance, and consequently there are a plethora of Castilian-
Aragonese treaties from the later twelfth century. 
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 The reign of Alfonso VIII of Castile was characterized by an aggressive foreign 
policy, achieved both by diplomacy and war.  Hence, there was a cycle of agreements 
between the rulers of Castile and León, especially in the 1180s - notably the Treaties of 
Medina de Ríoseco and Fresno-Lavandera – and 1190s, aimed at attempting to achieve 
peace after the failure of the previous agreement and concomitant descent into conflict.  
This tendency began in the 1180s, with the reign of Fernando II of León (d. 1188), and 
continued under his son, Alfonso IX. 
 King Alfonso IX of León entered into various marriage alliances in order to 
safeguard the Leonese succession.  This was necessary so as to achieve the domestic 
stability required for peace with León’s neighbours, Castile and Portugal.  After King 
Alfonso VIII’s death in 1214, King Alfonso IX of León, who was now the senior ruler 
in Christian Iberia, followed a policy of détente with successive Castilian rulers, namely 
Enrique I and Fernando III, and this policy is evidenced by successive peace treaties 
between Castile and León from this period.  Under Leonese hegemony, he was also able 
to able to assume a position of dominance in relation to his neighbour, Portugal.    
 King Alfonso VIII of Castile was also the protagonist in the dispute over La 
Rioja with Navarre.  Including the Truce of Fitero (1167), this litigation involved no 
less than five separate documents, and even after the ajudication the issue was left 
unresolved.  Indeed, the Castilian monarch pursued his oriental diplomacy until the end 
of the first decade of the thirteenth century, both in conjunction with Aragón (the Treaty 
of Calatayud, 1198), and unilaterally (the Treaty of Guadalajara, 1208). 
 Peace was a highy desirable foreign policy objective in an era when violence 
was rife.  Indeed, from both the political and military perspectives, peace was ideal.  
This was true because quarrels over territory were frequent, and political rivalry could 
lead to conflict.                    
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Chapter 1 – The Political Geography of León-Castile, c. 1100-1157 
 
Introduction: 
The first half of the twelfth century in Spain was dominated by Castilian-Leonese 
imperial pretensions, and, after the Imperial coronation of Alfonso VII in 1135, the 
formal realisation of the Castilian-Leonese Empire.  ‘Imperator’ (Emperor) signified a 
supreme military leader who had won a decisive victory in battle.  More often, it 
connoted a potentate who wielded suzerainty (overlordship) over a plurality of 
dominions.  This predominance distinguished the Castilian-Leonese Empire from lesser 
powers of the era, such as the County of Barcelona.  In the case of León, its dominions 
embraced Galicia and Extremadura (territory south of the River Duero); with Castile, 
there was the ongoing dispute with Navarre and Aragón over La Rioja region.  
Moreover, the Leonese monarchy considered that they were the legitimate 
personification of the ancient Visigothic kings of Spain, who had been usurped by the 
Arab invasion of the Iberian Peninsula in 711 AD.   
The chapter will pose the question why diplomatic peace treaties appear to be 
recorded for the first time, when previously issues of war and peace had been the 
subject of oral agreements.  In so doing, I will assess the long-term structural problems 
associated with the Castilian-Leonese Empire, such as the secession of Portugal, the 
desire for independence on the part of ascendant Aragon-Catalonia, and the perennial 
issue of Navarre.   
Historiography: 
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 The short-lived ‘Empire’ of Castile-León has been regarded as the exemplar for 
all later Spanish empires by Castilian historians, such as Ramon Menéndez Pidal and 
Recuero Astray.
131
    They view the Alfonsine era as the forerunner of the later Castilian 
and Aragonese empires that succeeded the Almohad Caliphate after c. 1250, when the 
Reconquista was almost complete.  This phenomenon was achieved by the suzerainty 
exercised by successive Castilian-Leonese kings from Alfonso VI onwards.
132
  
 By contrast, Aragonese and Navarrese historians, such as Ubieto Arteta view the 
Castilian-Leonese Empire as a historical construct.  Such a paradigm manifests itself as 
a pretension to power that the kings of Castile wielded over Aragón and Navarre in a 
blatent desire to subjugate the lesser powers of Christian Iberia.
133
  This relationship 
was expressed in the feudal homage performed by the king of Aragón to the Castilian-
Leonese emperor.
134
  As Estepa Díez argues, it is significant that King Sancho Ramírez 
of Aragón should acknowledge Castilian-Leonese hegemony, even if this does not fully 
equate with the notion of a formal Hispanic Empire.
135
 
Precedents for Imperial claims: 
 Precedents for claims of imperium refer back to the early eighth century, when 
Spain was ruled by the Visigothic dynasties, hence the scholar needs to bear imperial 
antecedents in mind when considering any claims to overlordship in the High Middle 
Ages.  In the mid-twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the concept of sovereignty implied 
overlordship of an emperor over lesser kings and princes.
136
  Such was the status of the 
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Holy Roman Emperor.  So too, was the aspiration of Emperor Alfonso VII of León-
Castile.
137
  This struggle reflects the conflicting ideological currents in the twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries.  At the basis of the concept of imperial sovereignty lay the political 
theory that the Emperor was the legitimate suzerain over subject territories.  This 
authority was both indivisible and inalienable.
138
 
 However, French autonomy from the Empire was based on the justification that 
the Capetian monarch enjoyed his extensive territorial possessions (known as the royal 
domaine).  This theory was elaborated from the thirteenth century onwards.  This 
territorial concept was the basis for the division of the Empire and the Frankish 
kingdom (987), although formal division had occurred much earlier, during the 
Carolingian Empire, at the Treaty of Verdun (843).   
The Imperial concept which animated the Asturian and Leonese kingdoms 
derived from the Visigothic kings of Spain, who had ruled the greater part of the Iberian 
Peninsula.  It was this idea of an Iberian empire that inspired the Leonese monarchs in 
their ideal of a united Spain.  The title ‘imperator’ signified the Leonese aspiration to 
hegemony over the other Christian Iberian states already in existence in the tenth 
century. 
 The Imperial ideal was personified in the supremacy of the Leonese monarchs.  
For Menéndez Pidal, this ideal manifested itself as an institutional reality in the   early 
Middle Ages, from the tenth to the mid-twelfth century.  This title of ‘Emperor’ 
declaimed the superior political and military power of the Leonese ruler over other 
monarchs of Iberia.  The ideal of unity was aptly expressed by the title ‘Emperor’: a 
substitute title, for example, ‘rex Hispaniae’, could not suffice, as it merely connated a 
regional ruler, with no claims to overlordship.   
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King Alfonso VI (1072-1109) had begun to style himself ‘Emperor’ as early as 
1077.
139
  He did this to signify Castilian-Leonese hegemony over all of Christian Spain, 
as well as to denoted papal and Islamic claims to overlordship.  He employed the titles: 
‘Imperator totius Hispanie’ (Emperor of all Spain), and ‘Imperator super omnes 
Hispaniae nationes constitutus’ (Emperor of all the peoples of Spain).  This was to 
indicate his wider suzerainty over all of Spain, Christian as well as Muslim – for 
example, on the credentials of the Castilian envoy, Alvar Hanez to al-Mu’tamid, taifa 
king of Seville, Alfonso VI describes himself as: 
Emperador de los dos religiones’. 
King Alfonso VI won an outstanding victory at Toledo in 1085, when he 
recaptured the former Visigothic capital from the Muslims.  However, with the conquest 
of Toledo, the Christian frontier moved south from the River Duero to the River Tagus, 
in the centre of the Meseta.  Following the capture of the ‘royal city’ (urbs regia), 
Alfonso assumed the mantle of a triumphant emperor, and his seat of power was the 
former Visigothic capital: 
 ‘Adephonsus Imperator Toletanus Magnificus Triumphator’.140 
 However, Alfonso’s imperial pretensions faced the reality of a plurality of 
nascent Christian kingdoms emerging in the late eleventh century.  Ubieto Arteta argues 
that Alfonso’s suzerainty over the other Christian kingdoms of Iberia was merely 
notional, and that in fact relations of parity existed between the Peninsula rulers – that at 
this time there was not a hierarchy of monarchs.  This argument rests on the premise 
that the kings of Iberia were equals, who merely performed homage out of a sense of 
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friendship.  For example, he cites the occasion when King Sancho Ramírez of Aragón 
swore fealty to Alfonso VI in 1087.
141
 
 Castilian-Leonese imperial pretensions were given actuality by Alfonso’s 
annexation of Navarre in 1077, following the assassination of the Navarrese monarch, 
Sancho García IV (1054-76) the year before, on 4 June 1076.142  Navarre had already 
been a tributary of Castile prior to Sancho’s death, and Castile exercised suzerainty over 
the Pyrenean kingdom.  Alfonso VI appropriated all of Sancho’s former possessions.   
At this time, neighbouring Aragon also seized a portion of Navarre, which now 
devolved on King Sancho Ramírez I of Aragón (1063-94).  Sancho Ramírez captured 
Pamplona and its surrounding territory.  The two monarchs, or their agents, met to agree 
a partition treaty, which has not survived.  Under the terms of the treaty, Aragon was to 
receive the core territory of Navarre around Pamplona, extending as far south west as 
Estella.  However, he was to perform homage for it to the Castilian king, Alfonso VI.  
Castile was to receive the entire middle Ebro Valley, as far south as Calahorra, namely 
La Rioja region.  Castile was also to receive the old Basque provinces of Alava, 
Vizcaya and Guizpuzcoa.
143
  
Consequently, Navarre was partitioned between Castile and Aragón, and ceased 
to be an independent kingdom for the next half-century, until 1134.  La Rioja had 
become Castilian territory, and lordship over the Basque territories was now assumed 
by Castile, which exercised hegemony over them. 
However, in 1081 Alfonso VI altered his oriental policy to the detriment of 
Aragon.  The Basque territories of Alava, Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa were consolidated 
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under the lordship of the magnate, Lop Jiménez.  He had co-operated with the Castilian 
monarch in the partition of Navarre in 1076.  The fact that these three counties were 
now under Castilian control constituted a threat to Aragón.  Alfonso VI also created a 
county of La Rioja under the powerful Castilian noble, Garcia Ordoñez, who had been a 
royal alférez (standard bearer).  Garcia now appears in documents not only as comes 
(count), but also as husband of Urraca, sister of the former king of Navarre.  This new 
county was designed to contain the Navarrese, and strengthen the frontier with the taifa 
of Zaragoza.  The region also constituted a buffer zone between Castile and Aragón in 
the Upper Ebro Valley. 
On Alfonso VI’s death, his daughter, Queen Urraca (1109-26), styled herself 
‘Empress of all Spain’ (totius Ispanie Imperatorix).144  Meanwhile, her husband, who 
was King of Aragón, Alfonso I el Batallador, claimed the Leonese title for himself, 
adopting the style, ‘imperator de Leone et rex totius Hispaniae.’  However, at the Peace 
of Tamara (1127) he was sufficiently astute to acknowledge, that on Urraca’s death in 
1126, the imperial title had passed to her son, Alfonso VII of León-Castile (1126-57). 
 During Alfonso VII’s reign, the Leonese imperial concept reached its zenith in 
political terms.  This was particularly so after the Imperial Coronation of Alfonso in 
León in 1135.  He was now ‘Imperator Hispaniae’ (Emperor of Spain).  At this 
ceremony, the King of Navarre, García Ramírez (1134-50) and Count Ramon 
Berenguer IV of Barcelona, Prince of Aragón (1131-62), swore vassalage to the 
Leonese-Castilian emperor for their territories. 
 In the second half of the twelfth century, political circumstances did not 
facilitate the endurance of the Castilian-Leonese Empire.  Since 1085, and the recapture 
of Toledo, Alfonso VI had styled himself ‘Imperator Toletanus’, after the ancient royal 
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city of Visigothic Spain.  However, he had not been able to revivify Spain in its entirety.  
Moreover, according to Valdeavellano, the traditional ‘prestige of Empire’ had been 
linked to León in terms of political dominance, although Toledo was now ascribed to 
the emergent kingdom of Castile.
145
 
 Moreover, territorial expansion and political consolidation by other Christian 
Iberian states, especially Aragón, did not permit Castile and León to exercise hegemony 
over other Iberian powers.  For these reasons, the Imperial project was abandoned.  
Neither Fernando II of León (1157-88) or Alfonso VIII of Castile (1158-1214) adopted 
the title ‘Emperor’, which fell into disuse.  Nevertheless, Fernando III of Castile (1217-
52) vainly attempted to revive it on occasions. 
 Instead, the Christian Iberian states found expression in the thirteenth century as 
differentiated polities.
146
    The ‘five kingdoms’ were Castile, León, Portugal, Navarre 
and Aragón-Barcelona.  However, this disintegration never implied the transcendant 
unity of the Hispanic nation or dynastic solidarity between its royal houses, who were 
still styled by chroniclers in diplomas as the ‘Reges Hispaniae’ (Kings of Spain). 
The Secession of Portugal: 
 Alongside the existence of the Castilian-Leonese Empire, which occupied the 
core of Christian Iberia in the Middle Ages, the other, peripheral kingdoms exhibited 
varying degrees of drives towards independence, and these need to be considered on an 
individual basis.  Portuguese secession tendencies dated back to the beginning of the 
twelfth century, when Count Henry of Burgundy had married Alfonso VI’s natural 
daughter, Teresa.  Just before the former’s death in 1109, the couple had refused to 
accept his plans for a marriage alliance between their step-sister, Urraca, to Alfonso I of 
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Aragón.  Consequently, they withdrew from the Castilian court to Coimbra, in Portugal.  
Reilly argues that ‘effectively they never returned, and that Portuguese independence 
dated from this time.
147
  Under Afonso Henriquez (1128-85), an independent kingdom 
of Portugal emerged.  From 1128 – 35 he merely styled himself ‘Infans’, emphasising 
his relationship to his grandfather, Alfonso VI of León-Castile.  However, after the 
Imperial Coronation in 1135,Alfonso VII began to employ the title ‘Imperator’.148 
Following his Imperial Coronation, Emperor Alfonso VII sought to impose 
Castilian-Leonese hegemony over the other realms of Christian Iberia.  His first 
objective was the subjugation of Portugal.  Portugal was fighting the Almoravids on its 
own account, and was increasingly exhibiting secessionist tendencies – independence 
was achieved in 1140.
149
  Diplomacy was necessary to subordinate dominions such as 
Portugal, which might otherwise pose a threat if left to their own devices.
150
   
 Shortly after the Imperial Coronation in 1135, the Portuguese ruler invaded 
Galicia – part of the Leonese Empire - and captured the city of Túy.151  This occurrence 
constituted a threat to León on its western flank.  The Leonese nobles, Count Gómez 
Núñez and Count Rodrigo Pérez the Hairy rebelled against the Leonese emperor, and 
sided with the Portuguese leader.
152
  The Leonese emperor was obliged to march west to 
Túy, where he recaptured the city and forced the Portuguese leader to submit.153 
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 Hence, Alfonso VII agreed the Treaty of Túy (4 July 1137) with the Portuguese 
Infante, Afonso Henriquez.  This was the first Castilian-Leonese agreement to be 
committed to writing, and it set the precedent for royal peacemaking efforts in the 
kingdom.
154
  The treaty was described as a ‘pledge and a covenant’ (placitum et 
convenientia), and it was intended to last in perpetuity.  The aim of the Túy treaty was 
to establish the Portuguese Infante as a ‘good and faithful friend of the Emperor’: 
 ‘bonus amicus eius et fidelis.’155 
The border was to remain peaceful for the next three years.  However, in 1140/1, 
Afonso launched another invasion of the Galician borderlands, in the River Mino Valley, 
achieving victories over the Leonese.  Following the defeat of León, a truce for an 
indefinite period was agreed.  Sometime during this period, and certainly by July 1140, 
Afonso Henriquez began styling himself ‘Portugalensium Rex’ in Portuguese charters: 
the first original charter in which he styles himself by this title is dated 7 July 1140.
156
    
Friendship was one of the key motivations for kings to form diplomatic 
relationships with ‘opposing’ monarchs in the early Middle Ages, a phenomenon that 
has been much discussed by Althoff.
 157
  He refers to the role of friendship in the 
exercise of political power, citing the role of consilium (counsel) and decision-making.  
During the twelfth century, treaties agreed in friendship between the Iberian kings 
evolved into more formal political and military alliances.  This was crucial to establish 
Christian unity in the     face of the Islamic threat from al-Andalus.  Allies in peace 
became partners in war.  Alliances implied the provision of mutual auxilium, and were 
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sealed by the swearing of oaths.  However, an alliance might also act as a deterrent 
against attack from another Christian power. 
 In such treaties, the parties described themselves as friends, who were willing to 
fight to secure each other’s personal liberty and territorial security: 
  ‘facit ei securitatem de suo corpore.’158 
The aim of such early pacts was to safeguard the peace.  This was achieved through the 
lesser party swearing to be faithful to the senior party (fidelis)
159
.  Hence, the role of 
goodwill, loyalty and trust was vital to the spirit of the agreement.   
 Personal loyalty was only part of the equation: parties also swore to uphold the 
other party’s territorial sovereignty. In the Tuy treaty we find that Afonso pledges the 
security of the territory belonging to Alfonso VII: 
 ‘Faciat, etiam, illi securitatem de sua terra, quod non perdat.’160 
Castilian-Aragonese Rivalry: 
 All the principal Christian Iberian powers were pursuing the Reconquest on their 
own frontiers, and expanding their kingdoms in the process.  Castile and Aragón were 
no exception.  Until 1134, the year of the death of Alfonso I el Batallador (‘the Battler’) 
(1104-34), Castile-León and Aragón had been fierce rivals.  The Aragonese monarch’s 
first opportunity for expansion came with the death of King Alfonso VI of Castile-León 
in 1109.  The latter had died without male issue.  Consequently, he directed that his 
daughter, Urraca, who had been proclaimed his heir, should marry Alfonso I, thereby 
safeguarding the realm of Castile and its newly-acquired gains.  Such a union would 
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also create an alliance between the two major powers of Christian Iberia, Castile and 
Aragón.  The wedding took place at Monzon, near Palencia, in October 1109.161   
 The carta de arras (marriage contract) was broadly favourable to the Castilian-
Leonese side.
162
  Under its terms, if either party deserted the other, then the offender 
would forfeit the loyalty of its supporters; secondly, Alfonso I agreed that neither blood 
relations or excommunication would deter him from proceeding with the match; thirdly, 
they agreed that if they had a son, then Urraca and him would jointly inherit Alfonso’s 
territories after his death; fourthly, that if there was no progeny, then Alfonso would 
jointly inherit with the child; fifthly, if Urraca died first, Alfonso would jointly inherit 
with the child; and sixthly, in the absence of issue, he would only have use of her lands 
during her lifetime. 
However, the Castilian-Aragonese marriage alliance failed.  Both parties shared 
a common ancestor in Sancho el Mayor of Navarre (1000-35), and consequently they 
were related within the prohibited degrees of consanguinity.  On these grounds, 
Archbishop Bernard of Toledo opposed the marriage, and Pope Paschal I condemned it 
in 1110. 
 Moreover, Alfonso I and Urraca failed to produce an heir.  This was the undoing 
of the union: if the match had produced a successor, then both parties could have ruled 
their realms in his name until his majority.
163
  Even if the couple were forced to separate, 
the child would still have had a claim on the crowns of the two kingdoms.  Under the 
circumstances, the lack of offspring meant that the marriage was doomed, as it was 
beset by enemies in the Church and the secular nobility. 
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Alfonso I was clearly the most senior military leader in Christian Iberia, having 
scored a major triumph by his defeat of the taifa of Zaragoza in 1118, and subsequently 
having raided deep into Andalusian territory in a successful expedition in 1125.
164
  
However, after March 1126, when Alfonso VII inherited the   throne of León-Castile, 
Alfonso I faced an ambitious stepson, in the form of Queen Urraca’s heir.  The former 
immediately attempted to recover Castilian-Leonese territory seized by Alfonso el 
Batallador since 1113.  By 1127, the young Leonese monarch had recaptured Burgos 
and Carrion de los Condes.  Moreover, Alfonso VII secured a marriage alliance with 
doña Berengaria, daughter of Count Ramon Berenguer III of Barcelona.  Whilst Aragón 
was preoccupied with its struggle against Barcelona and the latter’s French allies (the 
counts of Aquitaine, Toulouse, Bearn and Bigorre), Alfonso VII captured Castrojeriz 
and Aragonese positions west of the Sierra de la Demanda.      
However, Alfonso VII’s interests were harmed by the fact that several prominent 
Castilian nobles sided with the Aragonese monarch, no doubt attracted by his military 
prowess.  These conflicting noble loyalties manifested themselves in the allegiances of 
the magnates concerned, who only made peace with Alfonso VII under duress.  The 
Chronica Adefonsi Imperatoris [CAI] comments: 
 ‘…they made peace with him, although they did so deceitfully on account of the 
king of Aragón, whom they esteemed above all others.’165 
 However, the Battler died without heirs on 8 September 1134, shortly after the 
battle of Fraga (1134).  As he was without male issue, he bequeathed the Kingdom of 
Aragón to the international military orders.  Subsequently, Alfonso’s younger brother, 
Ramiro II (1134-37), who was a monk, assumed the throne.  In September 1134, in the 
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old royal city of Jaca, the majority of the Aragonese aristocracy recognised King 
Sancho II as the new monarch of Aragón.  He was the brother of Alfonso I el 
Batallador, a monk, former abbot and bishop-elect.  Papal dispensation was needed for 
his return to lay life, subsequent marriage and the transfer of Alfonso’s inheritance to 
him.   
 The kingdom of Aragón was arguably Alfonso I’s creation, and whether it 
would endure without him was a moot point.  Meanwhile, León-Castile was in the 
ascendant under King Alfonso VII.  On hearing of the death of his rival, Alfonso VII 
marched for La Rioja. At this time, Alfonso VII was able to recover the entire west bank 
of the River Ebro, which constituted the core of Castilan dominions in the east since the 
annexation of Navarre in 1077.
166
  The border city of Nájera had already declared for 
Garcia Ramirez of Pamplona, however at Alfonso’s appearance, the majority of the 
nobility transferred their allegiance to the Castilian monarch.
167
     
Lourie argues that the consequence of Alfonso I’s Will was a significant 
reconfiguration of Christian Iberian politics in the early twelfth century
168
: firstly, and 
most significantly, León-Castile assumed hegemony over Christian Iberia, replacing 
Aragón.  This development has been much discussed by Castilian historians, such as 
Menéndez Pidal, and many others since
169
; secondly, Aragón and Navarre sundered 
their alliance; and thirdly, a new union between Aragón and Catalonia was inaugurated 
by the marriage of Count Ramon Berenguer IV of Barcelona and Petronilla of Aragón. 
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 Alfonso VII had a clear political advantage in exploiting the temporary 
Aragonese vacuum of power caused by the interregnum.  He was a third claimant to the 
Aragonese throne, as he was a great-grandson of Sancho III el Mayor (‘the Great’) of 
Navarre, through his mother, Queen Urraca, wife of Alfonso el Batallador.  Moreover, 
the Castilian monarchy had formed an interest on the frontier Rioja region dating back 
to 1076, during the reign of Alfonso VI.
170
  He also had a strategic political interest in 
acquiring the city of Zaragoza, as had his predecessors.
171
   
 Castilian imperial hegemony consisted of the suzerainty (overlordship) of the 
Empire over a proliferation of Iberian dominions.  Suzerainty was given legal actuality 
by the vassalage of Count Ramon Berenguer IV of Barcelona, ruler of Aragón and 
Catalonia and King García Ramírez of Navarre to King Alfonso VII.
172
  This feudal 
relationship was the basis for the most enduring alliance of the twelfth and early 
thirteenth centuries: that between Castile and Aragón.  In that same year, 1134, Count 
Ramon and Count Alfonse Jourdain of Toulouse presented themselves before the 
Leonese king, promised to obey him in everything, and became vassals of the Leonese 
monarch.
173
  At this time Alfonso VII gave the lordship of Zaragoza to Count Ramon as 
a fief.      
 The lord-vassal relationship between the Emperor and the king of Aragón is 
demonstrated by the ceremony with which King Ramiro greeted Alfonso VII:  the latter 
advanced down the River Ebro to Zaragoza, and Ramiro came out of the city to 
welcome him, with all his nobles, bishops and abbots.
174
  Alfonso entered the city in 
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December 1134.
175
  According to the terms of his agreement with Ramiro II, he 
acquired the city itself, as well as its surrounding territory, and Almazan and Soria.  
Alfonso was received by the nobles and citizens of the city, who welcomed him.  He 
stayed several days in the royal palace, and left a garrison of soldiers to guard the city.  
Ramiro gladly accepted Alfonso’s promise of auxilium (military assistance) against the 
Muslims.  Thus, the Castilian-Leonese monarch gained the capital of the kingdom of 
Aragón.  Ramiro ceded the ‘regnum Caesaraugustanum’ (i.e. Zaragoza) in perpetuity. 
Indeed, according to the CAI, the city would: 
 ‘always remain under his dominion and that of his sons.’ 
This reference to Alfonso’s sons, Sancho and Fernando, heralds the beginning of later 
Castilian-Leonese hegemony over the other Christian kingdoms of northern Iberia, 
namely Aragón-Catalonia and Navarre, although Aragón was formally released from its 
vassalage in 1170. 
King Ramiro II of Aragón married Agnes, daughter of Duke William IX of 
Aquitaine in 1135
176
, and the couple produced an heiress, Petronilla the following year 
(1136)
177
.  However, the fact that she was a girl precluded her from ruling Aragón in an 
age when military prowess was essential in a leader.  In 1137 she was married to Count 
Ramon Berenguer IV of Barcelona (1131-62), although the union was only 
consummated in 1150.  The latter was initially made Protector of the Kingdom of 
Aragón, and later its sovereign, when he assumed the title, ‘Prince of Aragón’.  Ramiro 
now abdicated in favour of Count Ramon, who ruled until his death in 1162.   
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The county of Barcelona, which came to form the nucleus of Catalonia, was now 
united to the Kingdom of Aragón.  This joint polity, Aragón-Barcelona, was to become 
the principal rival to Castile-León in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, second only in 
power to Castile itself.  Reilly concludes that this new power disputed the leadership of 
the Iberian Peninsula with Castile-León until the fifteenth century.178 
After 1134 and the death of the ‘Battler’, the king of León-Castile allied himself 
to the Count of Barcelona, Ramon Berenguer IV, who by virtue of his marriage to 
Petronilla, daughter of Ramiro II, became Prince of Aragón.  This alliance was 
remarkable because it replaced the earlier rivalry that had existed between Castile and 
Aragón during ‘the Battler’s’ reign.  Aragón was now united with Catalonia.  This 
alliance between Castile-León and Aragón-Catalonia took the form of the feudal 
submission of Aragón to León-Castile by Count Ramon swearing homage to Emperor 
Alfonso VII (1136).  In this manner, the lesser rulers of Christian Iberia were bound to 
the Castilian monarch through a network of feudal liens (bonds).  Indeed, Le Goff 
remarks on the typically feudal nature of the gesture of homage to the Castilian ruler.
179
  
The CAI describes the ceremony: 
‘In the same year…the king’s brother-in-law, Count Ramon of  Barcelona, and 
his relative, Count Alfonse of Toulouse, came before the king of León and promised to 
obey him in all matters.  They were made his knights, after they had touched he king’s 
right hand to confirm their loyalty.
180
 
As Count Ramon Berenguer IV was a vassal of Emperor Alfonso VII, he was 
the junior partner in the Castilian-Aragonese alliance.  In the early twelfth century, the 
main purpose of this alliance was to subjugate and partition the kingdom of Navarre, in 
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which both powers had long-standing territorial claims dating to 1077.  This was 
achieved through three successive treaties of concord, those of Carrión (1140/1), 
Tudejen (1151) and Lérida (1156).  In each case, although Emperor Alfonso VII 
received the lesser share of the territory in Navarre, he ensured his hegemony over 
Christian Iberia by insisting that Count Ramon Berenguer IV perform homage to him 
for the Aragonese share of Navarre.  Thus, Castilian suzerainty was preserved.  For 
example, in the Treaty of Carrión we find: 
‘et pro illis duabus partibus quas habebit, faciat imperatori Adefonsi tale 
hominium, quale rex Sancius et rex Petrus Adefonsi regi, avuo imperatoris Adefonsi 
fecerunt.’181 
By this feudal device, Emperor Alfonso VII succeeded in preserving Castilian 
suzerainty over Navarre, despite only being in possession of one-third of the kingdom.  
Prior to partition however, Castilian-Aragonese forces had to capture Navarre.  The 
Navarrese had defeated the Aragonese at the battle of Ejea (1140).  The Castilians came 
to the aid of the Aragonese army, whereupon the Navarrese fled the field at the sight of 
the Castilian standard.  The following year (1141), Alfonso VII moved to Nájera on the 
Castilian-Navarrese frontier to renew his attack on King García of Navarre.  However, 
García had no appetite for war, having been defeated several times by Castilian 
forces.
182
  Hence, he   sued for peace.  The CAI reports that this move on García’s part 
was inspired by the Treaty of Túy, between Alfonso VII and Afonso Henriquez of 
Portugal: 
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‘Videte quod consilium capiamus, quia iterum imperator, facta pace cum 
Portugalensium rege, volet venire super nos, ut nos disperdat et terram nostrum aut 
bello aut obsidione.’183  
Peace with Navarre was agreed at the end of October 1140.  It was achieved 
through the mediation of Count Alfonse Jourdain of Toulouse, who was embarked on a 
pilgrimage to Santiago de Compostela.
184
  Count Alfonse and the Navarrese nobles, 
having arrived at a decision, went out to meet the Emperor – we are not told where - and 
peace was agreed between the latter and the Navarrese king.  At this meeting, King 
García agreed to serve the emperor all the days of his life.  The outcome was a marriage 
alliance between King García of Navarre and the Castilian Infanta, Urraca, daughter of 
Emperor Alfonso VII.  The wedding took place on 24 June 1144. 
This union achieved peace between Castile-León and the Kingdom of Navarre.  
It constituted a vivid illustration of the benefits of marital alliances as a form of 
diplomacy.  The wedding was also a magnificent example of twelfth-century pageantry.  
The CAI describes the festivities in great detail: 
‘Venit autem imperator et cum eo uxor sua imperatorix domna Berengaria et 
maxima turba potestatem, comitum et militum Castelle.  Venit autem et rex Garsia cum 
turba militum non pauca ita paratus et ornatus, sicut regem sponsatum ad proprias decet 
venire nuptias.  Intravit autem serenissima infans domna Sanctia in Legionem per 
portam Cauriensem et cum ea sobrina sua infans domna Urraca, sponsa regis Garsie, 
cum maxima turba nobelium militum et clericorum et mulierum et puellarum…’185 
The Issue of Navarre: 
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 Both Aragón and Castile claimed parts of the Kingdom of Navarre for 
themselves, on the basis of ancestral claims dating back to the late eleventh century.  
Both refused to countenance an independent Navarre existing in its own right, so in any 
study of Navarre we also have to consider Castilian and Aragonese foreign policy, 
sometimes in isolation, but more usually in conjunction with each other.  Although this 
choice of successor was acceptable to Sancho’s Aragonese subjects, Navarre – part of 
which was claimed by Aragón at this time – refused to acknowledge the new incumbent.  
Instead, they turned to García Ramírez, a Navarrese noble, of royal but illegitimate 
descent.  García was duly acclaimed King of Navarre (1134-50).
186
  He was known as 
‘el Restaurador’ (‘the Restorer’), as he championed the restoration of Navarrese 
independence for another seven years, until 1144, when he settled for a restored 
Kingdom of Navarre, albeit one limited to Pamplona and the Rioja as far south as 
Tudela. 
 King García of Navarre also performed homage to the Leonese king at this time, 
when he received gifts and a lordship.  This meeting probably occurred at Nájera, on the 
Castilian-Navarrese border, in November 1134.
187
  During the vista real (royal meeting), 
the Leonese king recognised King García as the legitimate Navarrese sovereign.  In 
return, García surrendered the Rioja and all the other territories west of the River Ebro 
that his mother, Urraca, had lost to King Alfonso I of Aragón.  This augmented 
Castilian territory formerly held by Aragón in Navarre, cementing Castilian dominance.  
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The following May (1135), the Navarrese ruler renewed his oath of homage to Alfonso 
VII.
188
 
Territorial disputes, such as that of Castile versus Navarre led to political 
discourse and diplomatic exchanges in the twelfth century.  In the process, kingdoms 
such as Navarre emerged.  Following the collapse of Aragón at the time of the death of 
the Battler, Navarre once more became a separate polity, autonomous from Aragón.  
This circumstance was largely due to the widespread feeling in Navarre that the union 
of the two kingdoms could not continue under such a weak ruler as King Ramiro II of 
Aragón.
189
  Alfonso VII exploited this division to subordinate Navarre (and Aragón).  
The new kingdom of Navarre centred around Pamplona and stretched as far south as 
Tudela on the River Ebro.  The Leonese monarch recognised García Ramírez as the 
legitimate dux (duke) of Pamplona, the Basque provinces and other territory of Ramiro 
beyond the River Ebro that he could capture.  In return, Alfonso required Navarrese 
military auxilium in Zaragoza against Ramiro II
190
 
 The two principal Christian powers of Iberia, Castile and Aragón, both 
attempted to divide Navarre and al-Andalus on repeated occasions in the mid-twelfth 
century.  These attempts manifested themselves in the partition treaties.  Such partition 
treaties also implicitly recognised the rights of monarchs to expand their kingdoms at 
the expense of al-Andalus.  It was not merely enough to defeat the Muslims in battle; 
their territory had to be annexed and resettled with a Christian population.  This implied 
the partition of al-Andalus between the respective Christian powers, namely Castile-
León and Aragón.  Hence, the diplomatic treaties of the first half of the twelfth century 
regarded it as perfectly legitimate to partition territory which had yet to be recaptured. 
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The purpose of the Treaty of Carrión (1140/1) was to partition the Kingdom of 
Navarre between Castile-León and Aragón, both of which wanted to reclaim the parts of 
Navarre which they asserted belonged to them: 
‘Concordati sunt…super illam terram quam tenet Garsias, rex 
Pampilonensium.’191 
The parties to the treaty were Emperor Alfonso VII, ‘Emperor of Spain’, and Ramon 
Berenguer IV of Barcelona, who was by now ‘Prince of Aragón’.  King García IV must 
be considered a non-party to the treaty.  The terms of the treaty were that Aragon would 
receive the larger, two-thirds share of Navarre.  Ubieto Arteta argues that on this basis 
the import of the treaty ran contrary to the ambitions of Emperor Alfonso VII, as its 
effect was to promote the interests of Count Ramon, who was now Prince of Aragón.
192
  
Thus, the count of Barcelona would hold the same territory which former Aragonese 
monarchs, Sancho Ramírez and Pedro I had done.  This division of territory was made 
on the grounds that part of the kingdom of Navarre legally belonged to the Aragonese 
kingdom: 
 ‘…totam illam terram que regno Aragonensi pertinet 193 
The Aragonese claim derived from the land beyond the River Ebro held by King 
Alfonso I el Batallador at his death, ex parte King García of Navarre: 
 ‘…totam aliam terram quam Adefonsus rex, avus illius illo die quo mortuus est, 
ultra Iberum ex parte Pampilonie tenebat.’194 
Castile-León was granted the remaining share, around the city of Pamplona and 
Estella.  However, Count Ramon was obliged to perform homage to Emperor Alfonso 
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VII for his share of Navarrese territory, as King Sancho Ramírez had earlier done to 
King Alfonso VI of León-Castile.  In this manner, Emperor Alfonso VII managed to 
preserve his suzerainty over Christian Iberia, whilst only receiving the minority share of 
partitioned Navarre. 
As regards al-Andalus, only a joint Christian effort could succeed in defeating 
the Muslims.  The preliminary objective was to end internecine warfare between the 
Christian kingdoms as a prerequisite to engaging the Muslims in combat.  Hence, the 
Christian powers of Castile-León and Aragón agreed to partition al-Andalus into 
respective spheres of influence, in return for mutual auxilium.   
The first such partition treaty, the Treaty of Tudejen (1151), effectively 
partitioned the whole of the Levante (the Eastern seaboard of al-Andalus) between 
Emperor Alfonso VII and Count Ramon Berenguer IV of Barcelona.
195
  The Treaty of 
Tudejen was the first of several partition treaties to apportion as yet unconquered 
territory in al-Andalus.  However, although on the face of the document it claimed to 
divide the whole of al-Andalus, only the Levantine coast is mentioned specifically.  It 
was intended to be enforced after those lands had been seized in battle, at a yet 
unspecified date.  
The Count of Barcelona was promised the Eastern seaboard of al-Andalus in 
return for his assistance.  Specifically, this territory included the strategic cities of 
Valencia, Denia and Murcia, and all their hinterlands: 
‘Preterea, predictus imperator et prenominatus comes se invicem convenieunt et 
faciunt placitum et concordia de terra Ispanie, quam modo sarraceni tenant, ut comes 
habeat  civitatem Valenciam cum omni terra…ad terminam regni Tortose; et habeat 
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similiter civitatem Deniam cum omnibus suis pertinentiis et cum omni illo domino quod 
tempore sarracenorum ipsi sarraceni habeant.’196      
In each case, the Count of Barcelona was granted the city mentioned as well as 
its appurtenances and surrounding territory (alfoz).  Moreover, the treaty was careful to 
delineate the           borders of such allocated territory.  Hence, Ramon Berenguer was to 
receive: 
 ‘the city of Valencia with all its territory…as far as the Kingdom of Denia.’ 
In return, the count of Barcelona was obliged to perform homage to the Emperor 
Alfonso VII in return for the possession of Valencia and Murcia: 
‘tali pacto, ut habeat predictas ciuitates prelibatus comes per iam dictum 
imperatorem per tale hominium…’197 
 The third partition treaty was the Treaty of Lérida (May 1156).
198
  This pact, too, 
aimed to partition Navarre between León-Castile and Aragón.  Both León-Castile and 
Aragón-Catalonia wanted to divide Navarre again.  Hence, they both signed a partition 
treaty, in which   the respective shares of territory would be allocated according to the 
earlier Treaty of Tudején (1151).  Under Tudején, Aragón had received the majority 
two-thirds share, and León-Castile had retained a one-thirds share.  However, the 
Emperor Alfonso VII had reserved the right of feudal suzerainty over the Aragonese 
share as the senior Iberian ruler at the time.    
The parties to the new treaty were Emperor Alfonso VII, his two sons, Sancho 
and Fernando, and Count Ramon Berenguer IV of Barcelona.  In the accord, Ramon 
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confirmed the terms of the earlier Treaty of Tudején (1151), which had partitioned 
Navarre between these two powers: 
 ‘Ego…Raimundus…concede et laudo et recognosco illam divisionem et 
convenienciam per medium factam inter me et illustrissimus imperatorem Adefonsum 
et filios eius regem Sancio atque Ferrandum de regno Navarre eiusdemque terris, sicut 
olim statutum est inter nos…que facta fuit in loco qui dicitur Tudilen…’199 
Lérida was a mutual alliance pact between León-Castile and Aragón, and 
consequently, both sides agreed to undertake reciprocal measures in common cause 
against the Kingdom of Navarre.  Consequently, Count Ramon promised the Emperor 
and his sons that he would not receive at his court, maintain or defend King García 
Ramírez of Navarre in word or deed, or provide him with auxilium, against the will of 
the Emperor.  The Emperor agreed similar terms in the treaty: 
‘Ita, quidem, quod imperator et filii eius non manuteneant nec defendant iam 
dictam regem Sancium Navarre, nec auxilium ei prebeant aliquo modo dictis nec factis 
contra voluntatem meam.’200 
Execution of the treaty was provided for by Count Ramon confirming that he would 
abide by its terms: 
 ‘…conveniencias ego iam dictus comes laudo, et per fidem meam sine dolo et 
fraude confirm perficiendas atque complendas.’201 
Thus, it is possible to discern that these treaties reflected the current of political 
relationships in twelfth-century Christian Iberia: the Crown of Aragón and the King of 
Navarre were both now vassals of the Castilian-Leonese emperor, and both had received 
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their own      territories as fiefs from him. Moreover, even the Portuguese monarch, 
King Afonso I Henriquez, remained a vassal of the Leonese emperor, as he had been 
since the Treaty of Túy (1137).  Nevertheless, Afonso Henriquez did not perform 
homage for the kingdom of Portugal itself, as García Ramírez had done for Navarre – 
Portugal was independent.
202
  Thus, by the end of 1140, Alfonso VII had consolidated 
his control over the Christian kingdoms of Iberia – the princes of Navarre and Aragón-
Barcelona had performed homage to him, and the ruler of Portugal had sworn allegiance.  
However, the attempt to absorb Navarre had proved beyond the resources of either 
Castile-León or Aragón. 
The Imperial Coronation of Emperor Alfonso VII: 
 Although Emperor Alfonso VII was the most powerful military ruler in 
Christian Iberia after the death of ‘the Battler’, this was unsufficient for him: he wanted 
political recognition of his imperial power.  This could only be achieved by having 
himself crowned Emperor.  The consequence of his imperial coronation was that he 
could style himself ‘Emperor’ in legal documents – they would refer to the fact of his 
coronation, which was now incontestable.  The plenitude of his dominions enabled 
Alfonso VII to style himself ‘Emperor’.  The title ‘Totius Hispanie Imperator’ implied 
Castilian-Leonese hegemony over the lesser kingdoms of the Iberian Peninsula.  He 
used the imperial title from the beginning of his reign in 1126, although he was only 
crowned Emperor in 1135.
203
  However, although Alfonso asserted his imperial title, he 
was confronted by the Almoravid threat and the rivalry with Aragón early in his reign, 
and it was not until the Battler’s death in 1134 that he began to realise his status as the 
Peninsular’s senior military leader. 
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 The Imperial Coronation took place on Whitsunday 1135 in the cathedral of 
León.
204
  Our principal source is the chronicle, CAI.  The ceremony was attended by 
King García Ramírez IV of Pamplona, Count Ramon Berenguer IV of Barcelona, Count 
Alfonse Jordan of Toulouse and by a plethora of nobility from France and Gascony.  All 
the ecclesiastical and lay nobility were present to celebrate the festivities.  On the Feast 
of Whitsunday all the assembled magnates and people of the realm witnessed Alfonso 
being crowned Emperor of León-Castile: 
 ‘ut vocarent regem imperatorem.’205 
He was attired in a cape and crowned with a golden crown.  Then he was acclaimed 
Emperor by the assembled congregation.  This lavish ceremonial was intended to 
impress his new status and prestige on the assembled rulers.  Reilly emphasises that it 
reaffirmed Alfonso’s political authority and the military strength of the kingdom of 
Castile-León in the Peninsula.
206
  On the third day of the Royal Council, the Emperor 
sanctioned new customs and laws to be enacted throughout his dominions: 
 ‘Deditque imperator mores et leges in universe regno suo.’207 
He also ordered the settlement of towns and villages that had been ravaged by war, and 
ordered the planting of trees and vineyards.  After the Coronation, Alfonso embarked on 
a royal progress from Toro to Burgos.
208
 
Diplomacy and the Second Crusade: 
 War and peace had always been the prerogative of medieval kings throughout 
Western Europe, and this was nowhere more certain than in the Iberian crusades, 
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collectively known as the ‘Reconquest’.  Usually, diplomacy preceded warfare, 
establishing the parameters of the campaign in hand.  This was especially necessary 
when long-distance diplomacy was required, as was the case in the second crusade, 
when the Commune of Genoa, in Italy, combined forces with the Castilian-Leonese 
Empire, and Aragonese-Catalan polity to launch a siege of the port city of Almeria, in 
al-Andalus. 
Peace between the Christian Iberian kingdoms was the essential prerequisite for 
the prosecution of the crusade against the Muslim Almoravid regime.  However, 
whereas in the Holy Land war and diplomacy were complementary tactics to be 
employed alternately against the infidel, in Spain peacemaking was necessary for 
Christian unity.  Political unity was the vital precondition for victory on the battlefield.  
It was also necessary to nullify domestic distractions whilst the Reconquista was 
ongoing.  Christian leaders tended to be rivals, and they competed for the same territory. 
However, in time of need they could forge alliances against a common foe.  In Christian 
Iberia, this unity was largely achieved by c. 1140, when Emperor Alfonso VII had 
received the feudal submission of all the lesser rulers in the Peninsula. 
 The crusades were essentially military expeditions against the Muslims that 
were licensed by the Papacy.
209
  It was the Papacy that was responsible for co-
ordinating Christian intervention against the Muslims.  Pope Urban II had preached the 
First Crusade as a war of liberation.
 210
  This implied both the liberation of the Orthodox 
Church in the East – which had   seceded from Rome in 1054 – and the liberation of the 
Holy Land and the city of Jerusalem from its servitude.
211
  Riley-Smith argues that this 
‘war of liberation’ must be viewed in the context of the prevailing spirit of the age, 
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namely the liberation of the Church as a whole, and cites eleventh-century sources 
which are replete with the terms ‘libertas’ and ‘liberatio’.212   
 However, at the same time the Papacy was keen to ensure the prosecution of the 
war against the Muslims in Christian Europe, most notably in Spain.  This required 
internal peace between the kingdoms of Western Europe.  Hence, the Papacy 
encouraged the knighthood of Europe to redirect their martial energies towards fighting 
the Holy War.
213
  In the process, a measure of peace and unity was achieved in 
Christendom. Alphendery advances the argument one stage further: he asserts that the 
crusades were manifestations of the Christian unity that they helped to create.
214
  
Mastnak elaborates that Pope Urban II’s crusade propaganda was based on ‘the 
community of the whole of Christendom’… launching a ‘massive assault, a common 
front’ against the infidel.215 
 From the very beginning of the crusading movement the Papacy equated the 
Reconquista in Spain with the crusades to the Holy Land:  Urban II urged Spanish 
knights to restore the frontier city of Tarragona, which had been an ancient Roman 
provincial capital, and was the eastern metropolitan diocese of Spain.
216
  Consequently, 
Spain became an equally valid theatre of war for crusaders in the twelfth century.  
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Indeed, the Papacy endeavoured to dissuade Spanish knights from venturing to 
Outremer because of the need to combat Islam in the Iberian Peninsula.
217
   
The Papacy made explicit the link between the Reconquista and the Crusades to 
the Holy Land under Pope Calixtus II in 1123.
218
  This was a vital step in the history of 
the Iberian crusades.  Calixtus had been Papal Legate to Spain, and he was well aware 
of the need to achieve parity between the two theatres of war from the perspective of 
Christian Iberia and the whole of Western Christendom.  Hence, the role of the crusade 
came to have a pivotal role in the Reconquest.  The First Lateran Council (March 1123) 
formally equated warfare in Iberia and the Holy Land, and granted to the former the 
crusading elements of vow, cross and indulgence.  Within a month Calixtus had issued a 
bull for Catalan crusaders in which he explicitly promised remission of sins, like that 
granted to participants in the Crusades to the East: 
‘With Apostolic authority and power divinely bestowed on us we graciously 
grant to all those fighting firmly on this expedition the same remission of sins that we 
conceded to the defenders of the Eastern Church.’219 
The Papacy consistently supported the Reconquest from the origins of the 
Crusading movement onwards.  This support is most visible in Pope Eugenius III’s bull, 
Quantum Praedecessores, in which he explicitly promoted the crusade in Spain.  On 27 
May 1145 he granted the Archbishop of Tarragona the pallium and reissued an earlier 
Bull for a campaign to Tarragona: 
‘…for the Reconquest of which our predecessors are known to have laboured 
greatly.’220 
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This Bull had already been promulgated by earlier popes, including Urban II (1089), 
Gelasius II (1118) and Lucius II (1144). 
 The chief protagonist in the Iberian second crusade was Emperor Alfonso VII.  
From 1133 onwards he had engaged with the enemy on a sporadic basis, however from 
c. 1140, he began to campaign regularly in al-Andalus.  Contemporaneously, the 
Almoravid caliphate was experiencing a rebellion in its heartland of Morocco.
221
  This 
provided the perfect opportunity for a Christian offensive.  The Almoravids were 
confronted by a radical new sect, the Almohads, who represented a puritanical version 
of Islam.
222
  By the 1140s, they had grown sufficiently strong to descend from their base 
in the Atlas Mountains and threaten the Almoravid capital of Marrakesh.  Ibn Khaldun 
argues that the ancien regime had grown weak on the sophisticated Andalusi lifestyle, 
although no convincing evidence of this theory exists.
223
  The Almoravid emir, Yusuf b. 
Tashufin, was recalled to North Africa in 1138, and by the early 1140s their power in 
the Maghreb (North Africa) had started to wane.  Christian rulers exploited this 
weakness, and they mounted raids into al-Andalus in 1143 and 1144.
224
 
 The crusades in the Iberian Peninsula in the late 1140s and the Second Crusade 
to the Holy Land (1147-49) were contemporaneous.
225
  Concomitantly, knights were 
fighting the pagan Wends in Pomerania.
226
  Contemporaries regarded these diverse 
campaigns as part of a common enterprise.  However, whilst the Iberian crusades were 
largely successful, the Second Crusade to the Holy Land was not.  It was the Geneose 
who proposed the launch of a new campaign in the Iberian Peninsula to Emperor 
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Alfonso VII.  Their participation, and the support of the Papacy, transformed a series of 
raids (razzias) into a full-blooded campaign. 
 Alfonso VII sent Bishop Arnaldo of Astorga (1144-52) on an embassy to the 
Count of Barcelona and William, Lord of Montpellier.  He was charged with recruiting 
their assistance for the forthcoming Almería campaign, so that: 
 ‘…for the redemption of their souls, they could participate in the expedition.’227 
This phrase is indicative of crusading ideology involved in the Almería war, and Barton 
and Fletcher argue that it is suggestive of a strong spiritual motivation for the 
crusade.
228
  Phillips observes that Papal involvement would also explain the grant of the 
spiritual rewards promised by Bishop Arnoldo
229
, as described in the CAI: 
 ‘…so that for the redemption of their souls, they would all be present…to 
destroy the aforementioned nest of pirates.  Receiving these words with great joy, they 
promised they would be present with the Genoese.’230 
 Although no Papal bull survives for the Almería campaign, there is a strong 
presumption that one was issued, because the Genoese annalist, Caffaro, reports that the 
Genoese: 
 ‘…prompted and called by God, through the Apostolic See, swore to lead an 
army against the Saracens of Almería.’231  
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However, in October 1146 Pope Eugenius III issued the crusading letter, Divina 
Dispensatione I to the clergy of Italy, who were participating in the crusade, in which he 
alluded to the Spanish Reconquest in general terms.  Papal encouragement for the 
Almería campaign was expressed in the issue of the bull, Divina Dispensatione II.  
Although this Bull was addressed to participants in the Wendish Crusades in the Baltic, 
Pope Eugenius placed that campaign in the context of the wider Christian struggle in 
Iberia and the Levant: 
 ‘…the king of Spain is strongly armed against the Saracens of those regions, 
over whom he had already frequently triumphed…so great a multitude of faithful from 
diverse regions is preparing to fight the infidel and that almost the whole of 
Christendom is being summoned for so great a task.’232 
 Both Ramon Berenguer IV and Lord William of Montpellier agreed to 
participate in the Almería campaign.  The motivation for their involvement was 
probably a combination of commercial strategy and religious inducements.  For both 
leaders, Almería represented a commercial rival and a military threat – it was a ‘nest of 
pirates’, having once been the naval base of the Umayyad Caliphate of Córdoba.233  The 
assembly of such a plethora of Christian forces and the prospect of spiritual rewards 
meant that it made military logic to capture Almería (1147), Lisbon (1147)
234
, Tortosa 
(1148) and Lérida (1149) all at once.  The outcome of Bishop Arnoldo’s negotiations 
was that by the end of 1146, Emperor Alfonso VII, the Commune of Genoa, Count 
Ramon Berenguer IV of Barcelona, and Lord William of Montpellier were all 
committed to a two-year campaign across the Peninsula.   
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However, Pope Eugenius III encouraged the Genoese to participate in the 
Second Crusade in Spain; indeed, he specifically enjoined them to do so.
235
  A 
precedent for Italian involvement in Iberian political affairs may have been the Pisan 
attack on the Balearic Islands in 1114-15.
236
  Constable concludes that this evidence 
leaves no doubt of Pope Eugenius’s interest in the Spanish Reconquista.  Further, it 
proves that the Papacy under Eugenius’s pontificate was active in co-ordinating the 
geographically diverse crusading movements of the day, from the Baltic to the 
Mediterranean, and from Portugal to the Holy Land.
237
  To a far greater degree than the 
First Crusade, the Second Crusade was achieved through the joint efforts of 
ecclesiastical and secular leaders, witnessed by the oratory of St. Bernard and Bishop 
Arnaldo, and the military leadership of Emperor Alfonso VII and the Commune of 
Genoa. 
 The Genoese treaties with León-Castile were almost entirely motivated by 
commercial interests on the part of the Commune.  From c. 1100 onwards, the great 
maritime republics of Italy – Genoa, Pisa, Venice and Amalfi – had emerged to rival the 
Islamic naval powers of the Mediterranean, like Almería.238  By participating in the 
Spanish Reconquest, the Commune of Genoa could expect to receive a commercial 
quarter in each of the cities that it captured in alliance with Spanish troops.  These 
developments were accompanied by a revolution in nautical technology, making 
navigation easier than it had been hitherto.
239
  The result was the emergence of trade 
arteries transversing the Mediterranean, manifesting the competition between Christian 
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and Muslim powers, and later, between Christian powers themselves, such as the rivalry 
between Genoa and Pisa. 
 Genoa’s participation in the Almería campaign was recorded by the annalist, 
Caffaro.
240
  Caffaro was also a consul of the Commune, so he is an authoritative source 
for Genoese history.  Consuls were elected officials, although their method of selection 
is unclear.  In the twelfth century, these urban communes were proliferating in northern 
and central Italy: they existed in Venice, Florence, Pisa, Milan and Genoa.
241
  The main 
purpose of the commune was to defend its people, and to find the financial means to pay 
for such defence.
242
  The consuls were responsible for proclaiming and enforcing trade 
sanctions (i.e. embargos) against all enemies of the republic.  Defence of the commune 
was entrusted to the consuls after they had sworn an oath (compagna).  The oath 
represented an attempt to create an urban government with moral and legal authority, 
whose power was binding on its citizens.  Caffaro states that the Genoese established a 
compagna early in 1099. 
In this period, c. 1100-1150, treaties and other written documents, such as acta, 
charters and legal documents, all attest to Genoa’s growing importance in 
Mediterranean affairs.  It was the consul’s duty to manage relations with other 
Mediterranean powers.  According to Epstein, the consuls would have relied upon a 
political consensus amongst the civic population to formulate foreign policy.
243
  
Expansion often meant military conflict with competing powers, such as the Islamic 
port of Almería, although consuls also took measures to ensure that peaceful rivals, such 
as Pisa, could not undermine the commercial base of the city’s wealth. 
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The Almería campaign of 1147 was particularly significant in the history of the 
Commune because it was an enemy naval base.  As such, it was not only a military 
threat, but also the entrepot for Andalusian commercial shipping. 
The treaties between the Commune and Emperor Alfonso VII were probably 
agreed between 24-30 September1146, the year before the invasion of Almería.  No 
topical date is given, so we are ignorant of the location of the vista real that preceded 
the redaction of these treaties.  Both treaties were mutual assistance agreements that 
specified the promise of auxilium by the respective parties.
244
  After redaction, 
presumably by notaries, they were duplicated and exchanged. 
The object of this Leonese-Castilian – Genoese alliance was Almería (1147).  
The treaties agreed between these two powers specified the division of captured 
territory that was the hallmark of Italian trading agreements at this time.
245
  Typically, 
the commercial quarter granted to the Genoese comprised a third of the captured 
territory of Almería.  This territory was held with absolute title, freely, and with all 
appurtenances and property rights.  Moreover, the Genoese were allowed full 
possession of the land, although in practice such possession was granted to a Genoese 
noble or group of nobles.  Hence, the treaties describe how two thirds of captured 
territory was to be held by Emperor Alfonso VII and the remaining third by the Genoese, 
for example: 
‘…tali convencione habiter inter nos et imperatorem quod civitatum et locorum 
cum eorum pertinentiis quas vel que cum imperartore ceperimus vel ipsi vel nobis se se 
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reddiderunt, duas partes imperator habeat, tercia nobis retenta, quam libere, sine omni 
gravamina habere possidere ius debemus.’246 
These land rights were subject to elaborate provisions in the treaties.  They included      
chattels (moveable goods) and appurtenances (rights and privileges associated with the 
land).  Terms included the free enjoyment of property (habeatis libere), and exemption 
from land taxes (sine omni gravimine). 
 Nevertheless, the Genoese held such territory from the Emperor, Alfonso VII.  
Under the treaties, the Genoese were obliged to recognise the lordship (dominium) of 
the Emperor, as the senior political ruler in the Iberian Peninsula.  They were also 
forced to acknowledge that they held their quarter from him.  Furthermore, they had to 
accept that this lord-vassal relationship would continue under the Emperor’s heirs and 
successors, Sancho and Fernando.  The object of such stringent terms was to force 
foreign powers to recognise the precedence of Imperial claims to captured cities or 
territory in Spain.  This was vital at a time of growing international participation in the 
Iberian crusades, and the concomitant proliferation of long-distance diplomatic links 
which heralded this intervention: 
 Preterea Ianuenses illi qui tenebunt partem illam, recognoscent dominium 
imperatoriis et suorum heredum, sic tamen ut partem illam libere…possideant, ita ut 
Ianuenses illi iurent meis heredibus duas partes et mei heredes comuni Ianue terciam 
partem salvare et fideliter defendere bona fide.’247   
 The Emperor was privileged over other, lesser, Hispanic rulers, such as the 
Count of Barcelona, who had also entered into agreements with the Genoese on his own 
initiative.  Given this precedence, it is natural that the Genoese treaties were also 
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characterized by their exclusivity.  Consequently, the Commune promised not to 
conclude treaties with other Hispanic powers, who might be rivals or enemies of the 
Emperor.  The exception was the Count of Barcelona, himself an important actor in the 
Reconquista. 
 In terms of compliance, the Genoese respected the divisions of spoils that they 
had agreed with the Emperor.  Both sides swore to allocate their respective shares of 
territory to their vassals, according to the terms of the treaty.  However, these treaties go 
further than the division of spoils.  As Pascua argues, they also relate the mutual 
recognition of the parties to the relevant agreement.  For example, in Doc. 167 (the 
treaty does not have a title because the place of redaction is unknown), the Genoese 
holding the third part of the city of Almeria pledge to recognise the lordship of the 
Emperor and his sons.   
 Various measures were taken to enforce the treaties.  These included clauses 
stipulating the overriding force of the relevant treaty: agreement of mutual auxilium 
against transgressors of the accords; and provisions for the restitution of land captured 
by a tortfeasor.  Hence, in Doc. 167, Alfonso VII promised to safeguard the Genoese 
and their possessions from attack from any quarter if the   attacker should desire to kill 
them.  This is the first time that the term ‘security’ is employed in a twelfth-century 
treaty, and it demonstrates the extent to which the Christian powers were determined to 
hold on to their newly-acquired dominions.
248
 
 Crucial to the success of such bilateral diplomacy was the guarantee that the 
relevant treaty would be honoured.  This commitment was a two-way process: the 
Genoese ‘safeguarding’ the two –thirds share of the Emperor, and the latter respecting 
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the Genoese quarter.  In case of a change in foreign policy by a new or existing consul, 
the treaty was to prevail despite pronouncements to the contrary by serving Genoese 
consuls.  On the Spanish side, if the Emperor was prevented from fulfilling the terms of 
the relevant treaty in person, then his son and his nobles would honour the agreement.  
The Genoese participated in the Iberian crusades when it suited their interests.  These 
were largely dictated by commercial considerations, as opposed to the territorial and 
religious concerns of the Iberian powers.   
Conclusion: 
 The legal realisation of the Castilian-Leonese Empire in 1135 allowed Emperor 
Alfonso VII to dominate the peripheral Christian Iberian kingdoms, in order to 
prosecute the Reconquest against Islam undhindered by domestic distractions.  Political 
and military hegemony was also necessary to form a united front against the Islamic 
Almoravid and Almohad caliphates of al-Andalus.  By c. 1140, all of the lesser 
kingdoms of Christian Iberia had acknowledged the suzerainty of the Emperor.  This 
took the form of peace treaties with Portugal and the Crown of Aragón, agreed to 
stabilise the disputed frontier regions of Galicia and La Rioja.  Navarre was partitioned 
between the Empire and Aragón, despite the efforts of the Navarrese king, García IV, to 
restore his kingdom to its former glory.  Imperial hegemony entailed recognition of the 
Emperor’s political seniority, his military supremacy and the plenitude of his dominions.  
The resultant treaties ensured the security of the Empire, and led to the enduring 
alliance between Castile and Aragón, which was such a political hallmark of the twelfth 
century.   
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Chapter 2 – The Political Geography of León-Castile, c. 1157-1230 
After the demise of the Castilian-Leonese Empire with the death of Emperor Alfonso 
VII in 1157, Christian Iberia fragmented into a plethora of lesser kingdoms, collectively 
known to historians as the ‘cinco reinos’ (‘five kingdoms’).  At the centre of this 
fragmentation was the core of the former Empire itself: the kingdoms of León and 
Castile.  The fault line ran through the heart of the twin kingdoms, separating them on a 
north-south axis.  The other kingdoms of Christian Iberia coalesced around them.  
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Castile engaged with Aragon and Navarre in the east, forming an alliance with Aragon, 
whilst attempting to subjugate Navarre. Meanwhile, León contracted successive 
marriage alliances with the Portuguese kingdom in the west. 
 In this chapter, I will attempt to answer the question of why there are so many 
peace treaties extant between the cinco reinos, and in particular, between Castile and 
León.  In so doing I will examine the political context of the agreements, analysing the 
issue of fragmentation that occurred in the wake of the partition of Empire.  In particular, 
I will attempt to guage whether fragmentation inevitably followed succession, and 
consequently, whether it led to such a proliferation of treaties between the divided 
powers.  I will begin by appraising the divisio imperii itself, as this was the root cause of 
all the disputes that lay ahead in the second half of the twelfth century, especially 
between Castile and León, until a final resolution of the conflict was found in 
reunification of the crowns in 1230.    
The Divisio Imperii: 
 Partition was intended to prevent the Emperor’s heirs, kings Sancho III and 
Fernando II, from quarrelling over their inheritance.  In this sense, it was meant to 
anticipate any unilateral action which might threaten the Empire after the Emperor’s 
death.  In Spain, the second half of the twelfth century is marked by the divisio imperii 
(division of the Empire).  In 1157, Emperor Alfonso VII, divided the core of his realm, 
León-Castile, into separate kingdoms.  León was allocated to his son, Fernando II 
(1157-88), whilst Sancho III (1157-8) inherited Castile.  Partition commenced on 
Alfonso’ death in 1157.  The Crónica Latina comments on the partition: 
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 ‘divisit siquidem regnum suum permittente de propter pessata hominium duobus 
filiis suis.’249 
 However, partition led to the fragmentation of the Leonese-Castilian Empire, 
occasioning internecine conflicts.  This in turn led to a succession of peace treaties, 
which were largely unsuccessful, and consequently necessitated new peace accords.  
However, the Castilian-Leonese dispute of the later twelfth century was confined to a 
limited geographical area known as the ‘Tierra de Campos’.  This was the frontier area 
between the two kingdoms, located on the Meseta to the north of Valladolid.  The 
frontier established by the divisio imperii ran north-south from the Asturias Mountains 
to the River Tagus in central Spain.  This border zone was fiercely contested in the 
twelfth century, and was the cause of endemic warfare between Castile and León.  The 
dispute was only definitively resolved by the reunification of the two crowns of Castile 
and León under the rule of King Fernando III in 1230. 
 With the demise of the Castilian-Leonese Empire, the other kingdoms of 
twelfth-century Iberia pursued a path of independence, with varying degrees of success.  
Portugal had seceded in 1140.  Aragón was released from its bond of vassalage after 
providing auxilium at the siege of Cuenca (1177).  Only Navarre persisted in remaining 
a target of Castilian foreign policy objectives.  This was to lead to a lengthy arbitration 
dispute, and further partition treaties between Castile and Aragón.  Maravall observes 
that these fledgling states would later form the nuclei of the kingdoms of Spain.   
However, in the process, this fragmentation led to the growing consciousness of the 
concept of ‘Hispania’ (Spain) and the ‘reges Hispaniae’ (kings of Spain).250 
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 This acquisition of territory formed the power bases of the respective Christian 
Iberian kingdoms.  They were delineated by geographical boundaries, albeit ones that 
shifted with the political circumstances.  As the treaties show, these ‘frontiers’ acted as 
a restraint on a monarch’s authority more than would a borderline in the modern 
sense.
251
 
 Specifically, the divisio imperii was significant because the frontier zone 
contained castles situated in strategic locations, which held the key to the security of 
their surrounding territories (alfozes).  As Ladero Quesada argues, the formation of 
territorial boundaries under royal administration from the late twelfth to the thirteenth 
centuries has to be taken account of in any study of border relations between the 
Christian Iberian kingdoms during this period.
252
  The demarcation of the border area 
provoked numerous disputes, settlements and pacts in the post-Imperial period.  
Although, in a sense border relations were an internal issue, they dominated Castilian-
Leonese diplomatic efforts from the divisio imperii in 1157 to reunification in 1230.
253
 
 The division of the respective realms of Alfonso VII’s empire was the issue  
affecting King Sancho III of Castile and King Fernando II of León when they met at 
Sahagún on 23 May 1158.  Sahagún was essentially a partition treaty.  Firstly, they 
confirmed the Treaty of Tudején (1151), which had previously established the partition 
of Navarre and al-Andalus.  Secondly, they acknowledged the status of the Count of 
Barcelona, Ramon Berenguer IV.   However, he was the only Iberian ruler deemed 
worthy of Castilian-Leonese recognition.
254
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 The partition agreement reached at Sahagún extended to embrace all of Portugal.  
However, King Afonso Henriquez had established the independent kingdom of Portugal 
in 1140, and later conquered Santarem and Lisbon, where he established his capital.
255
  
Al-Andalus, ‘the territory of the Saracens’, was to be partitioned as follows: Fernando II 
was to acquire all the lands as far south west as Lisbon, including Extremadura, with the 
taifa (party) kingdoms of Mérida and  Badajoz: 
 ‘De terro vero Sarracenorum hanc facimus divisionem, scilicet, quod vos, frater 
meus Fernandus, habeatis…ad Lixbonam…Emiratem cum toto regno suo, Badailoz 
cum toto regno suo…cum mari, cum insulis, cum montibus, terries et aguis.’256   
King Sancho III of Castile was to be allocated ‘all the territory’ of Spain, namely the 
remainder of Almohad al-Andalus: 
 ‘et ego rex Sancius ab hinc superius habeam totam aliam terram.’257 
The treaty also fixed borders with al-Andalus, and granted territory to Castilian and 
Leonese nobles, namely, Ponce de Cabrera, Ponce de Minerva and Osorio Martínez. 
 This partition represented the east-west division of territory in Spain following 
Alfonso VII’s death.  Indeed, Linehan argues that the Treaty of Sahagún represented the 
formalization of the Emperor’s partition of Spain in the Treaty of Tudején (1151).258  
Then, Alfonso VII and Count Ramon Berenguer IV had agreed to divide the Kingdom 
of Navarre.  They had also agreed to occupy respective spheres of influence in the south 
and south-east of the Iberian Peninsula. 
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 At Sahagún, the two monarchs, Sancho and Fernando, agreed the partition of the 
‘land of the Saracens’ in the south and south-west of the Peninsula, namely Andalucia 
and Extremadura.  Portugal was to be eradicated despite the fact that it was now 
independent, and Seville, the provincial capital of the Almohad Caliphate, was to be 
shared between the two Christian powers.  Essentially, León was to occupy all the 
territory towards the Atlantic Ocean, whilst Sancho was to acquire all of al-Andalus as 
far as Granada and the Mediterranean. 
Castile v. León: 
 Castile and León were constantly at loggerheads after the divisio imperii, instead 
of enjoying the stability hoped for by the late emperor.  Following the premature death 
of Sancho III (d. 1158), Castile was ruled by a regent, Count Manrique de Lara, which 
made for weak government.  Castilian nobles defected to the neighbouring kingdom of 
León, and King Fernando II of León invaded Castile, seizing the capital, Toledo, and 
the young king, Alfonso VIII.  Castile itself was riven by civil war. Royal peacemaking 
in Spain was best exemplified by the Castilian – Leonese peace treaties agreed to restore 
order to the troubled Tierra de Campos region between the two kingdoms.  Disputes in 
this area had occurred since 1034, but since the divisio imperii in 1157 they persisted in 
a more pronounced way.
259
  Warfare was endemic between the two kingdoms, and both 
sides engaged in razzias (raids) in the border region.  Fernando II of León invaded 
Castile during the civil war in the 1160s, capturing the former royal capital of Toledo in 
1162, and after attaining his majority (1169), King Alfonso VIII of Castile was eager to 
recover lost territory.  Both sides wanted to preserve the territorial integrity of their 
kingdoms, and this could only be ensured through the maintenance of law and order. 
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The first such Castilian-Leonese peace treaty to attempt to restore peace in the Tierra de 
Campos was that of Medina de Ríoseco (1181).  Prior to the Treaty of Medina de 
Ríoseco, the two parties agreed a Peace at Castronuño (27 February 1181).  
Ambassadors from both kingdoms met at Castronuño, where they issued a issued a 
document affirming their mutual intent to make peace.  This appears to have been a 
goodwill gesture preliminary to the main treaty, signed by the monarchs who were party 
to the agreement at Medina de Ríoseco.
260
   
The aim of the Treaty of Medina de Ríoseco (21 March 1181) was to ‘make 
peace, agreement and friendship between the two parties’ (‘facimus pacem et 
concordiam et amiciciam firmam’).261  The duration of the treaty was indefinite (‘in 
perpetuum’).    This was to be achieved through binding the heirs of the parties in the 
same manner as the parties themselves:‘tam inter nos quam inter filios nostros et 
filias.’262 
Several means were employed to maintain the peace.  Firstly, the parties agreed 
to hold to the partition line between the two kingdoms made by the Emperor Alfonso 
VII in the divisio imperii, as far south as the River Tagus frontier: 
‘…teneamus divisionem et stemus per illam quam fecit Adefonsus imperator 
inter me, regem Fernandum, et patrem vestrum, regem Sancium, fratrem meum; et inde 
usque ad flumen Tagum, quod teneamus et stemus per eandem  divisionem quam fecit 
Adefonsus, idem imperator, inter ambo regna quando ea divisit.’263 
Secondly, the nobility were prevented under the treaty from invading the other 
party’s kingdom, and they were obliged to respect the frontiers of the respective parties: 
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‘et uterque nostrum sit dominus et rex omnium qui continetur infra limites regni 
sui iuxta predictum divisionem…’264 
Moreover, the nobility from both sides were to be restrained from intervening in the 
affairs of the neighbouring kingdom, as defined by its recognised borders. 
 ‘…nulla impediente requisitione nulloque interveniente impedimento alterius 
nostrum ad alterum super his que infra terminos alterutrius regni continentur, salvis in 
utroque regno directuris nobelium quos appellant filios de algo.’265 
 Thirdly, peace was to be achieved through the exchange of castles as a means of 
security.  As castle tenure was granted to tenants over a term of years, this was an 
effective means of guaranteeing long-term peace between the parties and their heirs.  
For example, King Fernando II of León placed five castles in the political arena: Melgar; 
Castrotierra; Peñafiel; Siero; and Portella. 
 Various guarantees were also included in the treaty in order to maintain peaceful 
relations.  Firstly, no magnates were allowed to cross the frontier established by 
Emperor Alfonso VII between Castile and León; secondly, no-one was permitted to 
attack the other party to the treaty; thirdly, no-one was allowed to lead an army across 
the borders of the other kingdom; fourthly, no-one was to construct a castle in the other 
party’s kingdom or settle people there; and fifthly, no-one was to capture a castle in the 
other party’s territory. 
 The sanctions for derogation from the treaty were draconian.  They can be 
divided into temporal and ecclesiastical measures.  Chief of the temporal sanctions was 
the forfeiture of castles by a violator of the peace: 
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 ‘Similiter, si in propria persona mea infra terminos regni vestri aliquam rapinam 
fecero…tradantur vobis aliquod de castellis meis fidelitate.’266 
This measure applied particularly to vassals of both the monarchical parties to the treaty, 
Fernando II and Alfonso VIII. 
 As regards ecclesiastical sanctions, if a suspect should raid the other party’s 
kingdom, and failed to make amends within forty days, then the bishop of the diocese      
in which the raid occurred was to impose an interdict on the part of the diocese that lay 
in the other kingdom.  Moreover, if the crime still had not been remedied forty days 
after the imposition of the interdict, then the sentence of excommunication was to be 
applied to the criminal: 
 ‘…et si usqe ad alios XL dies postquam fuerit positum interdictum predicta 
rapine duplum non emendavero, fuerat sententiam excommunicationis.’267 
 The Treaty of Medina de Ríoseco was unsuccessful in maintaining peace 
between Castile and León, despite the fact that both sides ratified it, and duly executed 
it by exchanging castles.
268
  The treaty failed to achieve peace because it did not 
satisfactorily resolve the border dispute between the two kingdoms, which was the root 
cause of military hostilities.  Rather, Alfonso VIII recovered Castilian territory in the 
Tierra de Campos that Fernando II of León had captured during his minority.  The 
Castilian royal notary records that by November 1181, Alfonso VIII had recovered ‘all 
of the Tierra de Campos’.269  Hence, there was a flagrant violation of the Treaty of 
Medina de Ríoseco within months of its agreement. 
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 The resumption of hostilities led both sides to consider that peace was desirable.  
Both parties recognised that it was necessary to find a just solution to the border conflict 
which underlay the pattern of belligerence that characterised Castilian-Leonese relations 
in the late twelfth century.   Hence, a new peace initiative was required.  This led to the 
Treaty of Fresno-Lavandera (1 June 1183).
270
  
 Fresno-Lavandera is significant for the role of diplomatic agents in the 
preliminary negotiations to the treaty.
271
  As such it constitutes an exceptional example 
of Castilian-Leonese diplomacy in the later twelfth century.  Its relevance lies in the 
insight that it affords historians about contemporary diplomatic procedure leading to the 
conclusion of a peace between the parties to the treaty.  Both kings decided to re-
embrace peace, and to this end they held a colloquium at Paradinas.  This symposium 
summoned nobles from both sides to represent their respective parties.  The Castilians 
were represented by Rodrigo Gutiérrez and Tello Pérez de Meneses.  For their part, the 
Leonese delegation consisted of Fernando Rodríguez ‘el Castellano’ and Pelayo 
Tabladelo.  After their discussion, they reached a written agreement, which was to form 
the basis of the future peace treaty.  The Treaty of Fresno-Lavandera is a clear example 
of monarchs delegating political duties to lay and ecclesiastical magnates.  In this case, 
both the Leonese representatives had been witnesses to the preceding Treaty of Medina 
de Ríoseco (1181).
272
  Consequently, they were the ideal choice to represent the 
Leonese monarch at Paradinas; they were familiar with antecedent Leonese-Castilian 
peacemaking activity.  Moreover, as landowners themselves, they were cognisant of the 
wider territorial dispute that characterised Leonese-Castilian relations at this time, 
namely the division of the Castilian-Leonese Empire into two adjacent kingdoms. 
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 A short time later, both monarchs met in a vista real (royal summit) at a neutral 
location between the towns of Fresno and Lavandera, the respective bases of Fernando 
and Alfonso VIII.  Both sides attempted to reach a definitive peace agreement on this 
occasion, mindful of past failures, such as the Treaty of Medina de Ríoseco (1181).  At 
Paradinas it had been accepted that Alfonso VIII had breached the peace, and a new 
effort was made to resolve the underlying issues at dispute. 
 The core of the Castilian-Leonese dispute was a quarrel over territory, and 
specifically the border area of the Tierra de Campos between the two neighbours.  
Under Fresno-Lavandera, peace was to be created by establishing a definitive frontier 
line, which would eliminate frontier disputes by delineating future zones of influence.  
The scope of the treaty was wide.  It was intended to bind the secular nobility and 
clergy by common consent.  In particular, the treaty was intended to transform relations 
between the two powers by investing power in the nobility, who swore allegiance to the 
two monarchs: 
 ‘Et ibi, per potesta tem quam vobis in nos concessarum prius et vos invicem 
vobis in vos, et nos ac regna nostra fecistis, reformastis pacem…’273  
Tenants were obliged to respect the divisio imperii that was germane to all peacemaking 
activity at this time, in an attempt to stabilise the frontier: 
 ‘…et tunc per eandem districtionem per quam tenemur ad servandam pacem 
compellamur ad regnorum divisionem.’274 
The apportionment of respective castles on either side of the border was to be observed 
faithfully, on pain of excommunication and interdict: 
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 ‘Et hoc totum observare per districtionem castellorum fidelitatis et per 
sententiam excommunicationis et interdicti…’275 
These concords demonstrate that the overriding imperative of Castilian and 
Leonese diplomacy in the 1180s was to achieve a durable peace.  It is arguable that in 
real terms this could only be achieved by both sides agreeing to cease hostilities in the 
frontier zone.  In order to guarantee compliance with the treaty, draconian sanctions 
were imposed.  Furthermore, if a monarch adopted bellicose policies, then an appeal 
could be made to the pope, who had the power to authorise the local prelate to impose a 
sentence of excommunication on the culprit.
276
  
To ensure the durability of the treaty, which had been the shortcoming of the 
Treaty of Medina de Ríoseco, the term of the peace was enshrined in the treaty: 
‘…debeo ego tenere usque ad decem annos sine aliquot querela.’277 
Indeed, to ensure that peace was upheld in the future, a time and place was specified in 
the treaty in order to examine whether it had been implemented.  Nevertheless, a mere 
five years later, after Fernando II’s death (d. 1188), King Alfonso VIII resumed his 
aggressive policies and seized Leonese castles in the Tierra de Campos.
278
 
 In short, the peacemaking attempts of the 1180s proved unsuccessful due to the 
continued border dispute between Castile and León.  In this frontier region, both 
kingdoms sought short-term political gain through military advantage.  Such rivalry was 
to endure until the definitive resolution of the Castilian-Leonese dispute through the 
marriage of King Alfonso IX of León and Queen Berenguela of Castile, and later, the 
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reunification of the two crowns in 1230 under the rule of their son, King Fernando III 
(1217-52).  
The Castilian – Aragonese Alliance: 
 A consistent theme of the twelfth century is the long-standing alliance between 
Castile and Aragón.  Broadly speaking, during the second half of the twelfth century, 
Castile faced east towards Aragon and Navarre, whilst León gravitated towards Portugal 
in the west.  After the death of Emperor Alfonso VII and the divisio imperii in 1157, 
there was a new configuration in Iberian politics.  Most importantly, the Kingdom of 
Aragón united with the County of Catalonia under the rule of a single prince.  Initially, 
this prince was the Count of Barcelona, Ramon Berenguer IV (d. 1166).  He was 
betrothed to Petronilla of Aragón, and on his death, the Crown of Aragón passed to their 
son, King Alfonso II.   
 The most powerful Christian Iberian ruler in the 1160s was King Fernando II of 
León (1157-88).  He held sway largely because his fellow rulers, King Alfonso VIII of 
Castile and King Alfonso II of Aragón were still minors, and had yet to exercise 
personal rule.  Civil war erupted in Castile in March 1160 between the rival Castro and 
Lara families.  The Castros sought the assistance of the Leonese, conducting 
negotiations with King Fernando II of León.  By 1162, the Leonese had captured the 
city of Toledo, where Fernando Rodríguez de Castro was installed as governor.  
Morevoer, the Leonese king exercised tutelage over the young Castilian monarch; 
likewise he acted similarly with respect to the Aragonese monarch.  Lucas of Túy 
describes Alfonso VIII as being in the care of Fernando II (‘nutrierat’).279  However, 
Fernando was unable to control the whole of the Castilian kingdom.  Neither did he 
personally take custodianship of the young Alfonso VIII.  Instead, he entrusted the child 
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to the Castilian regent, Manrique Pérez de Lara.  Finally, King Sancho VI of Navarre 
allied himself to Fernando II in order to make a common anti-Castilian front in La Rioja 
region.  Linehan argues that this development amounted to Leonese colonization of the 
entire region.
280
  Hence, it is possible to discern the Leonese and Navarrese 
appropriation of Castilian territory which was to form the casus belli for later Castilian 
incursions into these two kingdoms.   
 Once King Alfonso VIII had attained his majority (1169), he forged an alliance 
with his neighbour, the king of Aragón, Alfonso II.  The rationale for this alliance was 
to form a concerted anti-Navarrese coalition.  Initially, the aim was to recover Castilian 
territory recently seized by King Sancho VI of Navarre in Alava and Guipuzcoa during 
Alfonso VIII’s minority.  This land had been in Castilian possession since the late 
eleventh century.  It was intended that the treaty of Zaragoza (July 1170) would provide 
the basis for a joint campaign by Castile and Aragón against Navarre.  However, no 
military action actually took place. 
 The nature of the Treaty of Zaragoza was that of ‘friendship, perpetual accord 
and peace’: 
 ‘…facimus et firmamus veram amicitiam et perpetuam concordiam et pacem 
inter nos…’281 
It was to last in perpetuity (‘…omnibus diebus vite nostre…’).  In case of derogation 
from the treaty by either party, that side would forfeit their castles, which would accrue 
to the other side: 
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 ‘…quod si ego rex Adefonsus Castelle…ex tunc sim periurus, fide mentitus, 
proditor et alevosus, et amittam predicta castella, ita quod veniant in potestate regis 
Ildefonsus Aragonensium…’282 
Moreover, the nobility of the aggressor would be obliged to perform homage to the 
aggrieved party: 
 ‘…et illi mei vassalli qui tenant predicta castella per me faciant hominium 
Ildefonso, regi Aragonensium…’283 
Crucially, the treaty contains a pledge by Alfonso VIII of Castile to secure Aragonese 
territory should the king of Aragón become involved in a foreign war.  In this respect it 
was a veritable treaty of alliance, and similar to the Treaty of Túy (1137) in this respect: 
 ‘…et, si forte contingerit propter guerram vel aliquam occasionem, regem 
Ildefonsum Aragonensem ire in Provincia vel alias extra terram suam, ego defendam et 
manuteneam terram suam per bonam fidem…’284 
 Instead of fighting Navarre, Alfonso VIII of Castile concentrated his forces 
against the Almohads of al-Andalus.  For this venture, he sought the military assistance 
of the King of Aragon, Alfonso II.  The two kingdoms jointly besieged the frontier city 
of Cuenca.  This city was of strategic importance because it straddled the frontier of 
both kingdoms with al-Andalus.  During the siege, the two monarchs agreed a new 
treaty, the Treaty of Cuenca (1177), under which the Castilian monarch released the 
Aragonese leader from his duty of vassalage for the Kingdom of Zaragoza.  This 
concession was in reward for Aragonese military assistance during the siege of Cuenca.  
The Treaty of Cuenca also stipulated what territory both kingdoms could hold freely, 
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which had been agreed by their predecessors. Specifically, Alfonso VIII of Castile 
released the Aragonese king from the homage owed by the latter since 1136. 
 The nature of the treaty was peace between Castile and Aragon: 
 ‘…ego Aldefonsus, rex Castelle, et ego Ildefonsus, rex Aragonis…pacem 
firmam.’285 
It was to last in perpetuity (‘in perpetuum habere’).  The terms of the treaty were an 
alliance against all-comers, both Christian and Muslim: 
 ‘…ut iuvemus nos ad invicem contra omnes christianos et sarracenos, excepto 
rege Ferrando…’286  
 In practice, this meant an agreement to form a joint effort to make peace or war against 
all other parties: 
 ‘…et habeamus comuniter pacem vel guerram cum aliis omnibus, sicut in 
convenienciis nostris scriptum est.’287 
 Later, in 1179, the two monarchs met at Cázola, near Jaén, where they agreed a 
partition treaty.  It was also a friendship and and alliance treaty against all other rulers, 
both Christian and Muslim, but especially against the king of Navarre.  This treaty, the 
Treaty of Cázola (20 March 1179) was of vital strategic importance for the future 
development of the two kingdoms, as it determined the future spheres of influence of 
both kingdoms in al-Andalus (‘terram Hyspanie’).  However, Cázola was different from 
the earlier partition treaty of Tudején (1151) because that pact had obliged Aragón to 
perform homage to Castile for territory that it captured.  Valdeavellano argues, that on 
this basis, the imperial idea had been abandoned; no longer were other peninsular 
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monarchs obliged to perform homage in recognition of Castilian-Leonese hegemony.
 288
  
Whereas Fernando I, Alfonso VI and Alfonso VII had assumed the integration of 
conquered territory into the Castilian-Leonese Empire, post the divisio imperii the 
partition treaties between the various Peninsula kingdoms divided the respective zones 
of influence of captured Islamic territory. 
The Treaty of Cázola granted freely and in perpetuity to the king of Aragon all 
of the Levante, including the city and territory of Valencia, Játiva and Denia as far south 
as the port of Alicante: 
‘…concedit atque in perpetuum diffinit per se suos successores predictus 
Aldefonsus rex Castelle iam dicto Ildefonso regi Aragonum et successoribus suis, ut 
adquirant sibi, habeant…Valentiam.’289 
The king of Aragón was to possess this territory freely, with absolute title, in perpetuity, 
and without interference from any other party: 
 ‘…et im perpetuum possideant libere, solide et absolute, non interveniente 
aliqua contraria ab uno ad alterum…’290 
This territory was to be accompanied by all its appurtenances and subject population: 
 ‘…cum omnibus suis pertinenciis heremis et populates que sibi pertinent et 
pertinere debent.’291 
Likewise, the treaty granted to the king of Castile all the territory south of 
Alicante, namely the Kingdom of Murcia, with all its castles, towns and population: 
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‘Similiter predictus Ildefonsus, rex Aragonum…concedit atque in perpetuum 
diffinit per se iam dicto Aldefonso regi Castelle…totam terram Hyspanie heremam et 
populatam que est ultra predictum qui est ultra Biar…cum omnibus castellis…et 
villis…et populates.’292 
This concession by the king of Aragón effectively granted King Alfonso VIII of Castile 
carte blanche to capture all of al-Andalus south of Alicante.  Hence, the treaty 
concludes by restating its purpose as a pact of ‘division, concession and partition’ 
(‘…divisionem, concessionem atque diffinitionem’). 
The outcome of these two treaties, Cuenca and Cázola, was independence for the 
other Peninsula kingdoms, which were no longer obliged to recognise Castilian-Leonese 
suzerainty.
293
  During the siege of Cuenca, both powers dealt with each other on equal 
terms. Similarly, at Cázola, when both parties divided al-Andalus, they dealt with each 
other on a basis of parity.   
The Castilian-Navarrese Territorial Dispute: 
 Both Castile and Aragón had enduring claims to Navarre, dating back to the late 
eleventh century.  In both cases, the issue was the same: the partition of territory.  
During the 1170s, Castile was preoccupied with the Kingdom of Navarre, whether in 
alliance with its old rival Aragón or unilaterally.  Essentially, both Castile and Aragón 
competed for their share of the Kingdom of Navarre based on their inheritance.  Both 
kingdoms regarded an independent Navarre as the enemy, and they could not 
countenance an autonomous Navarrese kingdom existing on terms of parity with their 
own realms.   
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 Specifically, the cause of the dispute between Castile and Navarre in the mid-
1170s was the issue of the frontier region of La Rioja seized by the King of Navarre, 
Sancho VI, during the minority of King Alfonso VIII of Castile.
294
  On the Navarrese 
side, Sancho VI claimed that Alfonso VI had infringed a truce agreed in 1167 between 
the two monarchs.  This was the Truce of Fitero.
295
  In this accord, King Alfonso VIII 
and King Sancho VI had made a temporary peace between their two warring kingdoms. 
The duration of the truce was ten years, the usual term for truces in the twelfth 
century.  As regards the scope of the accord, both monarchs and their magnates were 
bound by the treaty, on oath, sworn on the Gospels.  In case of derogation, if either 
monarch or his nobles should breach the peace, and failed to make amends within forty 
days, then he was to be declared a perjuror (periurus). 
However, both Castile and Navarre were reluctant to resort to force of arms to 
resolve their dispute.  Rather, both parties were keen to employ diplomatic means to 
achieve peace.  Contemporaneously, Castile was engaged in fighting the Almohads, and 
was reluctant to fight on two fronts at once.  It was for this reason that Alfonso VIII of 
Castile opted to seek for a diplomatic solution to the crisis. 
Hence, on 25 August 1176 King Alfonso VIII of Castile and King Sancho VI of 
Navarre agreed to seek an arbitration of their case by the English monarch, Henry II 
Plantagenet (1154-89).  Calderón Medina observes that arbitration was one of the 
principal means of conflict resolution in the Middle Ages.
296
  Pascua defines arbitration 
as a contractual arrangement, whereby both parties delegated the power to adjudicate 
defined issues to a third party during a limited period of time.
297
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Henry II was chosen as an arbiter because the Castilian monarch, Alfonso VIII, 
was married to his daughter, Eleanor.
298
  Family and kinship ties were the most 
important means of guaranteeing peace in the Middle Ages.
299
  Eleanor had received 
Aquitaine as a dowry, although it was her brother, Richard – later Richard I of England 
– who exercised lordship over it.  Moreover, English kings would have sought the 
support of Castilian rulers to control Gascony in the twelfth century.  However, Navarre 
was also close to Gascony, and the Basque kingdom would have been a valuable ally in 
English attempts to control the region.  For example, Richard I of England married the 
daughter of Sancho VI of Navarre, doña Berenguela.
300
   
Both parties agreed a preliminary treaty, prior to the arbitration process itself.  
This was the Treaty of Nájera-Logroño (1176).
301
  The purpose of this treaty was to 
regulate the subsequent arbitration proceedings, in short to establish the parameters of 
the forthcoming litigation.  In this treaty, both parties exchanged castles, in order to 
show goodwill, and to provide sureties for any settlement agreed in London. 
This exchange guaranteed the parties’ mutual acceptance of Henry’s sentence, 
and compliance with the settlement pronounced in London.  For Castile, Alfonso gave 
the castles of Nájera, Arnedo and Celerigo; for Navarre, Sancho granted Estella, Funes 
and Maranon.  The term of the agreement was a seven-year truce. 
 Nuncii (envoys) from both parties were to present themselves before the court of 
the English king.  Under the Treaty of Nájera-Logroño, both monarchs were to elect 
four nuncii to represent them at the proceedings.  These diplomats were charged with 
presenting their party’s case before the English monarch, who would then proceed to 
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give his judgment.  Both sides would make an oral submission, before presenting their 
written petitions to the English court.   
 The Castilian and Navarrese petitions illuminate twelfth-century diplomatic 
practice, because we know more about them than any other contemporary treaty.  They 
have survived and have been transcribed by González.  Lomax illustrates the financial 
arrangements for the London conference: the English Treasury was to finance the travel 
expenses of the Spanish envoys.
302
  A significant feature of this litigation procedure was 
that Henry required the pleas of the respective embassies to take written form, because 
he could not understand the spoken Latin of the diplomats.  Moreover, both sides had 
furnished themselves with documentary proof of their respective claims and allegations.  
In order to facilitate their dispute to arbitration, and to make good their claims to breach 
of the peace and restitution of territory, rulers needed to have access to exact copies of 
the terms of any previous treaty that had been agreed, exchanged and proclaimed.  In 
this case, this was the Treaty of Nájera-Logroño (1176). 
 The protracted dispute was also alluded to in the English chronicles of the period.  
These were the Gesta Regis Henrici – wrongly attributed by Stubbs to Benedict of 
Peterborough, but now thought to have been authored by Roger of Hoveden – and the 
Chronicle of Roger of Hoveden.
303
  Another contemporary witness to events at Henry’s 
court at Westminster was that of the chronicler, Gerald of Wales.
304
 
 The basis of the Castilian monarch’s claim to Navarre was that he had inherited 
the kingdom from his ancestors.  In the Castilian petition, Alfonso VIII clearly states his 
claim to Navarre, based on his legitimate inheritance from earlier Castilian monarchs, 
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who had also ruled this territory during their reigns.  In his petition, King Alfonso VIII 
alleges that his grandfather, Alfonso VII, had conquered the Kingdom of Navarre at the 
battle of Ejéa (1140).  As a benign ruler, he had then granted Navarre to its own 
monarch, García IV Ramírez as a fief.  The latter had paid homage to the Emperor for 
his kingdom, which he, García, ruled as dux (duke) of Pamplona.   
Subsequently, the Emperor had granted it to his son, Sancho III, who ruled it 
peacefully during his lifetime. In the post-Imperial age, the descendant of Emperor 
Alfonso VII, Sancho III, had nevertheless preserved his claim to Navarre: 
 ‘et post mortem imperatoris rex Sancius filius eius sine querela et sine placito 
iure hereditario possedit.’305 
It is noteworthy that the petition unequivocally states that Sancho III ‘possessed’ 
Navarre.  Against this background, the present Castilian grievance was that the 
Navarrese monarch, Sancho VI, had violently withheld this land: 
 ‘…Rex Navarre abstulit et violenter detinet.’306 
  After Sancho’s death (d. 1158), the incumbent Castilian monarch, Alfonso VIII, 
legitimately inherited and peacefully ruled this territory: 
 ‘Quo mortuo dominus Rex noster Aldefonsus, filius eius, iure hereditario in pace 
posedit…’307 
 For the opposition, Sancho VI of Navarre asserted that all his territory was 
possessed by the Kingdom of Navarre since the death of Sancho IV el de Peñalen in 
1076: 
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 ‘Hec omnia repetit et quicquid est infra hec versus Navarram; et istius terre petit 
univiersos redditus a tempore quo obit rex Sanctius de Penalen…’308 
Sancho’s claim was a mixture of de jure and de facto causes.  On the one hand, he 
claimed to have inherited his kingdom from his ancestor, King Sancho García, who had 
expelled King Alfonso VI of Castile from Navarre in the late eleventh century.  On the 
other hand, he maintained that he possessed and held in peace all this land: 
 ‘Hec omnia ad regnum suum spectantia possedit et habuit in pace, et quiete 
abavus huius regis Sancii, Garsias, scilicet, rex Navarre et Nagere…’309 
In 1134, King García IV Ramírez, Sancho’s father, had recovered his kingdom from its 
union with Aragón, thus preserving its integrity.   Subsequently, he bequeathed Navarre 
to his son, the present incumbent, Sancho VI.   
 Sancho’s complaint was that King Alfonso VIII of Castile had sequestered King 
García’s kingdom.  He alluded to the fact that during his lifetime, the Emperor had 
restored Navarre to his father, King García IV.  He petitioned that on this basis he 
should be allowed to enjoy his inheritance in peace, especially now that the Emperor 
was dead: 
 ‘Conqueritur etiam…quod imperator reddiderat regi Garsie patri suo; et eo 
mortuo, idem imperator abstulit illud Sanctio nunc regi Navarre, tunc habenti et in pace 
possidenti tanquam suam propriam hereditatem.’310 
 According to Gerald of Wales, King Henry II of England chose a via media in 
his Sentence: he adjudicated that both sides were to have restored to them the territory 
that the other party had seized from them, which they had rightly petitioned and which 
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the other party had not contradicted.
311
  However, restitution was to be circumscribed by 
the border demarcations established at the death of Emperor Alfonso VII in 1157, 
regardless of preceding claims on either side. 
 In short, both parties were to be granted restitution of the settlements that had 
been violently and unjustly seized by the opposing party: 
 ‘Super querelis vero pretaxatis de castellis et terries cum omnibus terminis et 
pertinentiis hinc inde violenter et inuste abbatis…pleniaram utrique parti supradictorum 
que in iure petita erant fieri restitutionem adiudicavimus.’312   
For Castile, these were Logroño; Navarrete; Entrena; Autol; and Ausejo.  For Navarre, 
they were Leguin; Portilla; and the castle of Godin.  In addition, Alfonso VIII was 
obliged to pay three thousand maravedis to King Sancho VI annually for ten years, 
making payment every four months in Burgos.
313
 
 The Gesta Henrici records how the English monarch made the Spanish 
ambassadors sign the peace agreement, and take oaths on the Gospels that they would 
observe, and make their principals comply with, his decision, in order that it may be 
‘faithfully and indefinitely observed’: 
 ‘…ut pacem inter vos firmetis et in perpetuum fideliter observetis.’314   
He also forced the embassies to swear that if one of their principals derogated from his 
judgement, then they would be forced to surrender one of the castles that they had 
conceded as a guarantee.  However, the chronicle relates how only the most recent 
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conquests were subject to Henry’s judgement; previous, outstanding claims were 
disregarded.
315
 Henry also despatched letters to the two monarchs, setting out his 
judgement. 
 This procedure gives the impression that arbitration was the standard legal 
remedy in the twelfth century.  However, the territorial dispute between Castile and 
Navarre was not resolved by Henry’s arbitration, and it remained pending.  Firstly, the 
decision only referred to places which had been contested by the two monarchs during 
their respective reigns.  Luis Corral questions whether both sides desired a valid 
arbitiration.
316
  He cites Pascua, who remarks that often pacts were means of gaining 
intelligence regarding the political intentions of the enemy, without the slightest 
intention to abide by the judgement given.   Luis Corral concludes, that on the basis of 
the evidence, that this was the case here.
317
 
 Neither Alfonso VIII of Castile or Sancho VI of Navarre showed any inclination 
to abide by the judgement proclaimed by Henry II in London.  Alfonso VIII was 
currently occupied with the siege of Cuenca (1177), in which enterprise he counted on 
the auxilium of the Aragonese.  Castile and Aragón were now firm allies, having sworn 
‘friendship, concord and peace’ at the Treaty of Zaragoza (1170): 
 ‘Facimus et firmamus veram amicitiam et perpetuam concordiam et pacem inter 
nos omnibus diebus vite…’318 
This alliance demonstrated two things: first, the endurance of the Castilian-Aragonese 
partnership against the Almohads; and secondly, as the London conference had proved 
ineffectual, the resumption of the Castilian-Aragonese pact against Navarre.  This 
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alliance was cemented at the Treaty of Cázola (1179), when the two monarchs agreed a 
‘confederation pact’.  Under this agreement, they swore mutual assistance that the 
Castilian monarch could recover the lands the Navarrese had seized during his 
minority.
319
 On the other hand, the Navarrese failed to return the Castilian territory that 
was the subject of the London arbitration.  The renewed Castilian-Aragonese bloc as 
manifested by the Treaty of Cázola prompted an immediate diplomatic response from 
Navarre.  A new peace treaty was hastily agreed between Castile and Navarre, of which 
little is known.  Sancho VI’s aim in these negotiations was to avoid an imminent attack 
by Castile.   
 In this context, Luis Corral argues that Alfonso VIII was the principal 
beneficiary of the London arbitration.  The proceedings had coincided with Alfonso’s 
campaign against Almohads at Cuenca.  Rather, it was more expedient to launch a 
diplomatic mission, which could prolong matters.  In short, Luis Corral argues that the 
arbitration procedure was an astute political manoeuvre on Alfonso’s part. 320  The real 
problem arising from the litigation was that there was no means of enforcing it.  In the 
absence of strong royal power, it was impossible to ensure adherence to the judgement, 
or to specify the consequences in the event of derogation.  However, after his victory at 
the siege of Cuenca, and buoyed by his alliance with Aragon, which culminated in the 
Treaty of Cázola, Alfonso VIII possessed the political and military prestige to reclaim 
Castilian territory which had been captured by Navarre.  As the senior military ruler in 
Iberia, he was able to use to the diplomatic tactic of the London arbitration to facilitate a 
fragile truce with Navarre, and to assert his agenda, which was the reclamation of 
territory which he considered legitimately belonged to the Kingdom of Castile. 
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 This newly assertive Castile was able to demand peace from Navarre in the 
disputed border territory between the two kingdoms, which Navarre had seized during 
Alfonso’s minority.  This peace took the form of a new treaty, the Treaty of Nájera-
Logroño II (15 April 1179).
321
  The treaty was significantly agreed at the same location 
that the pre-arbitration pact had been signed.  This pact was one of ‘friendship and 
concord’.  Sancho VI gave Alfonso VIII the frontier castles of Logroño, Antelenam and 
Navarret, Auguseio, Abtol and Resam.  In turn, Alfonso would grant the same castles to 
his vassals, who were named in the treaty: Petri Roderici de Acafra; Martín Roderici de 
Acafra and Martín Guillermi.  These vassals would each hold these castles and serve 
Alfonso VIII for a term of ten years.  The aim of this measure was to stabilise the 
Castilian-Navarrese frontier for the foreseeable future.  In an attempt to engender cross-
border security, these three vassals were elected by the King of Navarre, granting him a 
direct stake in the peace process: 
 ‘…et Lucronium et iam dicta castella teneat per Aldefonsum regem Castellae 
primitus quislibet dictorum trium militum, quam rex Navarre elegerit.’322 
These vassals were to render homage to the king of Navarre, as Navarrese tenants 
holding these castles had done before them. 
Marriage Alliances and Succession: 
 In Castile-León, a marriage alliance succeeded where years of diplomacy had 
failed: through the union of the royal houses of both kingdoms, the offspring came to 
renunite the thrones of the divided Empire into one kingdom.  One of the principal 
means of forging diplomatic alliances in the Middle Ages was the dynastic union 
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between the ruling houses of rival kingdoms.
323
  In this respect, León and Portugal 
exceeded all expectations, both Leonese monarchs marrying Portuguese brides in the 
second half of the twelfth century: Fernando II married Urraca Alfonsez, daughter of the 
first king of Portugal, Afonso Henriquez, as his first wife; and his son, Alfonso IX 
married Teresa of Portugal also as his first spouse.  Thus, we can speak of a Leonese-
Portuguese axis in the later twelfth century.  However, in addition to this axis, the 
monarchs of León and Castile attempted to mend their fractured relationship by 
arranging a marriage between doña Berenguela, daughter of King Alfonso VIII of 
Castile and Alfonso IX of León. 
 Bianchini argues that a woman’s primary role in the Middle Ages was to 
marry.
324
  In this sense, Queen Berenguela fulfilled her destiny.  Such a union would 
secure an alliance between Castile and León, as desired by her father, King Alfonso 
VIII of Castile.  It would also allow her husband to beget heirs to the throne of León.  
The hope of most contemporaries was that such an heir would reunite the crowns of 
León and Castile, and so end the internecine warfare that was crippling political 
relations between the two kingdoms. 
 After marriage, a woman’s interest was expected to align with that of her 
husband and his family, and with their offspring.  Modern scholarship has enlightened 
this role.  Marriage alliances gave the bride’s father an ally in the opposing court.  
Indeed, monarchs used their married daughters as mediators between their natal and 
marital families.  This role could flourish long after the wedding ceremony was over.
325
  
Such relationships attest to the growing agency and authority wielded by royal wives 
and daughters. 
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 Queen Berenguela only ruled as Queen of León for seven years.  However, 
during this period she wielded broad powers, both independently and in conjunction 
with her husband, King Alfonso IX of León.  Earenfight argues that to some extent this 
was just her natural due: Iberian queens enjoyed greater prestige and authority than their 
northern European counterparts.
326
  However, the terms of Berenguela’s marriage 
contract, and a comparison of her rule in León with other contemporary queens, 
demonstrate that her        reign was unusual even by the standards of her age.  Firstly, 
she benefitted from the strength of the Kingdom of Castile in which she had been born.  
Secondly, the terms of her marriage contract made her the “agent and symbol” of peace 
between Castile and León; she actively mediated between her husband and her father 
both during and after her marriage to Alfonso IX.  In particular, she was the designated 
mediatrix of the troubled Tierra de Campos region that straddled the Castilian-Leonese 
frontier.   
She was also a significant force within Castilian-Leonese politics in her own 
right.  She was a partner to her husband, the king of León.  She was a mother to the 
couple’s children.  However, most importantly she was an intermediary between her 
natal and marital families.  As regards the proposed marriage alliance in 1197, the 
Leonese could not hope to recover their lost castles by military force.  However, the 
King of Castile, Alfonso VIII, might be persuaded to settle the disputed territory on his 
daughter, as her dowry.  According to Archbishop Rodrigo’s De Rebus Hispaniae, 
Alfonso VIII was understandably reluctant to return castles he had just won in battle.  
However, Queen Leonor, his wife, intervened to arrange their daughter’s marriage, in 
the interests of peace between Castile and León.
327
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Leonor’s active participation in the arrangement of her daughter’s marriage 
demonstrate the significant influence of medieval queens in the sphere of dynastic 
alliances.
328
  Marriage alliances were generally regarded as the remit of queens in the 
Middle Ages.  For example, such powerful queens as Eleanor of Aquitaine and Adela of 
Blois, negotiated marriage alliances on behalf of their    sons and daughters.
329
 
 Peace efforts between Castile and León largely failed in the late twelfth century 
because both sides had territorial interests in the frontier region, known as the Tierra de 
Campos.  These interests justified conflict, and consequently undermined the peace.  
This explains why the repeated diplomatic initiatives aimed at peacemaking between 
Castile and León all achieved nothing in the long term.  However, diplomacy finally 
succeeded at the end of the twelfth century, when a marriage alliance was proposed 
between King Alfonso IX of León and the Castilian Infanta, doña Berenguela, daughter 
of King Alfonso VIII of Castile.   
 However, whilst she was still only a child, doña Berenguela had been betrothed 
to an arguably more powerful suitor, namely Conrad III, son of the Emperor, Frederick 
Barbarossa.  The fact that she was heir to the Kingdom of Castile dramatically increased 
her marriage prospects.
330
  Conrad was an attractive suitor from the Castilian standpoint 
because, as he had three elder brothers, he would probably not inherit the Imperial 
throne, merely a duchy or two.  Nevetheless, there was a broader political purpose to 
this proposed alliance, namely to integrate the kingdom of Castile more fully into 
European affairs beyond the Pyrenees.  Since the late eleventh century, Castilian rulers 
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had desired to participate in political developments beyond the Iberian Peninsula, and 
had arranged dynastic marriages to achieve this objective. 
This arranged marriage was contracted by way of the Treaty of Seligenstadt, the 
seat of Frederick’s court, near Frankfurt, (23 April 1188).331      The parties to the 
agreement were the Emperor, Frederick I, and Alfonso VIII of Castile, grandson of 
Emperor Alfonso VII of Castile-León.  The purpose of the treaty was to contract a 
marriage alliance between the Emperor’s son, Conrad and Berenguela of Castile.  At 
issue was the Castilian inheritance.   
 The kings of Castile were the senior political and military rulers in the Iberian 
Peninsula in the late twelfth century.  Hence, it was vital to ensure their succession.  
However, the treaty’s provisions reveal profound anxieties in the Castilian camp about 
the prospect of a female heir.   
 The solution, according to Bianchini, was to create a ‘plural monarchy’. 332  
Berenguela’s position as heir to the Castilian throne made her the sole source of 
legitimate royal authority.  Moreover, it could not be transmitted to Conrad without her 
formal, public agreement.  Even after this occurred, she would retain royal authority for 
herself, too.  The treaty does not specify the circumstances of Castilian royal 
government if Berenguela and her children were the only successors to the throne.  
Nevertheless, it implies that royal legitimacy could be transmitted to her offspring 
(‘eis’).333 
The treaty provided that if Alfonso VIII should die without leaving issue, then 
Berenguela was to succeed  him, reigning with her husband, Conrad: 
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 ‘Si rex Aldefonsus sine filio masculo superstite obierit, succedat illi in regno 
filia sua Berengaria et vir eius Conradus, salvo et reservato illeso iure suo domine 
regine Alienor, uxori dicti regis Castelle, in omnibus et per omnia in arris suis.’334 
However, Queen Leonor of Castile, Alfonso’s wife, was to retain her property in these 
circumstances.  In this scenario, Conrad would act as Berenguela’s consort.  However, 
if Conrad should die without leaving male issue by Berenguela, then she would inherit 
the Kingdom of Castile in her own right, and the Castilian throne would pass through 
the female line.  If Conrad and Berengaria had progeny, then the Kingdom of Castile 
was to devolve on them. 
 Castilian-Leonese relations had been fraught since the Leonese humiliation at 
the Curia of Carrión in 1188, when King Alfonso IX had sworn homage to King 
Alfonso VIII of Castile.  In front of the assembled Curia, Alfonso IX submitted to the 
Castilian ruler, kissing his hand.  In return, he was knighted by Alfonso VIII.
335
  This 
was a brilliant example of statecraft on the part of the Castilian monarch, who was now 
the senior political and military leader in Christian Iberia.
336
  In reality, León resented 
its humiliation at Carrión, and this resentment perpetuated in Castilian-Leonese 
relations throughout the whole of Alfonso IX’s reign, until reunification in 1230. 
King Alfonso IX’s first marriage was to Teresa, daughter of Sancho I of 
Portugal.  ThisLeonese-Portuguese alliance was contracted in February 1191.
337
  The 
aim of this axis on the Leonese side was to contain Castile.  This was to be achieved 
through enlisting Portuguese assistance against Castile.  A measure of the success of 
this partnership was that Leonese-Portuguese amity was now so profound that they felt 
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able to despatch a joint delegation to the King of Aragón to seek his assistance, too.  
Thus, the two blocs, León-Portugal and Aragón-Navarre formed an anti-Castilian league 
at Huesca (12 May 1191). 
 However, the Papacy was alarmed by the polarization of relations between the 
Christian kingdoms of the Iberian Peninsula, especially given the Almohad menace.
338
  
Hence, Pope Celestine III made a concerted attempt to establish a lasting peace between 
Castile and León.  The aim of this diplomatic activity was to engender peace and unity 
between the Christian powers.  This was needed to effectively combat Muslim al-
Andalus.   
 In this undertaking, Pope Celestine III and his legate, Cardinal Gregory de Sant’ 
Angelo, were the principal actors.
339
  The Church had always played an important role 
in mediating dynastic alliances between belligerent neighbours.  However, this occasion 
was different because it marked the first time that the Papacy had directly intervened in 
Castilian-Leonese foreign policy.  Unlike earlier treaties, which had been mutual 
agreements, Cardinal Gregory imposed a solution on the two monarchs.  
 The motivation for the Treaty of Tordehumos was to restore peace between 
Castile and León, as well as between Castile and Aragón.
340
  Aragón had betrayed its 
long-standing alliance with Castile by joining the League of Huesca.  The parties to the 
treaty were Cardinal Gregory de Sant’ Angelo, King Alfonso VIII of Castile and King 
Alfonso IX of León.341  The treaty aimed to redress the climate of hostility and distrust 
between Castile and León that was symptomatic of their relations in the early 1190s.  
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Peace would achieved by returning Leonese castles captured by Alfonso VIII since the 
death of Fernando II of León in 1188.  These were principally the castles of Alba, Luna 
and Portella.  All other castles that Alfonso VIII had captured during the internecine 
conflicts of the early 1190s were to revert to the king of León on Alfonso VIII’s death.  
This was a mutually beneficial arrangement: Alfonso VIII held them during his lifetime 
(i.e. he was tenant for life), whilst ultimately they would devolve on the Leonese 
monarch, Alfonso IX.  Castilian tenants who still held these castles on the death of 
Alfonso VIII were to perform homage to the Leonese monarch for them: 
 ‘…et illi qui tenant ea  faciant regi Legionis hominium quod post mortem regis 
Castelle et ea regi Legionis vel eius heredi restituant.’342 
 The Treaty of Tordehumos (1194) also dealt with the question of the Leonese 
succession.
343
  King Alfonso IX of León had married Teresa of Portugal illegally: the 
union breached the ecclesiastical laws of consanguinity.  Consequently, the marriage 
was annulled by Cardinal Gregory de Sant’ Angelo.  However, in the Treaty, the Papal 
legate overlooked the rights of Alfonso’s offspring by his marriage to Teresa.  The 
treaty merely stipulated that if King Alfonso IX died without leaving an heir, then his 
kingdom would revert to the Castilian monarch, Alfonso VIII: 
 ‘Mandamus etiam quod si regem Legionis contingerit sine herede decedere, 
regnum eius ad regum Castelle devolvatur…’344   
 King Alfonso IX was also beset by internal feuding from the ‘Castilian party’ at 
the Leonese court.  Alfonso’s stepmother, Queen Urraca López, was a powerful figure 
domestically, and her son, Sancho ‘el Castellano’, weakened Alfonso’s position by 
providing a rival focus of attention.  All the parties to the treaty recognised that Urraca 
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and Sancho needed to be contained in order to prevent them becoming alternate 
claimant to the Leonese throne.  Hence, the treaty provided that their castles should be 
held trust for a term of ten years. 
 However, the Treaty of Tordehumos failed to deliver the sought after peace.  
Once again it was the disputed ownership of the frontier zone that caused hostilities to 
erupt.  King Alfonso IX aligned León with the Almohad Caliphate against Castile in the 
wake of the Castilian defeat at Alarcos (1195).  Together with the Navarrese they 
invaded Castile.  In return, the Aragonese monarch, Pedro II (1196-1213), resumed the 
traditional Aragonese alliance with Castile.  To counter the Almohad invasion, Alfonso 
VIII and Pedro II entered the Kingdom of León, occupying Ardon, Castro Gonzalo and 
Castrotierra.  León was clearly the aggressor in this case.  However, neither side was 
inclined to make peace, although it was obvious that military action had ended in a 
stalemate.
345
 
A marriage alliance between Castile and León was seen by contemporaries as 
the only hope of achieving peace between the two quarrelling kingdoms.
346
  Queen 
Leonor of Castile perceived that a marriage alliance could resolve the border conflict 
with León. Although Castile was victorious in the war with León that resulted from the 
League of Huesca (1191), the conflict had drained Castile of its resources.  
Consequently, it was in a weaker position to counter the Almohad threat from the south.  
Thus, she convinced her husband to come to terms with the Leonese.  This démarche 
represents the influence of medieval queens in the sphere of marital diplomacy.
347
 
Bianchini argues that marriage alliances were generally the remit of of queens in the 
Middle Ages, citing such powerful cases as Eleanor of Aquitaine and Adela of Blois, 
who negotiated marriage alliances on behalf of their offspring. 
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Hence, Berenguela of Castile was wedded to King Alfonso IX of León.
348
  She 
only ruled León for seven years, however during this time, she exercised broad powers 
over the kingdom, both independently and in conjunction with her husband.  Both 
parties hoped that the union would heal the rift between Castile and León that had 
existed since the divisio imperii.  The Crónica Latina reports that: 
‘…reformata est pax inter regem Legionis et regem Castelle que non potuit aliter 
reformari nisi rex Castelle filiam suam dominam Berengariam regi Legionis copularet, 
in matrimonio...’349 
Significantly, the majority of the Spanish clergy were favourably disposed to the 
union, despite the fact that it lay within the prohibited degrees of consanguinity.
350
  This 
was because they were aware of the pressing need for peace between the two 
neighbours: it was vital to expedite the union as soon as possible, because the peace was 
very fragile at this stage.  Nevertheless, as the match was uncanonical, Pope Innocent III 
excommunicated both parties on 6 June 1198.
351
  Later, the new pope despatched his 
legate, Cardinal Rainerio, to formally separate the couple, according to the terms of a 
papal bull of 25 May 1199.  Later still, the Kingdom of León was placed under interdict 
as a punishment.
352
 
 Queen Berenguela’s marriage to King Alfonso IX of León was politically 
significant because she held a large number of castles in her pre-nuptial settlement 
(arras).  Castles had geopolitical significance in the Middle Ages because they 
controlled their surrounding territory.  In this case, they held the key to peace in the 
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frontier zone of the Tierra de Campos.  To contemporaries, the union was the ideal 
solution to the frontier dispute between Castile and León: it was felicitous because it 
represented a peaceful solution to the ongoing quarrel.
353
  The Leonese could not hope 
to recover their castles by force; however King Alfonso VIII of Castile might be 
persuaded to settle them on his daughter as her dowry.  These would then revert to the 
Leonese Crown on Queen Berenguela’s death. 
 The union took place in 1197, in the context of a peace between Castile and 
León.  Peace would be secured by providing that castles in the Tierra de Campos should 
be held by the new Queen of León.  Berenguela was to hold the disputed territory in her 
dowry, which was advantageous to the Leonese king.  However, it also preserved 
Castilian influence in the border region.  The transfer of castles would lead to peace 
because both sides would have a stake in the governance of them and their surrounding 
territory.  The Leonese chronicler, Lucas of Túy states: 
 ‘Pacificatum est inter reges predictos post multas strages et dampna, sed iterum 
inter eos mota Discordia cum venirent ad pacem, dedit rex Adefonsus Legionensis uxori 
sue regine domine Berengarie, que tunc degebat cum patre suo in Castelle, Villarpando, 
Ardon, Roda, Arbolium, Gordonem et Lunam.’354 
In the Treaty of Palencia (8 December 1199), Alfonso IX granted thirty castles 
to his wife, Berenguela of Castile as her arras (dowry).
355
  Twelve of these castles were 
in the disputed Tierra de Campos region.  They were to be held with their surrounding 
territory (alfozes) and appurtenances.  Consequently, she was a major presence in the 
frontier region: 
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‘…ego Adefonsus, Dei gratia Rex Legionis, do in dotem uxori mee, regine 
domne Berengarie, filie domni, regis Castelle, ista triginta castella cum alfozis et 
directuris suis.’356   
The tenants of these castles, who were her vassals, were to perform homage to her in a 
measure designed to engender peace and security. 
 The principal objective of including frontier castles in Queen Berenguela’s 
dowry was to resolve the frontier dispute.  According to Bianchini, this was a common 
function for arras property in medieval Iberia.
357
  Queen Berenguela’s agency regarding 
these vital strategic fortresses was shared by her husband and father, but not 
circumscribed by them.  This implied that she was lord in her own right, subordinate to 
the kings of Castile and León, but able to exercise authority over the noble tenants of 
her castles so long as these demands did not conflict with the latters’s duties to their and 
her overlords. 
 The Treaty of Palencia established stringent measures for its implementation.  
These were designed to halt a return to warfare by Castile and León.  Nearly half of the 
castles in Berenguela’s arras lay within the contested Tierra de Campos region, and had 
been the subject of internecine warfare in the previous decade.  Consequently, the stakes 
in the negotiations that preceded the treaty were high.  The castles risked attack from 
either her father or husband at any change in the political circumstances.   For example, 
Alfonso IX would lose the arras castles if he dismissed his wife, held her captive, killed 
her, or had her killed.
358
  Forfeiture of castles was the sanction for any king who seized 
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her arras by force.
359
  However, in the absence of hostilities during her lifetime, she 
would retain her arras castles until her death, although they were likely to be contested 
after her or her husband’s death.360  Moreover, the treaty specified the line of succession 
to the Leonese throne in order to anticipate potential hostilities after her death.
361
   
Several contingencies were provided for by guarantees in the Treaty of Palencia, 
including the politically-sensitive status of Berenguela’s castles in the event of 
separation of the spouses.  If the marriage was dissolved, she would retain the castles in 
her arras agreement.  Moreover, they would be subject to vassalage to both the 
Castilian and Leonese crowns – this guarantee was designed to prevent the reoccurrence 
of hostilities.  Nevertheless, after the couple separated in 1204, Alfonso IX insisted that 
some of his wife’s castles be retained by the Leonese Crown.  This demand on the part 
of the Leonese was to remain an obstacle to Castilian-Leonese peace until reunification 
in 1230.   
However, if the Leonese monarch divorced his wife, then he was to lose those 
afore-mentioned castles.  In this case, the knights who held them were to transfer the 
potestas (right of entry) to her father, Alfonso VIII of Castile, or her brother, or 
whoever was reigning Castile at that time.  To ensure compliance from these vassals – 
who essentially held the fragile peace between Castile and León in their hands – they 
swore to faithfully abide by the terms of the treaty.  If they failed to honour it, then they 
were branded ‘traitors’ and unworthy of salvation: 
‘Et nos predicti fideles qui has arras tenemus facimus itaque istorum regum et 
regine domne Berengarie…quod fideliter compleamus et compleri faciamus hec omnia 
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que in presenti continetur carta.  Quod si non fecerimus, simus inde traditores et alevosi 
et non possimus nos de proditione salvare.’362  
In theory, this marriage alliance should have constituted the ideal diplomatic 
solution to the long-running frontier dispute.  In reality, Queen Berenguela and Alfonso 
IX were cousins, and their marriage was uncanonical.  In January 1198 Pope Celestine 
III died, and his successor, Pope Innocent III (1198-1216) was elected.  Innocent’s 
predecessor, Pope Celestine, had taken a lenient view of this incestuous union in the 
interests of peace between the two kingdoms.  However, Pope Innocent III, who was 
young and energetic, was much more assiduous in applying canon law.  He was not 
prepared to tolerate such a state of affairs, on the basis that the illicit marriage might 
destabilise the two central kingdoms of Christian Spain. 
The Spanish clergy sent a delegation to Rome to plead for the union of Alfonso 
IX and Queen Berenguela to be upheld.
363
  This commission consisted of the bishops of 
Toledo, Palencia, Leon and Zamora.  They urged the pope to ignore the question of 
consanguinity in the interests of peace between Castile and León.  In their petitions, 
they advocated the issue of the queen’s arras, which largely consisted of castles in the 
Tierra de Campos, and which held the key to peace in the disputed frontier zone.  The 
pope merely ordered that the castles be returned to the Kingdom of León.
364
  He also 
insisted on the separation of the spouses. 
The desire of the Spanish clergy was that the couple would have an heir, who 
would reunite the thrones of Castile and León, and so restore peace to the two warring 
kingdoms. During the delay created by the papal judgement, the couple had a son, the 
future Fernando III.  He ascended to the Castilian throne in 1217, and on his father’s 
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death, to the Leonese Crown, in 1230.
365
  The hope of all parties that a united monarchy 
would restore peace to the two warring kingdoms was fulfilled.  However, it was Queen 
Berenguela who played a determining role in managing tension on the Castilian – 
Leonese frontier in the years between her marriage to King Alfonso IX of León and the 
reunification of the two crowns under Fernando III in 1230.  This was achieved through 
her lordship over strategic castles in the frontier region to engender political stability. 
Monarchs versus Nobles: 
In medieval society, peacemaking occurred primarily  at a monarchical level, 
between rival kings.  However, nobles, who formed the retinue of these monarchs, were 
also affected by royal peace treaties.  Usually, they were instrumental in implementing 
the peace, despite the fact that they were almost always non-parties to the agreements 
themselves.  Hence, it is to them that we now turn.  From the point of view of monarchs, 
nobles were potential violators of the peace, and therefore needed to be constrained.  
Baronial rebellions could breach a hard-won peace, and therefore hinder royal 
peacemaking activity.  Consequently, as Pascua argues, monarchs undertook to 
circumvent noble ambitions.
366
  This was achieved through a combination of war and 
diplomatic pacts.  These peace agreements co-opted the nobility as non-parties, who 
were nevertheless obliged to obey their monarchical superiors, as expressed in the peace 
treaties themselves.  Hence, most peace treaties from the twelfth century contain 
extensive provisions for implementation and derogation by nobles. 
 The nobility were a significant political force in the Middle Ages.
367
  The terms 
‘noble’ refers to magnates, with or without a comital title, as well as local lords, 
infanzones (lesser magnates), and knights (caballeros).  Nobles, in contrast to the rest of 
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the populace, were part of a privileged class: they were born into noble families, often 
they were knights, and they constituted a social elite.  However, there is a great 
distinction between the upper nobility, who had access to the king and the royal family, 
and local lords, who merely had a range of rights and goods conferred on them. 
 In the late eleventh and twelfth centuries, the Iberian nobility were ambitious to 
increase their wealth and influence.  To this end, many nobles migrated to neighbouring 
kingdoms, where the opportunities for royal patronage were greater than in their own 
kingdom.
368
  In the twelfth century, to a large degree, the king was the fount of royal 
power, and the source of social advancement.
369
 The monarchical-noble relationship 
was a mutual one: magnates provided political counsel and military assistance; whilst 
the king distributed land, money, offices – including revenue and jurisdictional offices - 
and lordship.  Frequent presence at court was therefore essential for nobles aspiring to 
power and wealth.  Consequently, they were obliged to live a peripatetic existence.  
This is testified by the subscription lists attached to royal documents.   
Nevertheless, noble fortunes could ameliorate or decline, depending on the 
political circumstances of the   epoch.  Against this background, wealthy magnates took 
action to ensure the perpetration of their dynastic lines, and the insurance of their 
patrimonies.  Meanwhile, royal politics could disrupt the fortunes of the nobility.  Most 
graphically, the divisio imperii of 1157 sundered many Castilian-Leonese nobles from 
their landed estates, especially those who held tenencias (tenancies) in the Tierra de 
Campos region.
370
  Noble lordship became more dispersed.  This tendency was 
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exacerbated by the lack of military advancement with respect to the Almohad caliphate, 
as the lack of territorial advancement became more acute.  Consequently, successive 
Castilian and Leonese monarchs were unable to reward the service of their vassals with 
newly-reconquered land. 
At the same period, in the twelfth century, royal domains were governed by 
dynastic monarchies.  This process was no different in Christian Iberia.  In this process, 
noble families played a key role.  For example, Count Ramon Berenguer IV of 
Barcelona became Prince of Aragón by virtue of his marriage to Petronilla, daughter of 
King Ramiro II of Aragón.  He was a leading player in the Aragonese Reconquest, and 
negotiated many peace treaties with his Castilian-Leonese counterparts.   
Pascua identifies four principal trends in the monarchical – noble dynamic.  
Firstly, there was endemic warfare between the Christian kingdoms of the north of 
Iberia.  Secondly, the emergence of noble dynasties via political marriages occurred, 
involving families from distant regions.  Thirdly, there appeared a change of service of 
members of the noble class between different royal courts.  Fourthly, the practice of 
vistas reales and truces between peninsular kings began to become established.
371
 
The twelfth century was an era of civil war, urban uprisings, running contrary to 
the prevailing development of the consolidation of Feudal kingdoms.  During these 
hostilities, the nobility seized castles, land and men, in order to expand their power base.  
Nowhere was this more true than in the Castile of Alfonso VIII’s minority, in the 1160s, 
when the Lara and Castro dynasties competed for control of the young king.   
Meanwhile, kings were establishing themselves at the pinnacle of the political 
hierarchy in the twelfth century.  They did this in the face of competition from rival 
monarchs. They did so by forging political and military alliances with their 
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contemporaries, such as the long-standing alliance between Castile and Aragón that 
endured through the reigns of successive monarchs from these kingdoms.   
These alliances were both political, designed to create a bloc larger than the sum 
of the two constituents, which would deter future attack against one of its members, and 
thus lead to peace.  This was the case with successive Castilian-Aragonese treaties 
regarding Navarre, such as the Treaty of Cazola.  On the offensive side of the equation, 
they were also military alliances, reliant on the mutual auxilium of the parties to the 
agreement, to effectively combat the enemy. 
However, these alliances had the effect of alienating the nobility of the        
kingdoms who were the parties to such agreements.  Pascua argues that royal power, as 
expressed in this ‘network of alliances and armies’ was very distinct from the familial 
organisation and kinship ties which   characterised the feudal nobility at this time.  This 
was despite the political marriages that great magnates engaged in, and the trans-
regional nature of these marital relationships.  Over time, monarchs managed to curtail 
noble ambition, and confine them to defined territorial units.
372
  Nobles were obliged to 
align themselves with the emerging royal blocs that were contending for power at this 
time in Christian Iberia.   
Nobles were alienated because they were excluded from the partition of territory 
that accompanied military activity.  In effect, kings divided captured territory, and then 
allotted it to their vassals, who had served them in battle.  However, this was often at 
the expense of nobles, who held patrimonial estates that they had inherited, as opposed 
to tenencias (tenancies) granted by the king.  Against this background it is easy to see 
how nobles could become disaffected. 
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Nobles possessed similar strategies in the twelfth century.  They proferred 
multiple service to different kings; they changed their fidelity according to fluctuating 
political circumstances; and they acquired castles in volatile frontier regions.  Indeed, 
Pascua concludes that the phenomenon of migrating nobles is the most characteristic 
feature of twelfth-century Iberian politics.  In particular, nobles changed their 
allegiances between rival kings, as it suited their own ambitions.  Accompanying them 
went knights, vassals, families and the dependants of their households.   
When a new incumbent ascended the throne, there was always a concomitant 
realignment of the kingdom’s nobility.  This is reflected in the pattern of peace treaties, 
which were regularly renewed on the ascendancy of a new monarch or ruler.  Those 
nobles who had been demoted might seek new arenas for their talents at rival courts.  
Similarly, established nobles could expect to face competition from arriviste magnates, 
who had migrated from foreign courts.  For example, during the Castilian civil war of 
the early 1160s, the Castro dynasty, who had been entrusted with the custody of the heir 
to the throne, Alfonso VIII, migrated to the court of King Fernando II of León.  They 
held extensive properties in Extremadura, which was largely under the Leonese sphere 
of influence, hence it is unsurprising that they took refuge at the Leonese Court.
373
  The 
arrival of new families at court affected the position of established magnates in terms of 
proximity to the king.  This factor probably explains the appearance and disappearance 
of certain noble names in the witness lists of royal acta from this period.  
At this  time, royal diplomacy had a direct impact on the nobility of the 
Christian kingdoms of Iberia.  Kings imposed their authority on the rest of the 
population, especially the nobility, who were prone to rebel if  by doing so they could 
improve their position.  One way that this was achieved was through diplomatic treaties, 
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which bound nobles as ‘vassals’ of the monarchical parties.  At the same time, 
monarchs depended on their magnates to provide feudal levies in time of war.  This was 
especially true in reference to treaties of mutual alliance, which provided for military 
assistance against common enemies, such as the king of Navarre. 
Competing monarchs attempted to define their territories and government 
hierarchies.  The treaties of medieval Spain employ terms such as ‘confederatione et 
amicicia’374, ‘pacem et concordiam et amiciciam’375, ‘veram amicitiam et perpetuam 
concordiam et pacem’376, ‘pacis et concordie’377.  The partition treaties between Castile 
and Aragón, in particular, explicitly divide up al-Andalus, and in doing so, delineate 
spheres of influence  during the Reconquista.
378
   
However, for their part, kings recognised that their noble followers might act 
autonomously, following their own ambitions.  Nobles tended to shift allegiances, and 
this might hinder royal foreign policy, which depended for its implementation on noble 
participation.  Hence, monarchs took action to constrain noble activity.  This took the 
form of ensuring that nobles were co-erced into   accepting monarchical foreign policy, 
by the insertion of binding clauses in peace treaties.  Thus, we see the appearance of 
clauses prohibiting the support, protection or employment of renegade nobles from 
enemy kingdoms.  For example, the Treaty of Nájera-Logroño II (1179) specified that: 
‘Item, si quis nobilium Regis Navarre per sel vel cum alio intraverit cum 
exercitu in terram regis Aldefonsi Castelle, perdat hereditates et honores quos a rege 
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Navarre teneas erit et amorem eiusdem, et non recuperate hec nec amorem regis 
Navarre nisi cum voluntate regis Castelle.’379   
 The divisio imperii of Castile-León in particular was a constant source of 
conflict between the two kingdoms, as the nobility of either side saw their estates 
divided between the opposing powers.  Consequently, the peace treaties of León-Castile 
of the early 1180s sought to regulate the activities of the  nobility of the respective 
kingdoms in the interests of the wider peace.  This was achieved through explicit anti-
compliance measures in the treaties themselves.  For example, the Treaty of Fresno-
Lavandera (1183), specified a reconvention of the parties, where the  treaty could be 
reviewed in order to ensure that peace was achieved: 
 ‘…ita quod singulis annis uno certo loco et die pro conservation pacis huius 
conveniamus.’380 
 The nobility formed political alliances which transcended frontiers.  Meanwhile, 
monarchs gradually came to oppose the nobility.  Constant border warfare led to treaties 
between neighbouring royal kingdoms. This led to the necessity for the nobility to 
assign themselves to political and geographical entities under the authority of the king.  
Secondly, monarchs developed legal mechanisms to render noble rebellion more 
difficult.  Finally, nobles could no longer hope to compete against alliances of several 
monarchs.            
The Leonese Succession: 
     Before, Castile and León could establish peace between themselves, there was 
the outstanding domestic issue of the Leonese succession to resolve.  This was 
necessary in order to restore political stability to the Kingdom of León.  This had been 
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harmed by the Treaty of Tordehumos (1194), which had stipulated that if King Alfonso 
IX died without leaving heirs, then the Kingdom of León would revert to King Alfonso 
VIII of Castile.
381
  Hence, there was a pressing need to restore the Leonese royal line.  
Stability in León was essential if there was to be a lasting peace between the two 
kingdoms. 
 Pope Innocent III denounced the marriage of Alfonso IX and Queen Berenguela 
on 16 April 1198 in a letter to his legate in Iberia, Cardinal Rainerius.
382
  This was on 
the grounds of inconsanguinity.  It is no exaggeration to say that this circumstance led 
to a diplomatic ‘war of attrition’ between the Iberian kingdoms and the Papacy.  Under 
the energetic Pope Innocent, the marriage could not survive.   
 The main issue, however, was not the union itself, but the matter of Queen 
Berenguela’s castles.383  Negotiations regarding these castles, which were crucial to the 
marriage, proceeded continuously between 1198 and 1204.
384
  However, once the 
couple had separated (1204), all hope of a peaceful settlement evaporated.   
 The restoration of the Leonese royal line was the motivation for the Treaty of 
Cabreros (26 March 1206).
385
  The treaty was a peace agreement between Alfonso VIII 
of Castile and Alfonso IX of León, and their respective heirs, Berenguela of Castile and 
the Leonese Infante, Fernando.  The end of the last frontier war in 1197 with the 
marriage of Berenguela to Alfonso IX had created a more favourable climate for peace 
initiatives between the two erstwhile enemies. 
 The treaty aimed to restore the Leonese succession by donating castles to the 
Leonese Infante, Fernando. In this way, he would have a strong power base, consisting 
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of castles from both Castile and León.  All of the disputed frontier castles were 
devolved onto Fernando under the terms of the pact.
386
  However, the treaty was also 
favourable to Castile.   By restoring the Leonese succession, it eliminated the main 
source of instability in León, which in turn created the necessary conditions for peace 
with Castile.                       
 The two monarchs met at Cabreros, between Valderaduez and Sequillo on 26 
March 1206, where they signed a peace: 
 ‘Esta es la forma de la paz que es firmada entrel rei don Alfonso de Castella et el 
rei don Alfonso de Leon, et entre el rei de Leon et el filio daques rei de Castella que en 
pos el regnara.’387              
The treaty was unique amongst Iberian diplomatic treaties in that it was composed in 
the vernacular, Castilian Romance, rather than in Latin.
388
  
 To engender peace and stability between Castile and León, King Alfonso VIII 
gave to Fernando several castles: Monreal; Carpio; Almanza Castrotierra Valderas; 
Bolanos Villafrechos; and Siero.  To reinforce Castilian peace efforts towards Leon, 
Berenguela gave Cabreros to her son: 
 ‘…et la reina de Leon doña Berenguela, filia del rei de Castella da a su filio, 
Cabreros.’389   
 On the Leonese side,   Alfonso IX acted to bolster the Leonese succession by 
giving five castles to his son.  In all cases these castles were accompanied by pledges of 
security (arras), as well as surrounding territory and appurtenances (alfozes y 
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pertinentias).  Nevertheless, Bianchini argues that both monarchs retained considerable 
power over the donated castles, even though they were nominally under Fernando’s 
lordship.
390
   
One of the principal objectives of the Leonese party was to ensure the loyalty of 
the ‘Castilian faction’, namely Queen Berenguela and her retinue, to the Leonese Crown.  
This was essential to ensure a smooth succession.  To this end, King Alfonso IX placed 
eight castles in the hands of the Infante’s vassals: 
 ‘Et, porque la reina dona Berenguela segura en aver estos ocho mil maravedis, 
mete el rei de Leon estos ochos castellos en seguranza en manos de vassallos ne nieto 
del  Rei de Castella, filio del rei de Leon.’391 
In order to ensure fidelity to the Leonese Infante, tenants holding these castles 
had to perform homage to him, and thus become his vassals.  The rationale for these 
measures was the maintenance of peace between the two kingdoms, a situation that had 
been conspicuously absent for the majority of the second half of the twelfth century.  As 
Bianchini argues, Fernando was now the chosen peacemaker by virtue of his royal 
lineage and his lordship over the frontier fortresses.  Thus, the treaty boldly stated that 
the performance of homage to both parties was designed to uphold the peace between 
the two kingdoms: 
‘…et deven fer omenage al rei de Castella de al rei de Leon que lealmientre 
fagan tener los pazes entre ellos.’392                          
 To successfully uphold the treaty, nobles who held these castles were to hold 
them from the King of León and the Leonese Infante, Fernando.  In so doing, they were 
                                                          
390
 Bianchini, Queen’s Hand, 85. 
391
 Ibid., 367. 
392
 Ibid., 368. 
138 
 
 
obliged to comply with all the pledges agreed by their liege lords, the monarchs of 
Castile and León, who were the signatories to the treaty: 
 ‘…et los cavalleros que los deveren tenio recibanlos per portero del 
sombrenombrado filio del rei de Leon, et sean vassallos del dellos, et retenganlos por 
complir todos los pleitos que por ellos deven seer complidos.’393                 
To further enhance peacemaking initiatives in the treaty, knights who held these castles 
were obliged to give homage to the king of León himself, and were regarded as vassals 
of him.  As such, they were obliged to perform military service for the land that they 
held, as specified in the treaty: 
 ‘…et aquellos que tovieren los castellos que dichos son de suo, quando los 
reciberen, fagan omenage al rei de Leon et sean vassallos del por complirle el servicio 
de terras et de terminos et de pertinenzas daquelos castellos…’394  
 However, castle tenure was explicitly linked to the performance of homage and 
the provision of military assistance on the part of these vassals.  In this way, peace was 
maintained between Castile and León as part of the ‘Feudal contract’.  This was a novel 
departure as no twelfth-century treaty had contained such a clause: 
 ‘…et antes que reciban elo castell ho los castellos devengen vassallos del rei de 
Leon por el servicio cumplir assi quomodo dicho es de suso, et faganle end omenage et 
ante fagan omenage ed ambos los rees et a la reina dona Berenguela por fazer tener las 
pazes et convenenzas de los rees et de la reina  anci quomodo es escripto.’395  
Castile’s Oriental Diplomacy: 
                                                          
393
 Ibid., 365. 
394
 Ibid., 366. 
395
 Ibid., 370. 
139 
 
 
 Since the era of the Empire, Castile had engaged with Aragón, as its principal 
partner in peace and ally in war.  As it had done in the twelfth century, Castile faced 
east towards Aragón and Navarre in the thirteenth century.  Once again, it renewed its 
longstanding alliance with Aragón.  This alliance was oriented towards attacking 
Navarre.  Meanwhile, León was isolated in the west. 
 In the last decade of the twelfth century, Castile attempted to redefine its borders 
from those existing at the death of King Sancho III (d. 1158).  It also attempted to 
recapture territory lost during the minority of King Alfonso VIII.  This implied 
imposing its authority on Navarre, with the assistance of neighbouring Aragón.396 
 Navarre, for its part, distanced itself from peninsular affairs, fearful of Castilian-
Aragonese intentions.  Castile had already begun recapturing disputed territory.  In so 
doing, it contravened previous truces – such as Fitero (1167) – and had occupied castles 
faithfully held in guarantee of antecedent peace treaties.
397
  The conduct of the 
Navarrese king and the reaction of the papal legate, Cardinal Rainerio, provided the 
pretext for the monarchs of Castile and Aragón to ‘close in’ on Navarre, and definitively 
resolve their quarrel regarding the weaker neighbour.   
 Both parties, Castile and Aragón, despatched envoys, probably lay persons, and 
to the exclusion of clerics, with the aim of concluding a military alliance between 
Alfonso VIII and Pedro II of Aragón.  This oriental policy was manifested in the Treaty 
of Calatayud (20 May 1198).
398
  In this treaty both powers agreed a pact of mutual 
assistance and the partition of Navarre.  The western part of Navarre would accrue to 
Castile; whilst Aragon would receive the eastern part, the partition line passing through 
Pamplona.  To this end, the two monarchs, Alfonso VIII of Castile and Pedro II of 
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Aragón agreed to sign a ‘Peace, concord and friendship covenant’ between the two 
kingdoms.  The Castilian offensive began in January 1199, contrary to the London 
settlement of 1177.   
 The Castilian-Aragonese alliance was strengthened by the explicit reference to 
‘friendship’ between the two parties.  Alfonso VIII of Castile promised to King Pedro II 
of Aragón to: 
 ‘…devenio bonus et fidelis amicus.’399  
However, the treaty extended beyond mere friendship.  It also committed the Castilian 
monarch to providing military assistance to the King of Aragón should the latter 
become engaged in a war.   
In the Treaty of Calatayud, Alfonso VIII placed five castles in the possession of 
an Aragonese noble, a certain Guillermo González, namely: Agreda; Aprol; Arneto; 
Aguilar; and Cervera.  The latter was to hold them as fief of the King of Aragón and 
become his vassal.  In reciprocal gesture, the King of Aragón placed five castles into the 
hands of a Castilian vassal, in order to stabilise the territory that they controlled.  This 
was a measure designed to ensure cross-border security. 
The evidence for the significance of castle exchange is patent.  If a noble vassal 
failed to observe the treaty under which he had received his castle, then he would forfeit 
it, and it would accrue to the party in whose kingdom it lay.  On the other hand, faithful 
vassals were to perform homage to their natural lord, as well.  Moreover, they were 
obliged to perform homage for castles held from the opposing party.  This is the first 
example of cross-border collaboration between monarchs to engender peace along the 
frontier: 
                                                          
399
 Treaty of Calatayud (20 May 1198), González, Alfonso VIII, II, Doc. 667, at 179. 
141 
 
 
‘Fideles autem qui tenuerit castra fidelitatis Regis Aragonis sint de regno regis 
Castelle et faciant hominium regi Castelle de castris fidelitatem.’400         
The sanctions for derogation from the treaty were severe.  The treaty explicitly 
states that vassals were to abide by all the treaties that had been agreed between Castile 
and Aragón, on pain of forfeiture of their castles.  Thus, the Treaty of Calatayud can be 
said to have retrospective effect.  Moreover, the treaty was pervasive in the sense that it 
applied to both monarchs and their vassals, although this was standard practice in 
medieval diplomacy.  Thus, if a monarch should enter the other party’s kingdom with 
hostile intent, then he was to be punished by losing his castles, and the vassals who held 
them were to surrender them to the aggrieved party: 
‘Preterea, si ego Adefonsus, rex Castelle, intravero hostiliter terram Regis 
Aragonis cum exercitu meus, vel exercitus meus sine me, contra fidelitatis amittam, et 
fidelis qui ea tenuerit tradat ei regi Aragonis…’401     
Anticipating complete circumvention of the treaty, it further specified that if anyone 
should attempt to breach it, or to attack a castle mentioned in it, then he was to be 
branded a ‘traitor and a perjuror’ (proditor et periurus).  Such a condemnation implied a 
spiritual as well as a temporal punishment as perjury involved lying on oath.  
 The significance of this treaty was that, in conjunction with other powers, 
Castile had partitioned the whole Peninsula in less than half a century: in the West, with 
León, under the Treaty of Sahagún (1158); in the Levante, with Aragon, under the 
Treaty of Cázola (1179); and in Navarre, again with Aragón, under the Treaty of 
Calatayud (1198).  In military terms, Alfonso VIII renewed the war with Navarre in the 
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following year, 1199, besieging Vitoria, and capturing San Sebastián and Guipúzcoa.402  
Sancho VI fled his kingdom, leaving it to its fate.  Meanwhile, Alfonso VIII 
successfully recovered the territory that the Navarrese had seized during his minority 
between Alava and Guipúzcoa.  Consequently, he took no further interest in securing 
the provisions of the Treaty of Calatayud, or the outcome of Navarrese politics. 
 Later, in the first decade of the thirteenth century, Castile unilaterally made 
peace with Navarre.  Castile had a long-standing claim to parts of Navarre, but it needed 
peace more urgently than mere piecemeal territorial gains.  Peace with its eastern 
neighbour was desirable mainly because a unified Christian Iberia could more 
effectively combat the Almohad Caliphate of al-Andalus: erstwhile Christian rivals 
would fight under the same banner against the Muslims.  Peace was also necessary to 
avoid domestic distractions that might hinder the war effort.   
 To this end, Castile agreed a peace treaty with Navarre, the Treaty of 
Guadalajara (29 October 1207).
403
  The term of the peace was fifteen years.  Each party 
was obliged to swear to uphold the treaty in the presence of six magnates (ricos 
homines).  In this relationship, Castile clearly held the superior position.  If the 
Navarrese king failed to uphold the treaty, then the King of Castile was licensed under 
the terms of the treaty to request the auxilium of the six ‘ricos homines’ of Navarre to 
make war on Navarre as a means of punishment: 
 ‘…et quod adiuvent illum ad guerreare contra regem Navarre et contra suam 
terram…donec iste treuge compleanture, et sint in adiutorio regis Castelle et in toto 
deservitio regis Navarre.’404   
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 However, Castile did not have carte blanche to attack Navarre.  Indeed, it was 
prevented under the treaty from launching an unprovoked attack on Navarre in alliance 
with Aragón.  This clause effectively reversed Castilian-Aragonese foreign policy 
towards Navarre in the twelfth century, when the latter kingdom had effectively been 
partitioned by the two powers.   
 In a measure designed to ensure adherence to the treaty, both parties exchanged 
castles in a spirit of fidelity.  Both sides elected four nobles from the opposite kingdom 
to hold the aforesaid castles.  The rico homines who held these castles, were to become 
vassals of the king in whose territory the castles lay.  They were also obliged to perform 
homage to him. 
 The sanctions of the treaty were severe.  If the King of Navarre infringed the 
treaty, then the six ricos homines of Navarre, who had performed homage to the 
Castilian monarch, were to transfer their allegiance to the latter with all their retinue.  
Compliance with the treaty also extended to the nobility of both kingdoms.  ‘Faithful’ 
vassals who had previously sworn homage to either of the parties were obliged to 
comply with the treaty.  If they failed to do so, they were to be branded ‘perjurors and 
traitors’.   
 Both parties promised to observe the treaty, and swore oaths and bound their 
vassals to unequivocally uphold the treaty.  These vassals were the ricos homines who 
had been elected to hold the castles exchanged in the treaty.  They also promised to 
protect faithful vassals who held their castles faithfully, with their persons, and with the 
persons of their vassals, and with their descendants.    Thus, the Treaty of Guadalajara 
represented an initiative towards a  durable peace with firm commitments to uphold it 
on both sides.    
Christian Peace and a United Front against Islam:  
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 Christian peace was the essential prerequisite for war against Muslim Spain.  
Internal peace between the Christian kingdoms of Iberia was necessary to effectively 
combat the Muslim Almohads of al-Andalus.  This was because domestic peace was 
necessary in order to avoid distractions during the forthcoming campaign.  González 
argues that although there was not outright war between Castile and León at this time, 
nevertheless the Treaty of Cabreros (1206) had been insufficient to prevent continuing 
friction between the two kingdoms.
405
  Hence, the Papacy intervened to encourage 
peace between the Christian kingdoms of Spain as a diplomatic prerequisite for the 
ongoing prosecution of the Reconquista.
 406
 
   Peace between Castile and León was achieved by the Treaty of Valladolid (27 
June 1209).
407
  The treaty contained several explicit peacemaking initiatives.  Firstly, 
both parties stated that they would put aside all animosity that had previously existed 
between the two kingdoms, and they agreed to abide by the pact made at Cabreros: 
 ‘Et ego et vos, Aldefonsus, rex Legionis, sumus pacati de totis rancuris quas de 
novis ad invicem habebamus, salvis pactis et convenienciis que scripte sunt in cartis illis 
que facte fuerunt inter nos apud Cabreros.’408 
To further engender amicable relations, both sides agreed in the treaty that they were 
friends, and that they would strive for peace, both between themselves and their 
successors 
 Nunc igitur promittimus nobis ad invicem et iuramus sacrosancti evangalia quod, 
dum vixerimus, amici fideles simus et veri per bonam fidem et sine malo ingenio et 
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hanc amicitiam et pacem firmamus tam inter nos quam inter filios nostros qui post nos 
regnaverint.’409 
On the negative side, peacemaking measures included a prohibition on waging war, or 
otherwise infringing the treaty by breaching the peace: 
 ‘Nec liceat nobis guerram invicem facere vel damnum nobis inferred vel aliquid 
contra pacem vel treuguas facere…’410 
 To pre-empt any disputes that might arise in the future, King Alfonso IX gave 
Queen Berenguela three towns, namely, Villapando; Ardon;  and Rueda.
411
  This 
concession was accompanied by all their respective territories.  They were to be held for 
the duration of her lifetime.  Upon her death, Queen Berenguela was obliged to 
relinquish these towns to her son, the Infante, Fernando.  Those knights who held 
castles on the frontier were obliged to perform homage to the ruler of the kingdom in 
which their castle lay, and to refrain from engaging in hostilities.  These measures were 
designed to stabilise the frontier and forestall any invasion of the other party’s territory, 
such as had been common in the 1190s.   
 Temporal sanctions for infringement of the treaty were stringent.  If anyone 
should contravene the treaty, then he was to be regarded as a ‘perjuror and a traitor’, an 
apparently new brand of transgression that only seems to appear from the early 
thirteenth century in the treaties.  If the felon was a monarch who was party to the treaty, 
then all his nobles were permitted to transfer their allegiance to the opposing monarch, 
‘…who was upholding the treaty and serving the peace.’ 
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 The ecclesiastical penalties for derogation were also stringent.  Anyone who 
breached the peace or engaged in hostility was to be anathematized or excommunicated, 
and their kingdom placed under interdict.  
 However, unlike the twelfth-century treaties between Castile and León, 
thirteenth-century peace treaties envisaged a solution to potential derogations from 
agreements.  In the Treaty of Valladolid, both sides agreed to perform mutual homage, 
to comply with the terms of the treaty, and to make amends for any possible breaches of 
the treaty, on the face of the agreement: 
 ‘…et nos per supra dictum hominium et iuramentum tenemur emendare et 
compere sicut illi mandaverit vel plures ex eis.’412 
This commitment to peace marked an unprecedented departure in relations between the 
Christian kingdoms of Spain: both parties agreed to serve the treaty, according to its 
letter. 
 The success of the Treaty of Valladolid (1209) in maintaining the peace can be 
gauged from the decisive victory won by King Alfonso VIII at the battle of Las Navas 
de Tolosa in 1212, when all the Christian kingdoms of Spain, including León, were 
represented on the battlefield.
413
  Moreover, there are no reported incidents of inter-
Christian violence during this pivotal epoch.  However, prior to the Las Navas 
campaign, King Alfonso VIII of Castile had requested the presence of the Leonese ruler 
himself amongst the assembled Christian forces, but Alfonso IX had replied that he 
would only do so if the former returned the Leonese castles that he had captured.  Hence, 
both sides failed to honour the outcome of the Curia of Carrion, when Alfonso VIII had 
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demanded Leonese auxilium; on the other hand, Castile failed to oblige León, by 
withholding Leonese castles that rightfully belonged to the Leonese monarch. 
The Post-Las Navas Reconfiguration of Iberian Politics: 
 The battle of Las Navas de Tolosa was the turning-point in the Reconquest.  
However, it not only paved the way for eventual victory against the Muslims of al-
Andalus, it also altered the manner in which the Christian powers engaged with each 
other.  Due to his decisive victory at the battle of Las Navas de Tolosa (1212), King 
Alfonso VIII had great political strength and military prestige.  Castile was triumphant 
at Las Navas, although all the Christian Iberian kingdoms had been represented on the 
battlefield in a demonstrable show of unity, even if King Alfonso IX of Leon was 
absent.
414
  Neverthless, King Alfonso VIII of Castile chose to negotiate with his 
Christian neighbours rather than indulge in military campaigns against them.   
 The three monarchs, Alfonso VIII of Castile, Alfonso IX of León and Afonso II 
of Portugal convened for a summit, held at Coimbra on the Feast of St. Martin de Tours 
(11 November 1212).  The preliminary formula of the agreement consisted of a promise 
to agree a truce between the hostile neighbours, Castile and León.  Portugal was invited 
to join the agreement, perhaps attracted by its alliance with León: 
 ‘Hec est forma treuga quam fecit Rex Legionis cum rege Castelle…in qua debet 
intrare Rex Portugalie…’415 
The truce effectively ended armed incursions into their respective kingdoms, 
thus ensuring peace. It was intended to endure until 1 May 1213.  To resolve the latent 
conflict between León and Portugal, the treaty provided for conflict resolution: if 
Leonese men committed a crime in Portugal, or vice versa, they were obliged to make 
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amends within twenty days, according to the terms of the truce.  All three monarchs 
swore to abide by the terms of the truce in good faith and with resolve, thus acting as 
guarantors of the agreement: 
‘Et ego rex Portugalie cum vassallis et hominibus meis has treugas iuravi quod 
eos teneam et teneri faciam bona fide et sine malo ingenio sicut dictum est in ista carta, 
et sicut reges Castelle et Legionis et vassalli illorum eas iuraverunt.’416 
Moreover, the three parties agreed to make war on al-Andalus.  Each party 
would engage in their own theatre of war, which would be delineated by their border 
with al-Andalus.  Each would provide mutual auxilium.  To this extent, the Truce of 
Coimbra was fundamental in that it provided an equitable partition of the western part 
of the Iberian Peninsula (al-Gharb), just as the Treaty of Tudején (1151) had done in 
the Levante.  
A Second Castilian Regency: 
 Following the death of King Alfonso VIII, King Alfonso IX of León became the 
senior political and military leader in Christian Iberia.  He bequeathed the Kingdom of 
Castile to his surviving male heir, Enrique I (1214-17), who was still a minor.  
Consequently, there was a regency for the second time in Castilian history in a century; 
Alfonso VIII himself had been a minor when he   inherited the throne of Castile in 1158.  
In these circumstances, Queen Leonor, who died shortly after King Alfonso VIII, 
invested all regalian rights in her daughter, Enrique’s sister, doña Berenguela.   
 Bianchini argues that most regencies were turbulent, as the issue of the custody 
of the monarch while still a minor led to conflicts between the various factions at 
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court.
417
  Enrique’s minority was characterised by feuding amongst the nobility.  Once 
again the principal cause of the dispute was the custodianship of the young king.  
Berenguela chose two prelates to be the tutors of Enrique: Archbishop Rodrigo 
Ximénez de Rada of Toledo, and Bishop Tello of Palencia.  This choice of tutors led to 
a rapprochement between the monarchy and the Church.  However, it opened the 
monarchy to charges of ecclesiastical preferment.  Conversely, the secular nobility felt 
alienated and marginalised by this monopoly of power by the Church.   
 Moreover, the fact of Queen Berenguela’s   gender and the corresponding 
assumption that she could not rule like a king made it tempting for powerful men at 
court to attempt to seize power from her.  The nobles of Castile observed that Queen 
Berenguela had not been chosen as Regent by the late King Alfonso VIII, only by his 
wife, Queen Leonor.   According to the Crónica Latina, the majority of magnates 
agreed that Álvaro Núñez de Lara should be the Regent, in place of Berenguela.
418
   
Within four months, Álvaro Núñez, head of the powerful Lara family and royal alférez 
(standard bearer) had reclaimed Enrique’s tutelage and the regency of Castile.419  The 
majority of the Castilian nobles revolted and accepted Álvaro’s position as regent.420   
 However, this scenario is complicated by the Laras’s gradual ascendancy in 
Castilian politics.  They had been gradually increasing in power during the reign of 
Alfonso VIII.  Now, they used their position as Enrique’s tutor to dominate Castilian 
affairs.  For example, as early as April 1215, Álvaro began styling himself ‘comes’ 
(count).
421
  Álvaro commanded the support of the majority of the aristocracy, episcopate 
and municipalities – the ‘three estates’ – for the    duration of his regency.  However, 
there was growing opposition to him among sectors of the nobility, caused by noble 
                                                          
417
 Bianchini, Queen’s Hand, 104. 
418
 CL, chap. 64. 
419
 Doubleday, Lara Family, 130. 
420
 Ibid., 53. 
421
 González, Alfonso VIII, I, 693-95. 
150 
 
 
exclusion from court.  For example, Gonzalo Rodríguez Girón, who had been Castilian 
maiordomo (head of the royal household) for eighteen years, was promptly 
dismissed.
422
  Later, this trend towards noble exclusion intensified: the king ceased 
inviting to the Cortes either Queen Berenguela or her noble retinue, for example, Lope 
Díaz de Haro, Álvaro Díaz de Cameros, Alfonso Tellez de Meneses, as well as the 
Metropolitan of Castile, Archbishop Rodrigo Ximénez de Rada.
423
 
 Despite the undercurrent of tension between Castile and León, principally 
caused by Álvaro’s bellicose policies, relations between the two kingdoms were 
sufficiently harmonious for the two rulers, Alfonso IX of León and Enrique I of Castile 
to conclude an agreement, the Treaty of Toro I (12 August 1216).  The pope urged 
peace, and the Spanish clergy returning from the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) bore 
the same message.   
The two monarchs held a vista real at Toro.  The treaty aimed to establish a 
lasting peace between the two kingdoms.  This was to be achieved by securing the 
Castilian-Leonese frontier: 
 ‘Hec est forma pacis inter regem Legionensem domnus Alfonsum et regem 
Castelle domnum Henricum, facta secundum mandatum domini pape, que debet in 
perpetuum inter eos bona fide et sine malo ingenio observari.’424 
In the interests of achieving a lasting peace, the peacemaking initiatives contained in the 
treaty were stringent.  Thus, if anyone from Castile committed a crime in the Kingdom 
of León, then he was to make amends within nine days, witnessed by ten magistrates, 
who were elected on an ad hoc basis from the town where the felony was perpetrated: 
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 ‘Si quis igitur de regno Castelle dampnum aliquod aut malum fecerit in regno 
Legionensi…omnia emendentur per decem iurators ad hoc electos in singulis civitatibus 
et villis, sic, scilicet, ut statim emendetur quicquid poterit emendari.  Et omnis 
emendatio plene fiat usque ad novem dies.’425 
 Further peacemaking measures were designed to maintain the peace already 
achieved.  Hence, the parties were not permitted to make treaties or wage war on other 
kingdoms not party to the treaty.  Rather, they were obliged to implement policies that 
served the peace: 
 ‘Et non fiat alia pugnaratio nec alia guerra sed pax semper firma inter reges et 
regna servetur.’426 
The nobility of both realms, who were the potential transgressors of the treaty, were 
bound to uphold the agreement and to perform homage on an ex parte basis: 
 ‘Pro pace autem istas et aliis que supradicta sunt observandis ex parte regni 
Legionensis iurantet hominium faciunt…’427 
 In short, during Enrique’s brief reign, there was an underlying current of 
dissidence at the Castilian court, where the ‘Church party’, represented by the Regent 
Berenguela, confronted the nobility, led by the ambitious Count Álvaro Núñez de Lara.  
However, this did not prevent both monarchs from seeking a durable peace. 
Reunification: 
 Queen Berenguela was the direct heir of King Alfonso VIII of Castile, and the 
right of succession vested in her.  In default of a male heir, then the eldest daughter 
would inherit the throne.  Indeed, there had been a precedent for female succession in 
                                                          
425
 Ibid., 730. 
426
 Ibid., 731. 
427
 Ibid., 731. 
152 
 
 
the twelfth century, when Queen Urraca (1109-26) had inherited the Castilian throne 
from Alfonso VI.  Hence, on 2 July 1217, at Valladolid, the burgesses, aristocracy and 
her knights acclaimed Berenguela as Queen of Castile.   
 However, the primary requirement of a monarch in the thirteenth century was to 
be a strong warleader, so it was impossible for a woman to rule in her own right.  Hence, 
the people of Castile petitioned Berenguela to cede the Crown to her son, the Leonese 
Infante, Fernando, who was the sole male heir to the Crown of Castile.  The Crónica 
Latina relates: 
 ‘Audita morte fratris…Regina domina Berengaria misit nuncios suos, viros 
nobiles et potentes…ad regem Legionis…dare ipsi filio maiori regnum patris sui…’428 
 Berenguela freely conceded the crown to her son, Fernando, as he was next in 
line to the Castilian throne.  As Fernando was the Leonese Infante, as well as being heir 
to the throne of Castile, this démarche represented the best hope for peace between the 
two kingdoms.  In 1197, King Alfonso IX of León and Queen Berenguela of Castile had 
married in the desire to produce heirs who could reunite the quarrelling kingdoms of 
León and Castile.  The intention on both sides was that eventually, the offspring of this 
relationship would reign the two kingdoms under one throne, and that peace would 
ensue as a result. 
 However, Berenguela retained a political role once she had ceded the Castilian 
throne to her son, Fernando.  Martin observes that Berenguela played a decisive role in 
her son’s accession to the Castilian throne in 1217.429    She preserved her status as 
Queen of Castile, assuring her an ongoing role in Castilian government.  Indeed, from 
the date of his accession until the death of his mother, King Fernando III executed the 
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majority of his policy decisions with her consent and acquiescence.  Hence, Martin 
argues, that far from being a retreat for Berenguela, the accession negotiations in 1217, 
assured: firstly, the permanence of the Castilian royal line; secondly, the necessary 
preliminaries for the reunification of Castile and León under one Crown; and finally, it 
allowed Queen Berenguela to reign in a consultative capacity – to ‘regner sans regner’, 
to use Martin’s phrase.430   
 Against this context of gradual rapprochement between Castile and León, 
Alfonso IX of León, and King Fernando III and Queen Berenguela for Castile, agreed a 
truce.  This was to last for one year, and it was signed on 26 November 1217.
431
  The 
Leonese monarch, as the senior ruler in Christian Iberia in the early thirteenth century, 
held superior power in the Peninsula; Fernando III had only recently acceded to the 
throne of Castile.  At this time, Alfonso IX of León pursued a policy of détente with 
Castile, being unwilling to attack his own son. 
 Under this truce, King Fernando III of Castile and Queen Berenguela were to 
secure the castles of the Leonese king, with all their surrounding territory, and they 
promised not to capture them openly or by stealth.  In a reciprocal measure, the King of 
León promised the Castilian monarch that he would not attack Castilian castles, either 
overtly or covertly.  Hence, if a vassal of one of the parties should seize a castle in the 
frontier region, or otherwise commit a crime, and failed to make amends, then the felon 
was to relinquish the castle to the Leonese monarch. 
 Stringent measures were included to prevent noble interference.  In particular, 
the magnate Don Álvaro de Lara was prevented from becoming a vassal of the Castilian 
monarch or his mother, Berenguela, should he continue his policy of  allying himself to 
the Leonese monarch.  This was necessary because Don Álvaro had appealed to King 
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Alfonso IX for auxilium following King Fernando’s accession to the Castilian throne.432  
Hence, this clause effectively curtailed noble ambition that might threaten the fragile 
Castilian monarchy.   
 In the same vein, the treaty also went further than its twelfth-century forebears in 
providing for conflict resolution.  As there are no recorded incidents of disputes after its 
implementation, it can be said to be more successful than its prototypes of the previous 
century.  Hence, the treaty stipulates: 
 ‘Si vero aliquis de regno Legionis vel de regno Castelle aliquam rapinam vel 
pignoram fecerit homini de altero regno, et emmendare noluerit usque ad triginta 
dies…sin autem eiciatur de regno pro inimico de ambobus regnis et integrant 
querelosum de suo avere.’433 
 At this time, just after the accession of King Fernando III of Castile (1217), the 
Lara clan was still engaging in rebellions against the crown.   Moreover, they were still 
seeking auxilium from the Leonese monarch, King Alfonso IX.
434
  However, as the 
chronicles demonstrate, Alfonso was reluctant to attack his son, even though he was 
intent on disinheriting him from the throne of Leon.  The truce of 1217 had expired at 
Easter, so warfare was theoretically once again legitimate. 
The Treaty of Toro II (26 August 1218) was an attempt to further bolster cross-
border security.
435
  This Peace was preceded by a preliminary agreement in which 
Alfonso IX promised mutual auxilium to Castile against all enemies (contra omnes), 
except against the Almohads, with whom the Castilians already had truces.   
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 The parties to the treaty were King Alfonso IX of León and his son, Fernando III 
of Castile, as well as his mother, Queen Berenguela.  For the first time in a generation, 
the Leonese held the superior position in negotiations between Castile and León.  To 
ensure that peace was actually maintained, as agreed in the treaty, both sides refused to 
shelter or grant military assistance to nobles who sought refuge in the other party’s 
kingdom, or to take counsel from them.  This measure was primarily aimed at Gonzalo 
and Fernando Núñez de Lara, who were exiled from the Kingdom of León until 
Christmas 1218, with the threat of forcible expulsion if they attempted to enter the 
realm.
436
    This clause effectively curtailed the dissenting noble faction in Castile that 
remained from Enrique’s reign, namely the belligerent Lara family, who had so plagued 
Berenguela’s regency. 
 At this time in the early thirteenth century, León was in the ascendant, following 
the death of King Alfonso VIII of Castile, in 1214.  Fernando III of Castile had only 
recently acceded to the Castilian throne.  Against a background of peaceful relations 
with Castile, Alfonso IX concentrated his forces in the west of the Peninsula, against 
Portugal. 
 However, both monarchs came to terms.  Alfonso IX agreed a peace and 
friendship treaty with King Afonso II of Portugal, the Treaty of Boronal (13 June 
1219).
437
  Both parties swore mutual assistance against all comers, except the Almohads, 
with whom the Portuguese already had truces.  This effectively prevented the Leonese 
from concluding their own truces with the Almohads without Portuguese consent. 
 In order to provide for Leonese security, the men of Portugal were obliged to 
swear allegiance to the King of León.  To ensure mutual security, once the Portuguese 
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truce with the Muslims had expired, neither party could make a new truce without the 
agreement of the other.  Thirdly, if the Leonese king wanted to forge a truce with the 
Muslims whilst his treaty with the Portuguese king was still valid, then the new treaty 
would not supersede the treaty that he already had with the Portuguese monarch.   
 Compliance with the Treaty of Boronal was rigorous, and this may be why it can 
be judged to be successful in maintaining peaceful Leonese – Portuguese relations.  
Both parties were obliged to swear in good faith and without malicious intent to 
faithfully uphold the truces.  In this way, peace was created, and the treaty was upheld, 
creating a mutual alliance between León and Portugal.      
 In the person of King Fernando III, the Castilian and Leonese crowns were 
reunited for the first time since the division of the Empire in 1157.  The Leonese 
succession was threatened because the Infante’s father, Alfonso IX, was opposed to his 
inheriting the crown.  Alfonso IX had been attempting to disinherit him since 1217, 
when Fernando inherited the Castilian crown.  Alfonso’s aim was to maintain the 
separation of the kingdoms.  This was at odds with Castilian foreign policy, which 
aimed to reunite the two kingdoms.  The only means of doing this was to establish heirs 
in opposition to Fernando.  Thus, Alfonso turned to the children of his first marriage, by 
Teresa of Portugal.  Teresa’s offspring were older than Fernando, and therefore they had 
a prior claim by virtue of seniority, although Fernando was Alfonso’s only male heir.     
King Alfonso IX of León (d. 24 September 1230) intended that his kingdom 
should devolve onto his two daughters, the Infantas, Sancha and Dulce, rather than on 
his son, who had become Fernando III of Castile in 1217.  Once again, it was Queen 
Berenguela, Fernando’s mother, who apprised him of his legitimate inheritance.  Lucas 
of Tuy relates how the bishop and citizens of the city of León sent messengers to King 
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Fernando requesting that he take possession of the city.
438
  González observes that the 
prelates of the realm of León, the Leonese magnates, and the concejos (municipalities), 
all declared in favour of King Fernando.
439
 
 Queen Berenguela acted to reach an initial agreement with doña Teresa of 
Portugal, King Alfonso’s first wife, who was the mother of the two Infantas.440  This 
was a significant diplomatic coup, considering that both Infantas had a substantial 
following and possessed many castles in the Kingdom of León.  According to the terms 
of Alfonso’s Will, they were the legitimate heirs to the Kingdom of León.441   
 The Treaty of Benavente (11 December 1230) was a peace agreed between King 
Fernando III and his sisters, Sancha and Dulce.
442
  Fernando retained the political 
advantage by reserving the regalian rights of justice, coinage and military service.  
However the aim of the treaty was to provide for the maintenance of Fernando’s sisters, 
by allocating them an annual income of thirty thousand morabetinos each, to be raised 
from specified towns and rents.  If either sister died or married, her share would revert 
to the Leonese Crown.  In return, the princesses renounced all claims to the Leonese 
throne that had been ‘promised’ to them by their late father, Alfonso IX: 
 ‘…et resignant iuri regni Legionensis, si quod habebant vel habere se 
contendebant, et abrenuntiant omnibus privilegiis sue cartis ab illustri Aldefonsi rege 
patre suo bone memorie sibi factis super donation seu concessione regni.’443 
 As usual, the security of the kingdom largely depended on the possession of 
castles, which controlled their surrounding territory.  Therefore, under the treaty, both 
Infantas agreed to concede to Fernando all their castles, except those guaranteeing the 
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present treaty.  The tenants holding these castles were to swear homage to Fernando and 
the Infantas, and become their vassals, as guarantees that both sides would adhere to the 
agreement.  The sanctions incurred for transgressing the treaty included being branded 
‘perjurors and traitors’: 
 ‘Et fideles debent castra recipere per portarium infantum et facere eis 
homagium…Similiter, fideles debent esse vassalli domini regis et infantum, et facere 
ipsi et eis homagium…sin autem sint alevosi et traditores.’444 
Also, Fernando promised to protect his sisters and their property.  According to 
Bianchini, the Treaty of Benavente achieved more than merely dissolving Sancha’s and 
Dulce’s claim to the Leonese Crown.445  Several of the castles that formed part of the 
treaty’s guarantee had been granted to the Infantas by Alfonso IX.  The treaty 
effectively appropriated these fortresses from the Infantas’s direct control.  This was 
achieved by transferring them to tenants who were vassals of both the Crown and the 
Infantas.  Hence, this legal manoeuvre effectively brought the castles back under direct 
royal authority.  More significantly, it    consolidated Leonese-Castilian control in 
Galicia and along the Leonese-Portuguese frontier.  In return, Fernando III and Queen 
Berenguela granted the Infantas properties and rents in Asturias, more distant from their 
supporters in Portugal.  These were crucial steps in widening King Fernando’s power 
base in the west of the Kingdom of Leon.        
 The knights whose castles were the subject of the Treaty of Benavente were to 
be regarded as ‘natural lords’ of the King of Leon, and were obliged to serve his 
Kingdom.  This reference to ‘natural lords’ is significant because it is the first time that 
nobles are identified as belonging to a specific territory.  Moreover, it represents the 
alignment of the Leonese nobility with their new monarch, Fernando III, who had 
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already been crowned king of Castile some twelve years earlier.  The reunification of 
the crowns of Castile and León, which had been separated at the divisio imperii of 1157, 
was complete. 
Conclusion: 
 During the reign of Emperor Alfonso VII, Castilian-Leonese diplomacy was 
principally aimed at achieving hegemony over rival Christian Iberian powers, namely, 
Aragón, Portugal and Navarre.  This was necessary to accomplish internal peace and 
stability.  However, it was also essential to achieve domestic peace in order to be able to 
successfully prosecute the Reconquista against the Almoravid and Almohad regimes of 
al-Andalus. 
 Castile dominated Christian Iberia in the later twelfth century, although there 
was a temporary lapse during the minority of Alfonso VIII, when León invaded Castile.  
Castilian supremacy was evident both politically and militarily during the era of the 
‘cinco reinos’, and was demonstrated in such episodes as the siege of Cuenca and the 
Curia of Carrión.  In diplomatic terms, the greatest achievement of this epoch was the 
enduring alliance between Castile and Aragón, manifested in repeated partition treaties.  
These two kingdoms consistently subjugated Navarre on the basis of ancestral claims 
dating back to the eleventh century.   
 León, the other central kingdom in Christian Iberia, was weak both internally 
and externally during this period.  This was due to the frontier dispute with Castile in 
the Tierra de Campos, where there were repeated conflagrations, focused on the 
disputed border established by Alfonso VII.  This problem could only be resolved by a 
mutually acceptable diplomatic solution, where both sides had a stake in the outcome.  
This was achieved by the marriage between King Alfonso IX of León and the daughter 
of King Alfonso VIII of Castile, doña Berenguela. 
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 Peace between Castile and León was finally achieved in the thirteenth century 
by successive treaties between the two powers.  Whereas in the 1100s a temporary 
cessation of hostilities had been agreed by halting raiding into enemy territory, in the 
1200s both kingdoms agreed reciprocal, cross-border initiatives to counter noble 
ambitions.  These included the performance of homage by nobles to the ruler of the 
opposite kingdom for castles that they held in the latter’s territory.  Such radical 
proposals appear to have been largely successful, as there are no recorded incidents of 
violence I Castile and León in the thirteenth century.  In this sense, the year 1200 was a 
watershed in peacemaking attempts between Castile and León, and in wider political 
relations between the two kingdoms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 This thesis is the first work to systematically analyse the Iberian peace treaties in 
English.  Moreover, it is pioneering to the extent that it places them in the context of 
Spanish history of the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries.  It is novel insofar as it 
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assesses their geopolitical significance, i.e. the degree to which they altered the ensuing 
course of events in Christian Iberia. 
 Christian rivalry during the Imperial era led to competing territorial claims, 
especially in the frontier regions of La Rioja, Galicia and Extremadura.  Peacemaking 
was necessary to counteract the secessionist tendencies of an increasingly autonomous 
Portugal.  This led to the landmark Treaty of Túy (1137), which came to serve as a 
prototype for later peace treaties elsewhere in the Peninsula.  Subsequently, the Empire 
was obliged to contain events on its eastern frontier, where the newly-constituted Crown 
of Aragón – consisting of a union of Aragón with Catalonia under the rule of Count 
Ramon Berenguer IV of Barcelona – was contesting ancient claims to its former ally, 
namely Navarre.  Three successive peace treaties, Carrión (1140/1), Tudején (1151) and 
Lerida (1156), partitioned Navarre between the two powers, but on each occasion, the 
Empire retained overlordship, guaranteed by its military superiority.  Menéndez Pidal 
and Ubieto Arteta both examine this state-of-affairs from opposite perspectives, but my 
study is the first to analyse the role of peace treaties in subduing a resergent Navarre. 
 This tendency towards fragmentation was exacerbated by the partition of the 
core Iberian kingdoms, Castile and León, which before the divisio imperii had 
constituted the Empire.  After the Emperor’s death in 1157, these twin kingdoms 
contested the border zone of the Tierra de Campos.  Moreover, as Menéndez Pidal 
argues, the partition led to the fragmentation of the peripheral kingdoms, known as the 
‘cinco reinos’.  Now, it was a question of survival, as Aragón, Portugal and Navarre 
pursued their own foreign policy agendas, as I make clear in Chapter 2. 
 The numerous Castilian-Aragonese alliance treaties examined in my thesis attest 
to the enduring partnership between the two former rivals.  Together they partitioned 
Navarre and the Levante on several occasions.   Initially, the Empire, and later a 
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separate Castile under the rule of King Alfonso VIII  was the superior party in the 
relationship, but after the joint siege of Cuenca in 1177, Aragón was released from its 
bond of vassalage, and was free to capture Islamic territory without acknowledging 
Castilian suzerainty.  No other historian deals with this alliance.  
 In Navarre, too, both allies attempted to partition a kingdom in which they had 
long-standing territorial interests.  However, c. 1200, it was Castile, and not Aragón, 
which held dominance over the Pyrenean kingdom of Navarre.  This analysis runs 
contrary to Linehan’s view that Aragón dominated the thirteenth century.446  Indeed, it 
is evident from the treaties of Cázola (1179), Calatayud (1198) and Guadalajara (1208) 
that King Alfonso VIII of Castile exploited his diplomatic manoeuvres vis-à-vis Aragón 
and Navarre to aggrandize his own kingdom of Castile, which then enjoyed hegemony 
over Christian Iberia.  This was largely achieved by a forming a Castilian-Aragonese 
coalition, which could be used to intimidate Navarre.  No other historian has argued this 
case, and consequently this is a novel contribution to the current scholarship.       
 The Castilian-Leonese tension in the Tierra de Campos was the subject of 
several peace treaties in the 1180s, notably those of Medina de Ríoseco (1181) and 
Fresno-Lavandera (1183).  The root cause of the dispute was the failure of both sides to 
respect the border demarcation of the divisio imperii, as established in the will of 
Emperor Alfonso VII.  Both sides raided each other’s territory, thus endangering a 
fragile peace.  Castile, in particular, instigated   repeated conflagrations on the basis that 
it was recovering lost territory, allegedly seized by León during the civil war of Alfonso 
VIII’s minority.  This analysis is novel to the extent that it supercedes González’s 
argument by examining the role of the peace treaties in attempting to halt the violence 
and create a durable peace.   
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 Where traditional diplomacy failed, marriage alliances could prove very 
effective.  This was because both sides had a stake in the outcome.  León, in particular, 
was very adept at utilising this form of diplomacy, outside official channels of 
communication.  Both kings Fernando II and Alfonso IX had wed Portuguese brides as 
their first wives.  However, it was the celebrated union of King Alfonso IX and Queen 
Berenguela which eventually overcame the Castilian-Leonese impasse, despite the 
opposition of the Papacy.  The Leonese monarch assigned thirty castles to his wife in a 
grant of arras.  As many of these castles were in the frontier zone of the Tierra de 
Campos, they held the key to the surrounding territory.  This was achieved through the 
Treaty of Palencia (1199).  Bianchini alludes to the issue of lordship under Queen 
Berenguela, but she does not explicitly confront the political and military consequences 
of this démarche.     
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix - Catalogue of Treaties 
 
1.  Treaty of Túy.  4 July 1137.   
M.S.:  No surviving manuscript. 
Ptd.:  (1)  Escalona, ed., Historia, app. 3, 527-28.  Copy. 
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          (2)  Colección diplomática del Monasterio de Sahagún (857-1300), ed. 
J.A. Fernández Flórez (León, 1991), Vol. 4, doc. 1263.  Copy. 
Pledge and covenant of friendship and fidelity between Emperor Alfonso VII 
and the Portuguese Infante Afonso Henríquez, whereby the Infante assured the 
Emperor of the latter’s personal liberty and territorial security. 
 
2. Treaty of Carrión.  22 February 1140/1.   
M.S.:   (1) Archivo de la Catedral de [A.C.] Jaca, 4, 5, 34.  Presumed copy.   
(2) F. Miquel Rosell, ed., Liber Feudorum Maior [LFM], 2 vols 
(Barcelona, 1945-47), vol. 1, fols. 15b-6b. Copy. 
  
Ptd.:  (1) Miquel Rosell, ed., LFM,vol. 1, 37-38.   
(2) P. de Bofarull, Colección de documentos inéditos del archivo de la 
Corona de Aragón (col. doc. ined. ACA) (Barcelona, 1849), vol. 4, 64-5. 
(3)  Zurita, Anales de la Corona de Aragón (1660), vol. 1, fol. 59v. 
 Covenant and concord between Alfonso VII and Ramon Berenguer IV, Count of  
Barcelona, partitioning Navarre, and under which the Aragonese ruler pledged to 
perform homage to the Emperor, thus acknowledging the latter’s suzerainty. 
 
3. Treaty of Tudején. 27 January 1151.   
M.S.:  Miquel Rosell, LFM, vol. 1, fols. 16b-17d.  Copy.   
Ptd.:  P. de Bofarull, Col. Doc. ined. ACA, (Barcelona, 1849), vol. 4, 168-174. 
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Peace, covenant and perpetual concord between Emperor Alfonso VII and his 
son, Sancho, and Count Ramon Berenguer IV of Barcelona, partitioning the 
whole of the Levante between the two powers. 
 
4. Treaty of Lérida.  May 1156.   
M.S.:  LFM, Vol. 1, fol. 18a-b.  Copy. 
Ptd.:  P.de Bofarull, col. doc. ined. ACA, vol. 4, 239-41. 
 
Covenant and concord between Emperor Alfonso VII and his sons, Sancho and 
Fernando, and Count Ramon Berenguer IV of Barcelona partitioning Navarre 
and reserving Castilian-Leonese suzerainty over their one-thirds share. 
 
5. Treaty between Emperor Alfonso VII and Commune of Genoa.  September 1146.   
M.S.:  No surviving manuscript. 
Ptd.:  (1) Codice Diplomatico della Repubblica di Genova [CDG], ed. C. 
Imperiale di Sant’ Angelo, I (Rome, 1936), in Fonti per la Storia d’ Italia [FSI], 
Vol. 77, doc. 166.  Copy. 
 (2) I libri iurium della repubblica de Genova [L.I.], eds. D. Puncuh, A. 
Rovere, S. Dellacasa, E. Madia, M. Bibliolini and E. Pallavicino, 9 vols (Rome, 
1992-2002), vol. 1/6, no. 932, 3-6. Copy. 
Treaty of alliance between the Emperor and Genoa guaranteeing the Commune a 
commercial quarter in return for military assistance. 
 
6. Treaty between Commune of Genoa and Emperor Alfonso VII.  September 1146.   
M.S.:  No surviving manuscript. 
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Ptd.:  (1) CDG, doc. 167 in FSI, vol. 77.  Copy. 
 (2) LI, vol. 1/6, no. 933, 6-7.  Copy.   
Treaty of alliance between the Commune and the Emperor specifying Genoese 
obligations: to besiege Almería by sea, to protect the city from Muslim attack, 
and to respect the lordship of Emperor Alfonso VII.   
 
7. Treaty of Nágima.  February 1158.   
M.S.:  Barcelona, ACA – LFM, fols. 18b- 19a.  Original.   
Ptd.:  (1)  España Sagrada [E.S.], ed. H. Flórez (Madrid, 1765), vol. 42, 375. 
 (2)  LFM, ed. Miquel, vol. 1, no. 31, 43-45. 
 (3) Bofarull, col. doc. ined. ACA, vol. 4, 245-47. 
 
Treaty of concord between King Sancho III of Castile and Count Ramon 
Berenguer IV of Barcelona.   
 
8. Treaty of Sahagún.  23 May 1158.   
M.S.: (1) Madrid, Archivo Histórico Nacional [AHN], R-100. Provenance of 
Monastery of Sahagún.  Copy of 12
th
  Century. 
(2)  Archivo Histórico Diocesano [AHD] de Palencia. Copy of 12
th
 century. 
(3) Madrid, AHN, R-8.  Provenance of Catedral de Toledo.  Contemporary copy. 
(4) Liber Privilegiorum Toletanae Ecclesiae, Vol. 1, fol. 60.  Copy. 
(5) Madrid, Biblioteca Nacional [BN], MS. 705, fol. 21v – 23r.  17th Century 
copy of Palencia manuscript. 
Ptd.:  Escalona, ed., Historia, 540-41, from Palencia copy. 
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Peace and friendship treaty between King Sancho III of Castile and King 
Fernando II of León partitioning Portugal, Extremadura and the remainder of al-
Andalus.   
 
9. Truce of Fitero.  October 1167.   
M.S.:  London, British Library [BL], Cotton MS. Julius A. XI, fols. 90-95.  
Copy.  
Ptd.: Gesta Regis Henrici Secundi Benedicti abbatis, ed. W. Stubbs, 2 vols 
(Rolls Series [R.S.], 1867).   
 
Truce between King Alfonso VIII of Castile and King Sancho VI of Navarre to 
last for a term of ten years in their dispute over La Rioja region. 
 
 
10. Treaty of Zaragoza.  July 1170.   
M.S.:   Barcelona, ACA, LFM, fols. 19a-20a.  Copy. 
Ptd.: Miquel, ed., LFM, vol.1, no. 32, 45-47. 
   
Friendship, concord and peace treaty between King Alfonso VIII of Castile and King 
Alfonso II of Aragón, who agreed to forge an alliance with the aim of providing mutual 
military assistance in the event of one of the allies becoming involved in a war. 
11.  Treaty of Nájera-Logroño I.  25 August 1176.   
M.S.: BL, Cotton MS. Julius A. XI, fol. 89. 
Ptd.:  (1)  Roger de Hoveden, Chronica, edn. Scriptores Angliae, 562.   
 (2) T. Rymer, Foedera et Conventiones, vol. 1, 43-44. 
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 (3) Stubbs, Gesta Regis Henrici, 139. 
 
Pact and covenant between King Alfonso VIII of Castile and King Sancho VI of 
Navarre with aim of referring their territorial dispute to arbitration by Henry II 
of England, and to establish the parameters of the forthcoming litigation. 
12.  Petitions of Alfonso VIII of Castile submitted at London arbitration.  1177.   
M.S.: BL, Cotton MS JuliusA. XI, fols. 89-97.  Copy.   
Ptd.: (1) Rymer, Foedera, vol. 1, 46. 
 (2) Stubbs, Gesta Regis Henrici, 138-54. 
 
Petition to request restitution of Castilian territory in La Rioja which Alfonso 
VIII claimed he had legitimately inherited from his ancestors, and which had 
allegedly been seized by the Navarrese monarch during Alfonso’s minority,  
 
13.  Petitions of Sancho VI of Navarre submitted at London arbitration.  1177.   
M.S.: BL, Cotton MS, Julius A. XI, fols. 89-97.  Copy.   
Ptd.: (1) Rymer, Foedera, vol.1, 47. 
 (2) Stubbs, Gesta Regis Henrici. 
 
Petition to restore Navarrese territory inherited from Sancho IV el de Peñalen, 
which belonged to the kingdom of Navarre and which had been unjustly seized 
by the Castilian monarch. 
 
14.  Treaty of Siege of Cuenca.  August 1177.   
169 
 
 
M.S.: Barcelona, ACA – LFM, fol. 21.  Copy.   
Ptd.: Miquel, LFM, vol. 1, no. 33, 47-48. 
 
Peace treaty between King Alfonso VIII of Castile and King Alfonso II of 
Aragón, agreed during joint siege of Cuenca by both parties, in which Castilian 
monarch released the Aragonese leader of his bond of vassalage in return for 
providing military assistance. 
 
 
15. Treaty of Cázola.  20 March 1179.   
M.S.: (1) Barcelona, ACA, doc. 268.  Copy. 
  (2)  Barcelona, LFM, fol. 22.  Copy. 
  (3) Madrid, AHN, Liber Privilegiorum Toletanae Ecclesiae, vol. 2, fol. 
152.  Copy of 1239. 
  
 Ptd.: Miquel, LFM, vol. 1, no. 35, 49-51. 
  
 Partition treaty agreed between King Alfonso VIII of Castile and King Alfonso 
II of Aragón, by which the Aragonese ruler was to capture all the territory of the 
Levante as far south as Alicante, and the remainder of al-Andalus was reserved for the 
Castilian leader. 
16.  Treaty of Nájera-Logroño II.  15 April 1179.   
M.S.: (1) Madrid, Biblioteca de la Academia de Historia.  Colección Velázquez 
cartulary.  Copy. 
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(2) Archivo Monasterio de Silos, MS. 13, fols. 201-7. 18
th
 Century Copy. 
 Ptd.: Moret, Anales, Bk. 19, chap. 7, trans. 
Friendship and concord pact between Alfonso VIII of Castile and Sancho VI of 
Navarre agreed with the aim of stabilising the frontier between the two 
kingdoms. 
 
17.  Treaty of Medina de Ríoseco.  21 March 1181.   
M.S.: AC Santiago de Compostela Tumbo B, fol. 28v ff.  Copy.   
Ptd.: López Ferreiro, Historia de la Catedral de Santiago, vol. 4, 145-53. 
 
Peace, concord and friendship treaty between King Fernando II of León and 
King Alfonso VIII of Castile in which both sides agreed to recognise the divisio 
imperii. 
 
18. Treaty of Fresno-Lavandera.  1 June 1183.   
(1) Madrid, AHN, Catedral de Ávila.  R-5.  Copy. 
 (2) AC Santiago Tumbo B, fol. 208v.  Copy. 
 Ptd.:  J. González, Regesta de Fernando II (Madrid, 1943). 
 Peace treaty aimed at halting violence between Castile and León, in which both 
sides contested the border Tierra de Campos zone. 
19. Treaty of Agreda.   21 June 1186.   
M.S.: Barcelona, ACA, Perg. Alfonso I, no. 402.  Copy.   
 Ptd.: G. Cirot, ‘Appendices’, Bulletin Hispanique [B. Hispan.] (1918), 154-55. 
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Pact between King Alfonso VIII of Castile and King Alfonso II of Aragón, 
renewing peace between the two allies. 
 
20. Treaty of Berdejo.  5 October 1186.   
M.S.: Barcelona, ACA, Perg. Alfonso I, no. 431.  Original.  
Ptd.:  Cirot, ‘Appendices’, B. Hispan., vol. 20, 150-54. 
 
Contract of peace, concord and friendship between King Alfonso VIII of Castile 
and King Alfonso II of Aragón and their successors. 
 
21. Treaty of Sauguillo.  30 September 1187.   
M.S.: Barcelona, ACA, no. 460, vol. 3, fol. 180.  Armorio 17 de Aragón.  Sach.  
S. Engracia, no. 125.  Copy. 
Ptd.:  Cirot, ‘Appendices’, B. Hispan., 20 (1918), 155-56. 
 
Treaty of friendship between Alfonso VIII of Castile and Alfonso II of Aragón.   
 
22.  Treaty of Seligenstadt.  23 April 1188.   
M.S.: (1) AC Cuenca, caj. 1, leg. 2, doc. 17.  Lead seal of Alfonso VIII.  
Original. 
 (2)  AC Burgos, vol. 17, no. 434.  Seal lost.  Original. 
 (3) Madrid, Biblioteca de la Academia de Historia, Colección Conde de Mora, 
vol.3.  Copy of Cuenca original. 
` (4) Biblioteca Colombina, MS. 82-4-23, fol. 76.  17
th
 Century copy of Burgos 
original. 
(5) BN, MS. 13071, fol. 162v – 167v.  Copy of Cuenca version. 
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 (6) Bib. Colombina, MS. 83-3-29.  18
th
 Century of Cuenca original. 
 (7) Madrid, AHN.  Estado, leg. 3190, no. 3, fol. 52r-56r.  Copy of Morales of 
Cuenca original. 
 (8) Madrid, Bib. Acad. Historia, Colección Abella, vol. 93.  18
th
 Century original. 
   (9) AC Burgos, Vol. 71 of Cartulary of 13
th
 Century, no. 116.  Copy of original 
Burgos version. 
 (11) Bib. Colombina, MS. 85-5-11, s.f.  17
th
 Century copy of Burgos original. 
 (12) Madrid, BN, MS. 720, 215ff.  Copy of Burgos original. 
  
 Ptd.: (1) Pertz, Monumenta Germaniae Historia [MGH], Leges, vol. 2 (1837). 
          (2) L. Weiland, in MGH, Legum sectio 4, Constitutiones et acta publica 
imperatorum et regum, vol. 1 (1893), no. 319, 452-57. 
  (3) P. Rassow, De Prinzgemahl (1950). 
 Contract of dynastic marriage alliance between Conrad III of Germany and the 
Castilian Infanta, doña Berenguela, specifying the arrangements for the 
Castilian inheritance. 
 
23. Treaty of Huesca.  May 1191.   
M.S.: Barcelona, ACA.  Copy. 
Ptd.: Cirot, ‘Appendices à la Chronique latine des rois de Castille’, B. Hispan., 
vol. 20 (1918) 156-57.  
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Covenant between King Alfonso II of Aragón, King Sancho of Portugal and 
King Alfonso IX of León to ally together in the form of a league, to provide 
mutual military assistance against their common enemy, King Alfonso VIII of 
Castile. 
 
24. Treaty of Tordehumos.  20 April 1194.   
M.S.: Monastery of Las Huelgas, Burgos, leg. 1, no. 1.  Original.   
Ptd.:  (1)  Amancio Rodríguez, Las Huelgas, vol. 2, 325-27. 
 (2)  González, Alfonso VIII, vol. 3, Doc. 622. 
 
Peace treaty between King Alfonso VIII of Castile and King Alfonso IX of León, 
dictated by Cardinal Gregory de Sant’ Angelo, with the intention of restoring 
peace to the two kingdoms, and to eliminate the climate of distrust and hostility 
between them, so as to more effectively combat al-Andalus. 
 
 
 
25. Treaty of Calatayud.  20 May 1198.   
M.S.: Madrid, AHN, Liber Privilegiorum Ecclesiae Toletanae, MS. 1242, fol. 
33v – 34 v.  Copy.   
Ptd.: J. González, El Reino de Castilla en la época de Alfonso VIII, 3 vols 
(Madrid, 1960), vol. 3, doc. 667, 179-86. 
 
Peace, concord and friendship convention between King Alfonso VIII of Castile 
and King Pedro II of Aragón specifying the partition of Navarre and the 
provision of mutual assistance to achieve this aim. 
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26. Treaty of Palencia.  8 December 1199.  
M.S.: (1) Archivo del monasterio de Las Huelgas, Burgos, leg. 1, no. 2.  
Original. 
  (2) Madrid, BN, MS. 13.064, fol. 140.  Notarial copy of 1671. 
  
 Ptd.: Amancio Rodríguez, Las Huelgas, vol. 2, 327. 
 Prenuptial agreement between King Alfonso IX of León and his wife, Queen 
Berenguela, granting her thirty castles as a gift of arras, many of which, being in 
the Tierra de Campos, held the key to the security of the frontier zone. 
 
 
27. Treaty of Cabreros.  26 March 1206.  
M.S.: (1) AC León, no. 27.  Original, although much deteriorated in last part. 
  (2)  Barcelona, ACA.  Copy. 
  
 Ptd.: (1) Risco, E.S. vol. 36, app. 62. 
  (2) Cirot, ‘Appendices’, B. Hispan., vol. 20 (1918), 172-80. 
 Peace treaty between King Alfonso VIII of Castile and King Alfonso IX of León, 
and their respective heirs, Berenguela and the Infante, Fernando, agreed with the 
intention of re-establishing the Leonese royal succession through the settlement 
of castles on Fernando. 
 
28. Treaty of Guadalajara.  20 October 1207.   
M.S.: Barcelona, ACA, armorio 20 de negocios entre Reyes, no. 269, of Pedro II.  
Copy.   
Ptd.: Cirot, ‘Appendices’, B. Hispan., vol. 20 (1918), 180-84. 
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Peace treaty between King Alfonso VIII of Castile and Sancho VI of Navarre 
agreed to finally settle the territorial dispute between the two neighbours. 
 
29. Treaty of Valladolid.  27 June 1209.   
M.S.: AC León, no. 30.  Original.  Chirographed ABC, superior part; lost its 3 
seals. 
   
Ptd.: Risco, E.S., vol. 37, app. 65. 
Peace between King Alfonso VIII of Castile and King Alfonso IX of León 
agreed at the instigation of the Papacy in order to achieve the unity necessary to 
combat Islamic al-Andalus. 
 
30. Truce of Coimbra.  11 November 1212.   
M.S.: AC León, no. 597.  Copy.   
Ptd.: L.G. Azevedo, R. H. Lisboa (1921), 137. 
 
Truce agreed between King Alfonso VIII of Castile and King Alfonso IX of 
León, and King Afonso II of Portugal, following the battle of Las Navas de 
Tolosa, and Castile’s consequent military dominance over the Iberian Peninsula. 
 
 
 
31. Treaty of Toro I.  12 August 1216.   
M.S.: Rome, Archivio Segreto Vaticano [ASV], Regesta de Honorius III, Bk. 1, 
fol. 14.  Copy. 
Ptd.: (1) Serrano, Don Mauricio, app. 3. 
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 (2) Gorosterratzu, Don Rodrigo, 420-21. 
 
Peace treaty between King Alfonso IX of León and King Enrique I of Castile, 
who as a minor, was the junior partner in the Castilian-Leonese relationship. 
 
32. Truce between Alfonso IX of León, and King Fernando III of Castile and Queen 
Berenguela.  26 November 1217.  No location given.  Copy.   
M.S.: AC León, no. 627, treaty divided by ABC chirograph.  
Ptd.: González, Alfonso IX, 2 vols (Madrid, 1944), vol. 2. 
 
Truce between the Kingdoms of León and Castile to last for a term of one year, 
during which King Alfonso IX pursued a policy of détente with Fernando III. 
 
33. Treaty of Toro II.  26 August 1218.   
M.S.: AC León, no. 469.  Copy.   
Ptd.: González, Alfonso IX, vol. 2, 
Pact between King Alfonso IX of León and his son, King Fernando III of Castile, 
designed to ensure cross-border security and mutual assistance against all 
enemies. 
 
34. Treaty of Boronal.  13 June 1219.   
M.S.: AC León, no. 25.  Original.   
Ptd.: Azevedo, Rev. H. Lisboa (1921), 139. 
 Peace treaty between King Alfonso IX of León and King Afonso II of Portugal 
in which both parties swore mutual assistance against all enemies, except the 
Almohad Caliphate, with whom the Portuguese already had truces. 
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35. Treaty of Benavente.  11 December 1230.   
M.S.: Rome, ASV, Regesta de Gregory IX, vol. 15, fol. 141, no. 161.  Copy.   
Ptd.: L. Serrano, El Cancíller de Fernando III, 29. 
 
Provision of maintenance for the two Leonese Infantas, Sancha and Dulce, by 
allocating them a fixed annual income, in return for them relinquishing their 
claims to the Leonese throne that had been promised to them by their father, 
King Alfonso IX in his will. 
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